CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the facts of this case, the District Court and Court of
Appeals were agreed in the opinion that neither under terms of the treaty of 1832 with Russia nor upon principles of international comity could the relator be delivered over to the master of the Variag as a deserter.
In committing him to the Philadelphia County Prison, the commissioner acted in pursuance of Rev. Stat. Sec. 5280, which provides as follows: "SEC. 5280. On application of a consul or vice-consul of any foreign government having a treaty with the United States stipulating for the restoration of seamen deserting, made in writing, stating that the person therein named has deserted from a vessel of any such government, while in any port of the United States, and on proof by the exhibition of the register of the vessel, ship's roll, or other official document, that the person named belonged, at the time of desertion, to the crew of such vessel, it shall be the duty of any court, judge, commissioner of any Circuit Court, justice, or other magistrate, having competent power, to issue warrants to cause such person to be arrested for examination." The procedure is then set forth.
The facts were, in substance, that Alexandroff entered the Russian naval service as a conscript, in 1896, at the age of seventeen, and was assigned to the duties of an assistant physician. Some time in October, 1899, an officer and a detail of fifty-three men, among whom was Alexandroff, were sent from Russia to Philadelphia to take possession of and man the Variag, then under construction by the firm of Cramp & Sons, in that city. The Variag was still upon the stocks when the men arrived in Philadelphia. She was, however, launched in October or November, 1899, and at the time Alexandroff deserted was lying in the stream still under construction, not yet having been accepted by the Russian government. Alexandroff left Philadelphia without leave April 20, 1899, went to New York, and there renounced his allegiance to the Emperor of Russia, declaring his intentions of becoming a citizen of the United States. He was subsequently arrested upon the written request of the Russian vice-consul, and on June 1, 1900, was committed upon a mittimus stating that he had been charged with desertion from the Imperial Russian crusier Variag, upon the complaint of the
captain, in accordance with the terms of the treaty between the United States and Russia.
The vice-consul, who prosecutes this appeal on behalf of the Russian government, relies chiefly upon Art. IX of the treaty of December, 1832, which reads as follows (8 Stat. 444): "The said Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Commercial Agents are authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities, for the search, arrest, detention and imprisonment of the deserters from the ships of war and merchant vessels of their country. For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges and officers, and shall in writing demand said deserters, proving by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls of the crews, or by other official documents, that such individuals formed part of the crews; and, this reclamation being thus substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused." Sections VIII and IX of the treaty, which cover the whole subject of deserting seamen, are reproduced in the margin.*fn1
While desertion is not a crime provided for by any of our numerous extradition treaties with foreign nations, the arrest and return to their ships of deserting seamen is no novelty either in treaties, legislation or general international jurisprudence. The ninth article of the treaty with the government of France, entered into November 14, 1788, before the adoption of the Constitution, contained a stipulation that "the Consuls and Vice-Consuls may cause to be arrested the captains, officers, mariners, sailors and all other persons, being part of the crews of the vessels of their respective nations, who shall have deserted from the said vessels, in order to send them back and transport them out of the country," specifying the procedure. 8 Stat. 106, 112. The same provision was contained in subsequent treaties with France, of June 24, 1822, and February 23, 1853, and it was to carry these and similar treaties into effect that the act of 1829, reproduced in Rev. Stat. sec. 5280, was adopted. Similar conventions were entered into with Brazil in 1828, Mexico in 1831, Chili in 1832, Greece in 1837, Bolivia in 1858, Austria in 1870, Belgium in 1880, and at different times with some seventeen or eighteen other powers, and finally by a special treaty with Great Britain, ratified June 3, 1892. In short, it may be said that with the exception of China, the Argentine Republic, and possibly a few others, there is not a maritime nation in the world with which we have not entered into a convention for the arrest and delivery over of deserting seamen. The multitude of these conventions is such as to indicate a pressing necessity that masters of vessels should have some recourse to local laws to prevent their being entirely stripped of their crews in foreign ports.
A like provision for the arrest and delivery over of seamen deserting from domestic vessels, adopted by the first Congress
in 1790, 1 Stat. 131, 134, was sustained by this court in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, and remained upon the statute books for over a hundred years, when it was finally repealed in 1898. 30 Stat. 755, 764.
