Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

EMMERT v. COUNTY OF SONOMA

October 25, 1993

THOMAS F. EMMERT, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants.


Caulfield


The opinion of the court was delivered by: BARBARA A. CAULFIELD

Plaintiff Thomas Emmert brings this action for damages alleging that two Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs used excessive force in effecting his arrest. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several state law theories of recovery. This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations period. After careful consideration of the parties' written and oral arguments, defendants' motion is GRANTED.

 BACKGROUND

 On October 31, 1990, plaintiff was arrested by two Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs. Plaintiff alleges that the deputies, for no apparent reason and without probable cause, ordered a police dog to attack plaintiff, and then beat him themselves. Shortly after November 5, 1990, plaintiff entered a no contest plea to charges of battery on an officer. On April 30, 1991, plaintiff submitted a claim for damages to the County of Sonoma in accordance with the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 900-997.6 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1992). His claim was rejected on June 21, and he filed suit in the Superior Court for the County of Sonoma on December 23, 1991. The County of Sonoma timely removed the action to federal court on October 29, 1992. Defendants now move to dismiss the federal claims as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 DISCUSSION

 It is settled in the Ninth Circuit that § 1983 claims are subject to California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3) -- a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. E.g., De Anza Properties, Ltd. v. County of Santa Cruz, 936 F.2d 1084, 1085 (9th Cir. 1991). Similarly, federal courts look to state law for applicable tolling provisions. Briley v. State of Cal., 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977).

 The California Tort Claims Act is a comprehensive set of statutes governing the process for bringing tort actions against state agencies. In general, the Act requires potential plaintiffs to submit a claim for damages to the appropriate state agency before filing suit. Failure to comply with this requirement will result in the suit's dismissal, as will a failure to comply with the Act's time limitations.

 The Act contains two tolling provisions that are relevant to this motion: Cal. Gov't Code § 945.3 and § 945.6.

 Cal. Gov't Code § 945.3 provides, in part, as follows:

 
No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or other accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil action for money damages against a peace officer based upon conduct of the peace officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged, including an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges against the accused are pending before a justice, municipal, or superior court.
 
Any applicable statute of limitation for filing or prosecuting these claims shall be tolled during the period that the charges are pending before a justice, municipal, or superior court. . . .

 Cal. Gov't Code § 945.6(a) describes the amount of time a plaintiff has to bring suit in court after a state agency has denied or failed to act on a claim submitted in accordance with the filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act. Subsection (b) provides in relevant part as follows:

 
When a person is unable to commence a suit on a cause of action described in subdivision (a) within the time prescribed . . . because he has been sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison, the time limit for the commencement of such suit is extended to six months after the date that the civil right to commence such action is restored to such person . . . .

 Section 945.3's tolling provisions apply to § 1983 claims. Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1989). Mr. Emmert, however, filed his claim more than one year after he entered his plea, so his claims are timely only if the tolling provisions of ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.