("County Jail"), 850 Bryant Street, San Francisco.
22. At no point during either the processing or the transportation did any agent question Pham.
23. Pham was booked into the County Jail on June 21, 1992, at 4:41 a.m.
24. At no time on the evening of June 20, 1992, or the morning of June 21, 1992, did any law enforcement agent threaten Pham.
B. The June 22 Statement.
1. On Monday, June 22, 1992, at 1:15 p.m., Customs Service Special Agents Marc Taylor and Joycelynn Favors and DEA Task Force Agents Gil Rodriguez and Stan Baroff arrived at the County Jail to transport Pham and three of his co-defendants (the Nguyens and Tran) to the Federal Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco.
2. These four co-defendants were scheduled to be arraigned before Magistrate Judge Wayne D. Brazil on June 22, 1992, at 1:30 p.m.
3. The travel time from the County Jail to the Federal Building is approximately five to ten minutes by car. The procedure for releasing an inmate from the County Jail to the custody of federal agents takes approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.
4. While the agents were at the County Jail, Pham approached Agent Baroff and said that he had changed his mind, that he wanted to talk to Agent Baroff, and that he wanted to cooperate with the investigation. Pham's statement was not made in response to any question asked by Agent Baroff.
5. Agent Baroff then told Pham to wait while he informed Agent Taylor of Pham's statement.
6. After Agent Baroff told Agent Taylor what Pham had said, Agent Taylor told Pham not to say anything else until they all arrived at the Federal Building and Agent Taylor had a chance to discuss Pham's statement with the Assistant United States Attorney.
7. Agents Baroff and Favors transported Pham and co-defendant Tran to the Federal Building. Neither agent asked Pham anything about the case during the trip to the Federal Building.
8. Agents Baroff and Favors, together with Pham and Tran, arrived at the Federal Building at approximately 1:45 p.m. Agent Baroff took Pham and Tran directly to the 17th Floor, where Magistrate Judge Brazil's courtroom is located. Pham was seated outside of Magistrate Judge Brazil's courtroom, along with three of his his co-defendants (the Nguyens and Tran), Agent Taylor, and Customs Service Special Agent Joseph Pieretti.
9. Agent Taylor informed Agent Pieretti of Pham's statement to Agent Baroff at the County Jail. Agent Pieretti informed the United States Attorney's Office that Pham wished to cooperate with the investigation.
10. Several minutes after the defendants arrived outside Magistrate Judge Brazil's courtroom, Assistant United States Attorney Geoffrey Anderson emerged from that courtroom. Anderson informed Agent Pieretti that Magistrate Judge Brazil had rescheduled the arraignment of the defendants because a court interpreter was unavailable for that afternoon.
11. An interpreter, fluent in both Vietnamese and English, had appeared in Magistrate Judge Brazil's court earlier that day at 9:30 a.m., for the arraignment of co-defendant Le.
12. The agents and the United States Attorney's Office determined that Le should be arraigned at a different time than his co-defendants. The agents wanted to keep Le away from the other four defendants.
13. Due to the unavailability of an interpreter, Magistrate Judge Brazil continued the arraignment of Pham and his remaining co-defendants to the next day, June 23, 1992, at 9:30 a.m., before Magistrate Judge Claudia Wilken.
14. While outside Magistrate Judge Brazil's courtroom, Pham told Agent Pieretti that he wanted to help with the investigation; he also asked Pieretti whether his assistance would ensure his return to Vietnam. Neither of these statements was made in response to a question asked by Agent Pieretti. Agent Pieretti told Pham that he couldn't promise him anything.
15. Agent Pieretti then consulted the United States Attorney's Office. Thereafter, Agent Pieretti took Pham to the United States Attorney's Office.
16. At the United States Attorney's Office, DEA Analyst Thuy Coyne, who speaks both Vietnamese and English, read to Pham in Vietnamese the words from a waiver of rights form. This waiver of rights form included a waiver of (1) the Miranda rights and (2) the rights accorded a defendant under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including inter alia, the "right to appear immediately before a Federal Magistrate-Judge" for purposes of being arraigned.