We are cited to no case holding that courts have the power, in the absence of treaty stipulations, to order the arrest and return of seamen deserting from foreign ships; and it would appear there was no such power in this country, inasmuch as sec. 5280, under which the commissioner is bound to proceed, limits his jurisdiction to applications by a consul or vice-consul of a foreign government "having a treaty with the United States" for that purpose.
In Moore on Extradition, (sec. 408,) it is laid down as a general proposition that, in the absence of a treaty, the surrender of deserting seamen cannot be granted by the authorities of the United States; and an opinion of Attorney General Cushing, (6 Op. 148,) is cited upon that point. There is also another to the same effect. (6 Op. 209.) It is believed that in all the instances which arose between the United States and Great Britain prior to the treaty of 1892 for the reclamation of deserting seamen, both powers have taken the position that in the absence of a treaty there can be no reclamation. Several instances of this kind are cited by Mr. Moore in his treatise.
In the case of the United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, it was held that, apart from the provisions of treaties upon the subject, there was no well-defined obligation on the part of one country to deliver up fugitives from justice to another, "and though such delivery was often made, it was upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the government whose action was invoked, and it has never been recognized as among those obligations of one government towards another which rest upon established principles of international law."
The only case in our reports even indirectly considering such a case as one of international comity is that of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116. This was a libel for possession promoted by the former owners of the Exchange, who alleged that she had been seized under the orders of Napoleon and in violation of the law of nations; that no decree of condemnation had been pronounced
against her, but that she remained the property of the libellants.
The district attorney filed a suggestion to the effect that the vessel, whose name had been changed, belonged to the Emperor of the French, and while actually employed in his service was compelled, by stress of weather, to enter the port of Philadelphia for repairs; that if the vessel had ever belonged to the libellants, their title was divested according to the decrees and laws of France in such case provided. The District Judge dismissed the libel upon the ground that a public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign in amity with our government is not subject to the ordinary judicial tribunals of our country, so far as regards the question of title, by which such sovereign holds the vessel.
On appeal, this court, through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, held that the decree of the District Court should be affirmed; that the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation." He divided these cases into three classes:
1. The exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention in a foreign country.
2. The immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers.
3. Where the sovereign allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.
In respect to this last class he observed: "In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which it was
applicable, and would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require."
In this connection he held that there was a distinction between a military force which could only enter a foreign territory by permission of the sovereign, and a public armed vessel, which upon principles of international comity is entitled to enter the ports of any foreign country with which her own country is at peace. He further observed: "If there be no prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all powers with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports, and to remain in them while allowed to remain under the protection of the government of the place." It was upon this ground that the court held the Exchange exempt from seizure.
This case, however, only holds that the public armed vessels of a foreign nation may, upon principles of comity, enter our harbors with the presumed license of the government, and while there are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local courts; and, by parity of reasoning, that, if foreign troops are permitted to enter, or cross our territory, they are still subject to the control of their officers and exempt from local jurisdiction.
The case, however, is not authority for the proposition that, if the crews of such vessels, or the members of such military force, actually desert and scatter themselves through the country, their officers are, in the absence of treaty stipulation, authorized to call upon the local authorities for their reclamation. While we have no doubt that, under the case above cited, the foreign officer may exercise his accustomed authority for the maintenance of discipline, and perhaps arrest a deserter dum fervet opus, and to that extent this country waives its jurisdiction over the foreign crew or command, yet if a member of that crew actually escapes from the custody of his officers, he
commits no crime against the local government, and it is a grave question whether the local courts can be called upon to enforce what is in reality the law of a foreign sovereign. The principle of comity may imply the surrender of jurisdiction over a foreign force within our territory, but it does not necessarily imply the assumption by our courts of a new jurisdiction, invoked by a foreign power, for the arrest of persons who have committed no offence against our laws, and are perhaps seeking to become citizens of our country. Our attention has been called to no such case. But, however this may be, there can be no doubt that the commissioner, in exercising the powers vested in him by Rev. Stat. sec. 2580, is limited to the arrest of seamen belonging to a country with whom we have a treaty upon that subject.
Instances are by no means rare where foreign troops have been permitted to enter or cross our territory, although in September, 1790, General Washington, on the advice of Mr. Adams, did refuse to permit British troops to march through the territory of the United States from Detroit to the Mississippi, apparently for the reason that the object of such movement was an attack on New Orleans and the Spanish possessions on the Mississippi. The Government might well refuse the passage of foreign troops for the purpose of making an attack upon a power with which we were at peace.
In January, 1862, the Secretary of State gave permission to the British government to land a body of troops at Portland, and to transport them to Canada, the St. Lawrence being closed at that season of the year. The concession was the more significant from the fact that it occurred during our civil war, when our relations with Great Britain were considerably strained, and the object was evidently to strengthen the British garrisons in Canada.
In 1875, permission was granted ot the Governor General of Canada to transport through the territory of the United States certain supplies for the use of the Canadian mounted police force.
In 1876, the President permitted Mexico to land in Texas a small body of her troops, supposed to be intended to aid in the
defence of Matamoras, with the proviso that the stay be not unnecessarily long, and that the Mexican government should be liable for any injury inflicted by these troops.
By a reciprocity of courtesy, permission was given in 1881 by the Governor General of Canada for the passage of a company of Buffalo militia, armed and equipped, over the Canada Southern Railway, from Buffalo to Detroit. These and other instances are collected by Dr. Wharton in his Digest of International Law, section 13.
Our attention is also called by counsel to the following instances:
At the Columbian celebration in 1893 marines from every foreign war vessel, except the Spanish, were allowed to land and did land and parade in the public streets of New York under the control of their various commanders.
On the occasion of the Dewey parade, a regiment of Canadian troops was given permission to come into the United States and join in the procession.
This permission was granted as in the present case by the Secretary of the Treasury.
At the Buffalo Exposition, but recently closed, Mexican troops were allowed to go through the United States and be present at Buffalo, and remain there during the exposition.
In none of these cases, however, did a question arise with respect to the immunity of foreign troops from the territorial jurisdiction, or the power of their officers over them, or the right of the latter to call upon the local officers for the arrest of deserters. While no act of Congress authorizes the executive department to permit the introduction of foreign troops, the power to give such permission without legislative assent was probably assumed to exist from the authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the United States. It may be doubted, however, whether such power could be extended to the apprehension of deserters in the absence of positive legislation to that effect.
If the arrest of Alexandroff were wholly without authority of law, we should not feel it our duty to detain him and deliver him up to the custody of Captain Behr, notwithstanding we
might be of opinion that he had unlawfully escaped from his custody. If Captain Behr by the escape of Alexandroff lost the right to call upon the local authorities for his arrest and surrender, the acquired no new right in that particular by the fact that he was illegally arrested and is still in custody. His detention upon the ground of comity could only be justified by the fact that his original arrest was legal, although if his arrest were authorized by law, the fact that such arrest was irregular might be condoned.
But whatever view might be taken of the question of delivering over foreign seamen in the absence of a treaty, we are of opinion that the treaty with Russia, having contained a convention upon this subject, this convention must alone be looked to in determining the rights of the Russian authorities to the reclamation of the relator. Where the signatory powers have themselves fixed the terms upon which deserting seamen shall be surrendered, we have no right to enlarge those powers upon the principles of comity so as to embrace cases not contemplated by the treaty. Upon general principles applicable to the construction of written instruments, the enumeration of certain powers with respect to a particular subject matter is a negation of all other analogous powers with respect to the same subject matter. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506; Endlich on Stats. secs. 397, 400. As observed by Lord Denham in Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Ad. & El. (N.S.) 671, 684, "where parties have entered into written engagements with express stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable to extend them by any implications; the presumption is that, having expressed some, they have expressed all the conditions by which they intend to be bound under that instrument." The rule is curtly stated in the familiar legal maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In several recent cases in this court we have held that, where a statute gives a certain remedy for usurious interest paid, that remedy is exclusive, although in the absence of such a remedy the defence might be made by way of set off or credit upon the original demand. Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U.S. 555; Driesbach v. National Bank, 104 U.S. 52; Stephens v. Monongahela Bank, 111 U.S. 197; Haseltine v. Central National Bank,
ante, 130.) See also King v. Sedgley, 2 Barn. Ad. 65; Hare v. Horton, 5 Ibid. 715; Stafford v. Ingersoll, 3 Hill, 38.
