APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court.
This case involves the question whether a court of equity can be called upon the decree the specific performance of a contract, wherein the defendant, in consideration of receiving a license to use certain patents belonging to the plaintiff during the life of such patents, agrees never to import, manufacture or sell any machines or devices covered by certain other patents, unless permitted in writing so to do, nor to dispute or contest the validity of such patents or plaintiff's title thereto, and further to aid and morally assist the plaintiff in maintaining public respect for and preventing infringements upon the same; and further agrees that if, after the termination of his license, he shall continue to make, sell or use any machine or part thereof containing such patented inventions the plaintiff shall have the right to treat him as an infringer, and to sue out an injunction against him without notice.
There are other covenants in this contract which show that the plaintiff intended to reserve to itself a large supervision and control of the defendant's business; for example, in the second clause, wherein the defendant agrees to maintain a place of business in Chicago, keep on hand a stock of bicycles, and advertise his business by occupying and paying for one page space continuously, during the term of his license, in a certain periodical published in Boston, and in other publications of general circulation; and to advertise that it is licensed by the plaintiff. By the sixth clause he agrees to sell bicycles at retail, and not to sell to any person except upon terms and prices satisfactory to the plaintiff, and as shall first be submitted to and approved by it; and shall not have or sell to any agent in any other place than Chicago, nor pay nor allow freight beyond Chicago, nor any bonus, rebate, allowance or commission on sales. By the seventh clause he agrees to stamp the word "patented" on each machine, together with the dates of the patents under which each of the machines is made or sold, according to a list furnished by the plaintiff.
It is rarely that this court is called upon to consider so unique a contract, and we have found some difficulty in assigning to it its proper place among legal obligations. Its requirement is not merely that the licensee shall refrain during the terms of his license from infringing other patents than those which he is expressly authorized to use, but shall forever afterwards, at least during the life of such patents, refrain from importing, making or selling articles covered by them, and from disputing the validity thereof or plaintiff's title thereto, and shall afford his moral aid and assistance in securing proper aid and respect for such patents. The exact nature and amount of moral suasion the licensee is bound to exert in behalf of the plaintiff is not specified, but is apparently left to be determined by the circumstances of the case.
(1) Ordinarily the law leaves to parties the right to make such contracts as they please, demanding, however, that they shall not require either party to do an illegal thing, and that they shall not be against public policy or in restraint of trade. It is argued with much earnestness here that this contract is open to the last objection, as an attempt to fetter the defendant from importing or making bicycles, in which he might otherwise have a perfect right to deal, and thus foreclose himself from the ability to earn an honest living in his chosen calling. It is scarcely necessary to say that, without this contract, the defendant would have no right to manufacture or sell bicycles covered by valid patents of the plaintiff, so that the contract is not needed for the protection of the plaintiff to this extent. The real question is whether the defendant can estop himself from disputing patents which may be wholly void, or to which the plaintiff may have no shadow of title. It is impossible to define with accuracy what is meant by that public policy for an interference and violation of which a contract may be declared invalid. It may be understood in general that contracts which are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the time fall within the ban. The standard of such policy is not absolutely invariable or fixed, since contracts which at one stage of our civilization may seem to conflict with public interests, at a more advanced stage are
treated as legal and binding. In certain cases a man may doubtless agree that he will interpose no defence to a specified claim, and that another may take judgment against him without notice. This is a matter of every-day occurrence in connection with what are termed judgment notes. But if one should agree for a valuable consideration that he would set up no defence to any action which another might bring against him and such other person might enter up judgment against him in any such action without notice, we think that no court would hesitate to pronounce such an agreement invalid. There are certain fundamental rights which no man can barter away, such, for instance, as his right to life and personal freedom, and, in criminal cases, the right to be tried by a jury of his peers. Courts have even gone so far as to say that a man cannot consent to be tried by a jury of less than twelve men, whatever may be the circumstances under which the twelfth man is taken from the panel. Cooley's Cons. Lims. 319. We are reluctant to say that a right to defend a whole class of unjust claims may not be one of these. It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly; and it is a serious question whether public policy permits a man to barter away beforehand his right to defend unjust actions or classes of actions, though, in an individual case, he may doubtless assent that a judgment be rendered against him, even without notice.
The reports are not entirely barren of authority upon this subject. Thus in Crane v. French, 38 Mississippi, 503, 530, 532, it was held that though a party may omit to take advantage of a right, such as the right to plead the statute of limitations, secured to him by law, be could not bind himself by contract not to avail himself of such right if it be secured to him on grounds of public policy. "But there appears to be," says the court, "a clear distinction between declining to take advantage of a privilege which the law allows to a party, and binding himself by contract that he will not avail himself of a right which the law has allowed to him on grounds of public
policy. A man may decline to set up the defence of usury, or the statute of limitations, or failure of consideration, to an action on a promissory note. But it would scarcely be contended that a stipulation inserted in such a note, that he would never set up such a defence, would debar him of the defence if he thought fit to make it. . . . Suppose, then, an agreement made by the maker of a notice that he would not set up the defence of usury. Would an action lie for a breach of that agreement, in case the party should make the defence in disregard of it? It appears not, and the reason is, that the right to make the defence is not only a private right to the individual, but it is founded on public policy which is promoted by his making the defence, and contravened by his refusal to make it. . . . With regard to all such matters of public policy, it would seem that no man can bind himself by estoppel not to assert a right which the law gives him on reasons of public policy." There are cases wherein it is held that a promise not to plead the statute of limitations is a good bar, but they are those wherein the promise was made after the cause of action had accrued, and where it was considered by the court as a new promise. There are a few cases, however, which hold that an agreement not to plead the statute, made upon the instrument, or at the time of its execution, may be pleaded as an estoppel. So in Stoutenburg v. Lybrand, 13 Ohio St. 228, it was held that a contract which provides that a defendant in a proceeding for divorce shall make no defence thereto, is against public policy, and therefore void. "The tendency of such agreements," said the court, "is to mislead the court in the administration of justice, and injuriously affect public interests." A like ruling was made in Sayles v. Sayles, 1 ...