would provide for unsound policy, are ill-rooted in Jackson and cannot have been what the Ninth Circuit intended.
Counsels' position would provide for unsound policy because it fails to take into account the kinds of jurisprudential constraints recognized elsewhere in Batiste and in the related case law. See, e.g., Batiste, 868 F.2d at 1092 ("ultimate responsibility for the effective working of the adversary system rests with the trial judge;" noting relevance of time constraints in trial court's exercise of discretion in granting evidentiary hearings) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules (a)); United States v. Garcia, 272 F.Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Taken to its logical extreme, counsels' position would require a court to hear evidence on nothing more than counsel's assertion of the categorical right to a hearing. Not so much as even an allegation of coercion would be necessary in order to secure a hearing. Instead, counsel could commence witness questioning without even first identifying which factual issues were in dispute and satisfying the court that the issues were material and the disputes genuine. Concomitantly, a court would be required to hear such testimony without first having sufficient information even to determine the proper scope of questioning. Moreover, defense counsel's objection would trigger the right to a hearing whenever asserted -- whether before, during or even after trial. Read in a vacuum, untempered by common sense and jurisprudential principles of sound court administration, this is precisely what counsels' interpretation of the dicta in Batiste's footnote 5 would signify.
Of course, such a situation would be as ridiculous as it would be intolerable. Notwithstanding those aspects of this subject as to which counsel and the Court might disagree, nobody would dispute the need for court supervision of witness examination or for the imposition of reasonable deadlines beyond which rights are deemed waived. These are judicially-imposed requirements rooted in the necessity for sound court administration. Similarly, the requirement that defendants support their motions for evidentiary hearings with adequate indicia of reliability also is rooted in the necessity for sound court administration. Since courts are expected to routinely impose such requirements, it cannot be said that constitutional rights categorically trump jurisprudential rules.
Precisely for this reason, counsels' interpretation of Batiste's characterization of Jackson cannot be correct. For neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit could ever have intended to so utterly subordinate the dictates of sound court management to those of the Constitution.
A close reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson reveals that that case did not implicate the quality of proof necessary in order to trigger the constitutional right to a hearing. Rather, the Court in Jackson concerned itself with the quality of the hearing itself. In that case, the defendant challenged a New York state statute which permitted the trial judge to delegate to the jury at the close of all evidence the task of determining a confession's voluntariness. The Court held that this procedure violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it neither "afforded a reliable determination of . . . voluntariness" nor "adequately protected the defendant's] right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession." See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377. In the context of this holding, the Supreme Court then iterated the statement on the basis of which counsel in this Court routinely seek hearings on demand:
A defendant objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964).
Neither the facts nor the arguments in Jackson implicated jurisprudential concerns. Indeed there is no indication in the Court's opinion in Jackson that the scope of any counsel's inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant's confession were at all limited by the trial judge. Accordingly, when the above-quoted statement is read in the context of the holding which it modified, it becomes patently clear that of primary importance to the Court in its Jackson opinion was the integrity and trustworthiness of evidentiary hearings, not the circumstances under which defendants are entitled to them.
It is incomprehensible that the Supreme Court in Jackson or the Ninth Circuit in Batiste could have intended to render the orderly administration of justice as thoroughly subordinate to the Constitution as counsel in this court have argued.
C. MORAN-GARCIA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
Defendant MORAN-GARCIA has failed to place before the Court any facts that would require a response by the Government. Indeed, the brief submitted by defense counsel is akin to boilerplate motions that lay no factual foundation. To the extent, however, that the moving papers do make factual assertions, the Court finds that, as the unsworn representations of counsel, the assertions are too indefinite and conjectural to require the government to respond. As a result, defendant MORAN-GARCIA's motion to suppress statements is denied.
This holding is consistent with the Court's existing policy, of which defense counsel was aware. Under these circumstances, the Court holds that it is within its discretion to deny defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, as the Court refuses to hold an evidentiary hearing when facts have not been placed adequately before it.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies, without an evidentiary hearing, defendant MORAN-GARCIA's motion to suppress statements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 15, 1991
GORDON THOMPSON, JR.
United States District Jud