"In the absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,' the language of the statute itself 'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 92 L. Ed. 2d 483, 106 S. Ct. 3116 (1986) (citation omitted). Here, the amended statute plainly provides that the new definition of "reside" applies to all of the venue provisions found in chapter 87 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Nothing in the statute or its legislative history states that Congress intended to exempt Section 1400(b) from the force of this amendment. Although nothing in the legislative history, on the other hand, states that Congress recognized that its amendment to Section 1391(c) would overturn Fourco and its progeny, Congress is presumed to legislate with knowledge of judicial precedent. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40, 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978). "Where . . . Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law." Id. at 581. Therefore, in the absence of any clear legislative statement to the contrary, the Court cannot conclude that Congress was unaware of, and thus did not intend, the effect its amendment of Section 1391(c) would have upon the definition of corporate residence in Section 1400(b).
Defendant argues that Congress could not have intended to incorporate the definition of residency in Section 1391(c) into Section 1400(b) because this would render the second test for venue in Section 1400(b) superfluous.
This argument is not well-taken. The amendment to Section 1391(c) only redefines residence for corporate defendants; the second test in Section 1400(b) is still relevant for non-corporate defendants.
Defendant also argues that Congress' sole intent in enacting the amendment to Section 1391(c) was to clarify the issue of venue for a corporation in a state with multiple judicial districts.
While the second sentence of Section 1391(c) does show that Congress amended Section 1391(c) with that intent, this argument does not account for Congress' decision to recast the provision in its entirety and begin the first sentence with the phrase, "for purposes of venue under this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
Finally, defendant relies on Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153, 48 L. Ed. 2d 540, 96 S. Ct. 1989 (1976), for the proposition that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not subsumed by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized area. As the court observed in Century Wrecker Corp., however, Radzanower did not address a situation, as in the case at bar, in which the later enacted statute directly incorporates the earlier statute. See Century Wrecker Corp., supra, slip op. at 8. Thus, Radzanower, which involved statutes codified in two separate titles of the United States Code, does not apply.
Reading Section 1400(b) in conjunction with Section 1391(c), as the Court concludes that it should, venue in this case is proper in any district in which defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Defendant does not dispute that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss or alternatively to transfer is DENIED.
Dated: April 12, 1990