113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993) ("statute's plain meaning must be enforced").
Moreover, where Congress intended to address retaliation violations, it knew how to do so and did so expressly. Plaintiff argues that Congress' omission of mixed motive retaliation claims from Section 107 was "a mere oversight." Therefore, he argues, the court should infer a right to relief under Section 107(b). The court disagrees. Subsection 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) of Title 42 -- the subsection immediately preceding Section 107(b) -- does include the retaliation provision, "section 2000e-3(a) of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (1992).
The fact that Congress expressly treated Section 2000e-3(a) violations in such close proximity to Section 107(b) demonstrates that where Congress intended to address retaliation violations, it knew how to do so and did so explicitly. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1368 n. 12 (1993); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979) ("when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly").
Finally, Plaintiff argues that to interpret Section 107 to exclude "mixed motive" retaliation claims would be inconsistent with the goals and remedial purposes of Title VII. The court disagrees. First, Congress has clearly chosen to address illegal discrimination and wrongful retaliation separately and in distinct statutory sections. Moreover, the court's interpretation is consistent with Price Waterhouse, a decision this court must assume to properly construe Title VII. As stated above, a finding that the employer would have taken the challenged employment action absent the illegitimate motive (as in the present case) is a complete defense under Price Waterhouse. See 490 U.S. at 244-45. The fact that Congress altered that holding with respect to discrimination claims only does not detract from its legitimacy with respect to retaliation claims.
In sum, a plaintiff must show a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) to qualify for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The jury found that Plaintiff failed to make that showing at trial. Hence, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
B. Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the jury's finding entitles him to attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The court rejects that argument as well.
Section 2000e-5(k) reads:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.