We think, then, that the rights of the parties must be determined by the treaty, but that this particular convention being operative upon both powers and intended for their mutual protection, should be interpreted in a spirit of uberrima fides, and in a manner to carry out its manifest purpose. Taylor on International Law, sec. 383. As treaties are solemn engagements entered into between independent nations for the common advancement of their interests and the interests of civilization, and as their main object is not only to avoid war and secure a lasting and perpetual peace, but to promote a friendly feeling between the people of the two countries, they should be interpreted in that broad and liberal spirit which is calculated to make for the existence of a perpetual amity, so far as it can be done without the sacrifice of individual rights or those principles of personal liberty which lie at the foundation of our jurisprudence. It is said by Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries (vol. 1, p. 174): "Treaties of every kind are to receive a fair and liberal interpretation according to the intention of the contracting parties, and are to be kept with the most scrupulous good faith. Their meaning is to be ascertained by the same rules of construction and course of reasoning which we apply to the interpretation of private contracts."
What, then, are the stipulations to which we must look for the solution of the question involved in this case? They are found in the ninth article of the treaty, which authorizes the arrest and surrender of "deserters from the ships of war and merchant vessels of their country." It is insisted, however, that this article is no proper foundation for the arrest of Alexandroff for three reasons: First, that the Variag was not a Russian ship of war; second, that Alexandroff was not a deserter from such ship; and, third, that his membership of such crew was not proven by the exhibition of registers of vessels, the rolls of the crew, or by other official documents. The case depends upon the answers to these questions.
1. At the time Alexandroff arrived in Philadelphia, the Variag was still upon the stocks. Whatever be the proper construction
of the word under the treaty, she was not then a ship in the ordinary sense of the term, but shortly thereafter and long before Alexandroff deserted, she was launched, and thereby became a ship in its legal sense. A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron -- an ordinary piece of personal property -- as distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject only to mechanics' liens created by state law and enforceable in the state courts. In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own; becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for her obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, and be sued in her own name. Her owner's agents may not be her agents, and her agents may not be her owner's agents. The China, 7 Wall. 53; Thorp v. Hammond, 12 Wall. 408; Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552; The Little Charles, 1 Brock. 347, 354; The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 120; Homer Ramsdell Co. v. Comp. Gen. Trans., 182 U.S. 406. She is capable, too, of committing a tort, and is responsible in damages therefor. She may also become a quasi bankrupts; may be sold for the payment of her debts, and thereby receive a complete discharge from all prior liens, with liberty to begin a new life, contract further obligations, and perhaps be subjected to a second sale. We have had frequent occasion to notice the distinction between a vessel before and after she is launched. In The Jefferson, People's Ferry Company v. Beers, 20 How. 393, it was held that the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to cases where a line was claimed for work done and materials used in the construction of a vessel; while the cases holding that for repairs or alterations, supplies or materials, furnished after she is launched, suit may be brought in a court of admiralty, are too numerous for citation.
So sharply is the line drawn between a vessel upon the stocks and a vessel in the water, that the former can never be made liable in admiralty, either in rem against herself or in personam against her owners, upon contracts or for torts, while if, in taking
the water during the process of launching, she escapes from the control of those about her, shoots across the stream and injures another vessel, she is liable to a suit in rem for damages. The Blenheim, 2 W. Rob. 421; The Vianna, Swab. 405; The Andalusian, 2 P.D. 231; The Glengarry, 2 P.D. 235; The George Roper, 8 P.D. 119; Baker v. Power, 14 Fed. Rep. 483.
Inasmuch as the Variag had been launched and was lying in the stream at the time of Alexandroff's desertion, we think she was a ship within the meaning of the treaty.
It requires no argument to show that if she were a ship of any description, she was a ship of war as distinguished from a merchant vessel. Article IX of the treaty embraces deserters from both classes of vessels. She was clearly not a merchant vessel, and as clearly intended to be and was a ship of war, notwithstanding she had not received her armament. The contract with the Cramps under which she was built was entered into by the Russian Ministry of Marine, and provided for the construction by them for the Russian Imperial Government of "a protected cruiser, built, equipped, armed and fitted," etc. The ...