17. When Analyst Coyne finished translating the waiver of rights, Pham said to Agent Pieretti in English that he understood the rights explained to him and that he wished to sign a written waiver of rights form.
18. At approximately 3:15 p.m., Pham executed a written waiver of rights; the form Pham signed contained exactly the same language that Analyst Coyne had translated to him in Vietnamese. Analyst Coyne signed the waiver form as a witness.
19. Following his execution of the waiver of rights form, Pham proceeded to give Agent Pieretti a statement regarding the drug smuggling operation.
20. Pham thereafter agreed to cooperate with federal authorities in the "controlled" delivery to David. On Tuesday, June 23, 1992, at 8:00 a.m. (an hour and a half before the rescheduled arraignment before Magistrate Judge Wilken), Pham and several undercover agents boarded a plane for New York City for the purpose of completing the "controlled" delivery to David.
21. Pham was indicted on June 30, 1992. He was arraigned sometime after June 23, 1992.
22. At no time on June 22, 1992, did any law enforcement agent or representative of the United States Attorney's Office threaten Pham.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A. The June 20 Statement.
1. When a criminal suspect is taken into custody, that suspect must be informed of certain rights prior to the commencement of interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
2. A suspect may waive his or her rights under Miranda, and interrogation of the suspect may proceed. The suspect's waiver, however, must be knowing and voluntary. Whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is determined according to the following tests:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979)).
3. The government bears the burden of showing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
4. The government has met its burden of showing that Pham's June 20, 1992, waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Clearly, Pham's waiver was "knowing." Pham waived his Miranda rights after Investigator Nguyen twice read the warnings in Vietnamese. The Court is satisfied that Pham waived each of his rights with "a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Pham attempts to rebut the government's showing that his waiver was "knowing" by arguing that Investigator Nguyen misinterpreted Pham's statement. Pham now claims that he told Investigator Nguyen, "I don't understand much of anything." In support of this argument, Pham points to the phonetic similarities between the verbs "know" and "understand" in Vietnamese. Investigator Nguyen held to his original translation ("I don't know much of anything") when confronted on cross-examination. The Court accepts Investigator Nguyen's testimony and rejects Pham's argument that his waiver was not "knowing."
The Court also finds that Pham's waiver was "voluntary." The words "I want to talk to you" indicate a decision based on a "free and deliberate choice." Id. There is nothing to indicate that Pham's waiver was the product of "intimidation, coercion, or deception." Id.
5. The Court also must determine whether Pham's June 20, 1992, statement (as opposed to his waiver of his Miranda rights) was voluntarily given:
Before a criminal defendant's statement can be used against him, the government must prove its voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. An inculpatory statement is voluntary only when it is the product of a rational intellect and a free will. The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne.
United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6. The government has met its burden of demonstrating that Pham's June 20, 1992, statement was made "voluntarily." The totality of the circumstances indicates that Pham's statement was "the product of a rational intellect and a free will." Id. at 1365.
B. The June 22 Statement.
1. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires an arresting officer to "take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate[.]" Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) (emphasis added).
2. For purposes of Pham's motion, the critical words in Rule 5(a) are "without unnecessary delay." Well before Miranda, the Supreme Court determined that the appropriate remedy for violations of Rule 5(a) was to suppress confessions obtained during an unnecessary delay before arraignment. This remedial rule, applicable only in federal criminal cases, is known as the McNabb-Mallory rule, taking its name from the cases that created it. United States v. Mallory, 354 U.S. 449, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943).
3. Section 3501(c) of Title 18, United States Code, addresses the narrow issue of prearraignment delay, which also is the focus of Rule 5(a) and the McNabb-Mallory rule. Under § 3501(c), a confession obtained during a prearraignment detention
shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in [arraignment]  if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and  if the weight to be given to the confession is left to the jury and  if such confession was made or given by the person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention.