repeal state common law relating to employment discrimination but rather was intended to expand and supplement such common law causes of action. Federal courts held even before that common law claims not grounded in age discrimination may stand in a wrongful termination case. Pfeifer v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 676 F. Supp. 969, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
The Rojo analysis alone would not aid plaintiff because no common law for age discrimination existed prior to FEHA. However, plaintiff's complaint for age discrimination is properly based on FEHA and his related common law contract claims are thus grounded in FEHA, not a common law age discrimination claim. Defendants' motion to dismiss the supplemental state causes of action based on FEHA preemption is denied.
b. Preemption by worker's compensation
Defendants assert that plaintiff's claims are preempted by Worker's Compensation, Cal. Labor Code § 3200 et seq, to the extent they involve physical or mental injuries arising from his termination. The second through fifth causes of action do not allege any physical or mental injury; however, the sixth and seventh causes of action allege embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish in addition to economic injury.
Defendants rely on language in a California Supreme Court case which states physical and mental injuries arising from employment termination generally are subject to the exclusive remedies of worker's compensation laws. Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 7 (1990). That case, however, did not concern post-termination injury. Id. at 14, n. 6. Nevertheless, Shoemaker did discuss situations in which termination injury may not be covered by worker's compensation. Id. at 11. Defendants' conclusory argument that all termination injuries fall under worker's compensation is not convincing. In any event, allegations of embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish do not allege injuries within the jurisdiction of worker's compensation unless they are incident to a physical injury which is not present here. Robards v. Gaylord Brothers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988).
Additionally, the sixth and seventh causes of action are not against plaintiff's employer, Jet Services West, but against the employer's parent companies, Sequa Corporation and Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corporation. Defendants hope to skirt this flaw by relying on plaintiff's boilerplate language that all defendants were agents of one another. This is not sufficient to dismiss plaintiff's claims.
Defendant's motion to dismiss based on Worker's Compensation preemption is denied as to all causes of action.
c. Inducement of breach of contract
The sixth and seventh causes of action allege inducement of breach of contract or negligent interference with contract by Sequa and Chromalloy.
Defendants argue that plaintiff, in alleging that defendants are the agents of one another, has placed the parent corporations Sequa and Chromalloy in the shoes of his employer Jet Services. Defendants offer no authority for this legal proposition, and the court can find none. Defendants then argue that in those shoes Sequa and Chromalloy could not have induced the breach of Jet's contract with plaintiff because a party to a contract cannot induce its breach. Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 24-25 (1990).
The Shoemaker case is not violated by the sixth or seventh causes of action, and defendants' motion to dismiss these two causes of action must be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: DEC 20 1991
Rudi M. Brewster
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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