decided: April 9, 1900.
BISHOP IRON COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
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MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The testimony is not preserved in the record and no question can arise upon the findings of fact, for they are simply to the effect that the plaintiff had the legal title to an undivided 13/25 and the leasehold right from the legal holders of the remaining 12/25, and that the defendant was in possession without any color of title or right to the lands, so that the only questions which can be considered are those which arise upon the demurrers to the amended cross petition.
Upon the facts disclosed in that cross petition we remark that as the contest in reference to this tract was pending before the land department for nine years and carried on with exceeding vigor, as shown by the record of the frequent motions, applications and so forth on the part of the respective parties, it would seem impossible to believe that the department was not fully advised of the facts respecting the locations and entries. We are not called upon to determine
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whether every step in this protracted controversy was carried on with technical accuracy in the matter of procedure, and it may be, as counsel contend, that upon some of the motions and in some of the contests testimony was received which was not pertinent to that particular phase of the controversy, but it is quite evident that in one form or another, on some motion or another, in some stage of the proceedings, all the facts and claims of either party were fully presented, considered and determined by the department. This is not a case on error, in which the regularity of every step taken in the land department is to be considered and determined and upon that inquiry judgment entered, affirming or reversing its decision, but it is an independent suit in the courts in which the inquiry is whether the parties to the proceedings in the land department had full and proper notice of those proceedings, whether the department heard the claims and evidence offered by each party, and then whether upon the facts as found by it there was any error in matter of law in its decision. It may be remarked in passing that there is no allegation of corruption or perjury, or any of the grounds upon which sometimes a court of equity will set aside the conclusion of another tribunal even where the proceedings are regular in form. And as it is evident from the showing made in the cross petition that both parties were often and fully heard and no limitation placed upon their right to offer testimony, we must accept as conclusive the findings of fact made by the department, and inquire simply whether the law was properly adjudged.
Coming now to the merits of the controversy, the defendant, the cross petitioner, made a single application to enter 160 acres, one quarter of which is the tract in controversy. There were not two separate applications, one to enter the 40 and another the remaining 120 acres, and it cannot now be treated as though there were two. If the applicant was guilty of any violation of law such violation vitiated the proceeding in toto. This is not like Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U.S. 457, in which an entry of two tracts was sought, one of which was not at the disposal of the United States by reason of its being within a swamp land grant to the State, and it was held that the validity of the
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entry as to the other was not affected thereby. In that case there was no wrong on the part of the entryman. He had acted in good faith, had not attempted any fraud, or to do anything in disregard of the mandates of the statutes, either in letter or spirit, and obviously the land department erred in canceling the entire entry by reason of its covering land not subject to disposal. Here there was a distinct violation of law on the part of the entryman, and one which vitiated the application as a whole. The Revised Statutes, sec. 2262 require a preemption applicant to make affidavit "that he has not directly or indirectly made any agreement or contract, in any way or manner, with any person whatsoever, by which the title which he might acquire from the Government of the United States should inure in whole or in part to the benefit of any person except himself," and also provide that "if any person taking such oath swears falsely in the premises, he shall forfeit the money which he may have paid for such land, and all right and title to the same." It was this statute which the land department found the applicant had violated, in that he was seeking to enter a portion of the land, not solely for his own benefit, but also in part for the benefit of others. It would be a gross perversion of the spirit of this statute to permit a party who has made a single application to enter a tract of land to ignore its unity after it has been proved that he has made a contract in defiance of the statute in reference to half the land, and have it divided into two separate and independent applications, and then his application sustained and his title confirmed as to that part of the land in respect to which he had made no contract. Such a construction would enable an applicant without any risk to speculate on the chances of escaping detection in his effort to violate the statute and thwart the purposes of Congress in the disposal of public lands.
No one can read the testimony which was offered before the land officers without perceiving that there was sufficient in it to justify a finding that the applicant had made a contract in direct violation of the statutory provisions. It is true he himself testified that he was to secure Mr. White "on a one half interest," but the contract itself was not produced, having in some way disappeared, and McDonald, who was a party to it
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(for it was a joint contract between White, the applicant, and McDonald,) testified that Mr. White, paying expenses, did so under an agreement that he was to have half of the land. We do not stop to inquire whether an agreement to give a mortgage for money advanced comes within the letter or spirit of the statute, for there was enough in the testimony to justify the conclusion of the department that it was a contract to divide the land when obtained, and it is not the province of the courts to review such finding of fact.
These are the only questions which we deem of importance, and finding no error in the record the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is
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