also, was enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs point out that two Supreme Court cases indicate that the Rehabilitation Act was passed under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, the Supreme Court stated, "Petitioners conceded . . . that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze § 504 in light of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject unconsenting States to federal court jurisdiction." Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 244 n.4, 87 L. Ed. 2d 171, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985). Because the issue of Congressional authority was not in dispute in Scanlon, that case is not determinative of the issue. The Supreme Court noted in Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp. that "the question in Scanlon was whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, makes state agencies subject to suits for retroactive monetary relief in federal court. The Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress therefore had the power to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court." Welch, 483 U.S. 468, 472 n.2, 97 L. Ed. 2d 389, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (citing Scanlon). Welch provides further evidence that the Supreme Court considers that Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. But, this statement is dicta.
In Dep't of Educ., State of Haw. v. Katherine D., the district court held that the Rehabilitation Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 530 (D.C. Haw. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). The court based its holding on its analysis of legislative history and Congress' intent, as specifically explicated in the Act, to effectuate equal opportunity for disabled citizens. Id. The court concluded that this legislative goal is "precisely the specific legislative intent to effectuate the equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment which [the Supreme Court] recognized." Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522, 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978)).
Congress may enact legislation pursuant to more than one of its constitutional powers. See EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d at 1253. The Court finds that Congress utilized its authority under the Spending Clause and under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in enacting the Rehabilitation Act. Because the Court finds that Congressional authority for the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act arises in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize Defendants from suit.
C. Doctrine of Ex parte Young
Even if Defendants were immune under the Eleventh Amendment, their immunity would be subject to the exception of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). Ex parte Young created an exception to the principle that States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent, or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unambiguously expresses its intent to abrogate the States' immunity. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 88 L. Ed. 2d 371, 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985). Ex parte Young held that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent individual state officials from violating federal law. Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56; Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
Citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687, 93 L. Ed. 1628, 69 S. Ct. 1457 (1949) superseded in part by 5 U.S.C. § 702, Defendants argue that Young is inapplicable because Plaintiffs' claims are essentially directed against the State, not against the individuals named in the suit. In Larson, the Court explained that a suit nominally addressed to a government employee, but which actually requires relief against the government, is barred because the court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction over a suit against the government. Larson, 337 U.S. at 688. However, there are exceptions to this rule. Id. at 689. One exception is a case in which the statute conferring power on the government employee is unconstitutional, because the conduct against which relief is sought is beyond the employee's powers and is, therefore, not the conduct of the government. Id. at 690. This exception is based on the same reasoning as that relied upon in Young. "The theory of Young was that an unconstitutional statute is void, and therefore does not 'impart to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States'". Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60). By the same token, Young also held that officials do not have immunity for a continuing violation of federal law. Id.
That courts have applied the Young doctrine in cases in which inmates sue state prison officials for violations of federal law is further evidence that Larson does not apply to the case at bar. See e.g. Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied by Rowland v. Thompson, 502 U.S. 1071, 117 L. Ed. 2d 131, 112 S. Ct. 965 (1992) (holding that state officials not immune, under Young, from suits alleging constitutional violations); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 107 L. Ed. 2d 949, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990) (under Young, prison officials not immune from suit alleging violations of federal constitution and federal statutes). Here, Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief only against state officials acting in their official capacity. Under these circumstances, Larson does not apply.
Defendants also argue that, because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have detailed enforcement schemes limiting remedies against the State, they come under the exception to Ex parte Young applied by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe. In Seminole Tribe, the Court stated that ". . . where Congress has prescribed a detailed scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (the "IGRA") was the subject of the Court's inquiry in Seminole Tribe. Id. at 1119. The Court found that the IGRA provides for specific limited remedies against the State. Id. The Court reasoned that the limited statutory remedies would be superfluous if a state official could be exposed to the full remedial powers of a federal court in an action brought under Ex parte Young. Id. at 1133. The Court also reasoned that Congress' creation of the limited remedial scheme is a strong indication that it had no wish to expose States to liability under Ex parte Young. Id.
Defendants argue that, like the IGRA, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have limited remedial schemes, but Defendants do not specify what they are. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has held that "the full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and monetary damages" are available under the Rehabilitation Act. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 115 L. Ed. 2d 995, 111 S. Ct. 2825 (1991); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. at 72-73 (stating that the Rehabilitation Act provides a private litigant the full panoply of remedies). The ADA specifically incorporates the "remedies, procedures, and rights" of the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Under Ex parte Young, Defendants are not immune from this lawsuit.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: SEP 20 1996
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE