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June 16, 1994

SHANNON L. FORD, Plaintiff,


The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

Plaintiff Shannon L. Ford commenced the instant employment discrimination lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court on June 8, 1993, against defendants New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. ("NUMMI"), United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 2244 ("UAW"), Benjamin Rivera ("Rivera") and Robert Hendricks ("Hendricks"). On September 15, 1993, defendants removed the action to this Court on the ground that plaintiff's claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMMA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The parties are presently before the Court on plaintiff's motion to remand. After having read the papers submitted and considered the arguments of counsel, the Court denies plaintiff's motion.


 Plaintiff is an employee of defendant NUMMI and a member of the UAW. On June 8, 1993, plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint in the Superior Court of California in Alameda County. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint on August 3, 1993. She then served the amended complaint on NUMMI on August 5, 1993, on the UAW on August 11, 1993, and on defendant Rivera on August 16, 1993. *fn1"

 On September 15, 1993, defendant Rivera, joined by defendants NUMMI and UAW, removed the action to this Court. *fn2" The Notice of Removal filed by Rivera alleged that several of plaintiff's causes of action require an interpretation of the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement. (See Notice of Removal P 6.) As such, Rivera maintains that these claims are preempted by the LMRA. (Id.)

 Plaintiff now seeks to remand this case to state court on the ground that defendants' removal was untimely. Specifically, she contends that the thirty-day period for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) commenced to run on August 5, 1993, the date she effected service on NUMMI. Under plaintiff's reasoning, the thirty-day period for removal expired on September 7, 1993. Since defendant Rivera did not file his notice of removal until September 15, 1993, plaintiff argues that the removal is procedurally defective. Thus, the issue for this Court is whether the thirty-day period for removal of a case involving multiple defendants is determined by the date on which service was effected on the first-served defendant. For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes it does not.


 The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides that a defendant may remove an action to federal court on the basis of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1446, which governs the procedures for removal, provides, in part, that:

A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .

 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994). Subdivision (b) of section 1446 specifies the "notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (emphasis added). When there is more than one defendant in the action, all defendants must unanimously agree to join in the removal. Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986). *fn3" This is commonly referred to as the unanimity requirement.

 Failure to comply with the thirty-day time limitation or the unanimity requirement renders the removal procedurally defective. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1192 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural defects in removal, however, are not jurisdictional. Rather, such defects are modal or formal and may be waived. See Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 968 F.2d 18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 536, 113 S. Ct. 600 (1992); Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 560, 562 (C.D. Cal. 1988). *fn4"

 By its express terms, section 1446(b) does not address the time period for removal in actions involving staggered service of multiple defendants. Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to reach this issue, the majority of published decisions have found that in multi-defendant actions, the thirty-day time period for removal commences for all defendants when service is accomplished on the first-served defendant. Once that thirty-day window of time for removal lapses, all defendants are barred from removing the action. E.g., Brown v. Demco, 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986); Varney v. Johns-Manville Corp., 653 F. Supp. 839, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Transport Indemnity Co. v. Financial Trust Co., 339 F. Supp. 405, 407 (C.D. Cal. 1972); see also, 1A, J. Moore, B. Ringle, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice P 0.168[3.-2-1], at 586-87 (2d ed. 1987).

 Courts following the "first-served" rule generally cite the unanimity requirement as the basis for applying this rule. Brown, 792 F.2d at 481. The applicable reasoning is that "if the thirty-day limitation for removal has passed as to the first-served defendant, such defendant cannot then consent to removal. The necessary unanimity for removal is, therefore, lacking." D. Kirschner & Sons, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 805 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D. Ky. 1992). Other reasons often advanced for the first-served rule include the need to settle the forum for the lawsuit as early as possible and to prevent forum shopping by the defendant. Brown, 792 F.2d at 482. *fn5"

 This Court disagrees that the thirty-day removal period under section 1446(b) commences for all defendants on the date plaintiff initially serves the complaint. Preliminarily, there is nothing in the language or legislative history of section 1446(b) which supports the notion that the decision to remove rests exclusively with the first-served defendant. See McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Community College, 955 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1992). Section 1446(b) refers to removal by "the defendant," not "the firstserved defendant." Indeed, the first paragraph of section 1446 speaks of removal by "[a] defendant or defendants." See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1994) ...

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