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December 23, 1996

PETE WILSON, et al., Defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: HENDERSON



 This action presents a challenge to the constitutionality of newly-enacted Article 1, section 31 of the California Constitution. This measure, which appeared on the ballot as Proposition 209, was passed by the California electorate on November 5, 1996. It provides in relevant part as follows:


The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.

 CAL. CONST. art. 1, ยง 31(a). *fn1"

 It is important to note at the outset that much of this language simply reaffirms existing anti-discrimination protections already provided by the United States and California Constitutions, and by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These laws have long-guaranteed all persons "equal protection of the law," and prohibited discrimination in employment and in any program or activity receiving federal assistance. *fn2" This aspect of Proposition 209--which creates no change in existing law--is not at issue in this case. Indeed, it could hardly be more clear that a law that merely affirms the non-discrimination principles in our Constitution is, itself, constitutional.

 It is also undisputed that the Constitution precludes voluntary, government-sponsored race and gender "preferences" except in the most limited circumstances. Thus, government entities were already barred, prior to Proposition 209, from using race-conscious "preferences," e.g. race-conscious affirmative action programs, unless they could pass the most exacting "strict scrutiny" required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this test, only those programs that are " narrowly tailored" and " necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion" perpetuated by the enacting agency are permitted. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989)(emphasis added). *fn3" Quotas are not permitted. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Gender-based programs, under existing law, are also subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. U.S. v. Virginia, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996).

 In short, Congress and the courts had already prohibited discrimination, and sharply constrained government use of race and gender preferences, long before Proposition 209 was enacted on November 5, 1996. The parties do not dispute, however, that the people of California meant to do something more than simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209. It is this "something more" that is the focus of this action.

 To be sure, the outer boundaries of this "something more" have yet to be determined. It is clear, however, that the primary change Proposition 209 makes to existing law is to close that narrow but significant window that permits the governmental race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs described above that are still permissible under the United States Constitution. Notably, defendants agreed at oral argument that Proposition 209 prohibits at least some of these constitutionally permissible programs. They also failed to identify any other programs that would be affected by Proposition 209.

 It is thus essential to keep in mind that plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to Proposition 209 is not, in fact, a facial challenge to the entire initiative. Rather, it is much narrower in scope: it is a challenge only to that slice of the initiative that now prohibits governmental entities at every level from taking voluntary action to remediate past and present discrimination through the use of constitutionally permissible race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs. *fn4"

 Plaintiffs assert that this specific aspect of Proposition 209 violates the United States Constitution on two separate grounds. First, they allege that Proposition 209, although couched in neutral terms, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee of "the right to full participation in the political life of the community." Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467, 73 L. Ed. 2d 896, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982); see also Romer v. Evans, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (" our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government in each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."). Proposition 209 violates this guarantee, they argue, because it restructures the political process in a nonneutral manner. Specifically, it erects unique political hurdles only for those seeking legislation intended to benefit women and minorities--who must now obtain a constitutional amendment--while allowing those seeking preferential legislation on any other ground unimpeded access to the political process at all levels.

 Second, plaintiffs allege that Proposition 209 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because it interferes with Congress' intent that employers be afforded the option of utilizing constitutionally permissible race- and gender-conscious affirmative action to comply with their obligations under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

 The immediate issue before the Court is whether plaintiffs *fn5" have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that defendants *fn6" should be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing or implementing Proposition 209 pending a final determination of the merits of this action. In weighing this matter, the Court is mindful that any challenge to a duly-enacted law should be met with caution and restraint. It is not for this or any other court to lightly upset the expectations of the voters. At the same time, our system of democracy teaches that the will of the people, important as it is, does not reign absolute but must be kept in harmony with our Constitution.

 Thus, the issue is not whether one judge can thwart the will of the people; rather, the issue is whether the challenged enactment complies with our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Without a doubt, federal courts have no duty more important than to protect the rights and liberties of all Americans by considering and ruling on such issues, no matter how contentious or controversial they may be. This duty is certainly undiminished where the law under consideration comes directly from the ballot box and without the benefit of the legislative process. As the Supreme Court aptly noted in another socially-charged case:


Nor does the implementation of...change through popular referendum immunize it [from constitutional scrutiny]. The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.

 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393, 21 L. Ed. 2d 616, 89 S. Ct. 557 (1969).

 It also cannot be overemphasized that this case does not call upon this Court to adjudicate whether affirmative action is right or wrong, or whether it is no longer an appropriate policy for addressing the continuing effects of past and present discrimination against racial minorities and women. Such questions, while they are most certainly of vital public policy interest, lie beyond the purview of this Court. Nor does this case implicate the ability of governmental entities to voluntarily repeal affirmative action policies, as the Regents of the University of California did earlier this year.

 Rather, the substantive issues raised by this action are considerably more narrow, albeit no less important: whether the particular method chosen by Proposition 209 to curtail affirmative action is unlawful because it either (1) violates the rights of women and minorities to fully participate in our political system or (2) interferes with Congressional goals embodied in Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

 In the discussion that follows, this Court first addresses the question of whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. The Court then turns to the appropriate standard governing plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which is followed by this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with respect to that motion, as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 65.

 Based on these Findings and Conclusions, this Court rules that:

 (1) Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.

 (2) Plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of success on their claim that Proposition 209 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee to full participation in the political life of the community.

 (3) Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claim that Proposition 209 violates the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

 (4) Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that Proposition 209 violates the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

 (5) Plaintiffs have demonstrated that a preliminary injunction is necessary to protect the plaintiff class from the possibility of irreparable injury.

 Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and enjoins defendants, pursuant to the injunction following these Findings and Conclusions, from enforcing and implementing Proposition 209 pending trial or final judgment in this action.


 A "threshold question in every federal case [is] whether the plaintiff has stated a 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Article III." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The core component of whether a case or controversy under Article III exists is the doctrine of standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). The Supreme Court has established three elements necessary to meet the Article III standing requirement. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--"the plaintiff must show that he 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury'...and the injury or threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983). Second, the injury must be a result of the challenged conduct. See, e.g. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) ("The injury has to be 'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court."). Finally, a plaintiff must show a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Id.

 Here, defendants assert that none of the plaintiffs shows an imminent threatened injury. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by article 3, section 3.5 of the California Constitution, *fn7" however, Proposition 209 is a self-executing amendment to the California Constitution that imposes an affirmative duty to comply. "In this circumstance compliance is coerced by the threat of enforcement, and the controversy is both immediate and real." Lake Carriers' Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 508, 32 L. Ed. 2d 257, 92 S. Ct. 1749 (1972).

 Plaintiffs have shown a real and immediate threat of injury. Proposition 209 is clearly applicable to statutes and programs that are currently benefiting the named plaintiffs and it is virtually certain to be enforced. The amendment was recently enacted and is not a statute that has lain dormant for years and likely to remain moribund. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989, 81 S. Ct. 1752 (1961). Further, the Governor has already made moves to employ article 1, section 31, to invalidate certain state statues in a pending civil action. Wilson v. State Personnel Board, 96- CS01082 (App. to File Mot. to Amend, Nov., 6 1996). Moreover, a conflict between the plaintiffs' interests and the challenged amendment is inevitable. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297-305, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895, 99 S. Ct. 2301 (1979) ("One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough."); cf Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505, 94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974) (a plaintiff need not first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution before challenging the constitutionality of a criminal statute).

 The constitutional injury asserted by the plaintiffs is directly connected to the actions of the defendants. See S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 618, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1973) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 67 L. Ed. 1078, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923)) ("The party who invokes judicial power must be able to show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of a statute's enforcement."). Two of the defendants, and now class representatives, the California Governor and Attorney General, are explicitly charged with the task of enforcing the laws of the state. The other defendants are governmental entities that are under a duty to apply the amendment to existing statutes, ordinances, and regulations. Plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer the alleged constitutional injury when any one of the defendants enforces the constitutional amendment.

 Finally, since the constitutional injury to the plaintiffs is allegedly caused by the enforcement of Proposition 209, plaintiffs' requested remedy, a declaration that the Proposition is unconstitutional and unenforceable, would unquestionably address the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753, n.19, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (the redressability requirement "examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested").

 By demonstrating imminent injury attributable to the actions of the defendants that will be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court, plaintiffs have met the requirements for standing under the Article III "case or controversy" clause. *fn8"


 According to Ninth Circuit precedent, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the movant. Associated General Contractors, 950 F.2d at 1410. These formulations are not different tests but rather two points on a sliding scale in which the degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success on the merits decreases. Id. In considering a request for a preliminary injunction, a court must remain mindful that such relief is aimed primarily at preserving the status quo pending trial. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980) ("fundamental principle" governing preliminary injunctive relief is the need to maintain the status quo prior to determination on the merits). Under either formulation of the test, a court, in balancing the harms, must also take into account any public interests implicated by the injunctive relief sought. Caribbean Marine Services Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

 Because the plaintiffs here allege that they suffer constitutional injury at the hands of Proposition 209, the Court must evaluate the merits of their constitutional claims before it can meaningfully address the irreparability and imminence of any harm. See Bery v. City of New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (where constitutional injury is alleged, "the two prongs of the threshold showing required for injunctive relief merge into one"), rev'd on other grounds, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).


 The following Findings of Fact are based on the preliminary record presently before the Court.

 A. Characterization of Proposition 209

 After qualifying as an initiative constitutional amendment, Proposition 209 was placed on the California general election ballot for November 5, 1996.

 Prior to the election, each registered voter received an official California Ballot Pamphlet prepared by the non-partisan California Legislative Analyst's Office ("LAO"). *fn9" This Pamphlet, which provided an official description and analysis of each statewide initiative, portrayed Proposition 209 as a measure that would eliminate race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in the public sector. *fn10" Accordingly, the California Ballot Pamphlet explained to voters that:


A YES vote on [Proposition 209] means: The elimination of those affirmative action programs for women and minorities run by the state or local governments in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education that give "preferential treatment" on the basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.


A NO vote on this measure means State and local government affirmative action programs would remain in effect to the extent they are permitted under the United States Constitution.

 Pls. Exh. 2 (emphasis in original).

 In addition to this brief summary, the Ballot Pamphlet also provided voters with a more extensive analysis of Proposition 209, which underscored that the initiative would effectively eliminate race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs. Specifically, the LAO explained Proposition 209 and its effects as follows:


Federal, state, and local governments run many programs intended to increase opportunities for various groups--including women and racial and ethnic minority groups. These programs are commonly called "affirmative action" programs....


If [Proposition 209] is approved by the voters, it could affect [the following programs]....


Public Employment and Contracting


The measure would eliminate affirmative action programs used to increase hiring and promotion opportunities for state or local government jobs, where sex, race, or ethnicity are preferential factors in hiring, promotions, training or recruitment decisions. In addition, the measure would eliminate programs that give preference to women-owned or minority-owned companies on public contracts ....


Public Schools and Community Colleges


The measure could eliminate, or cause fundamental changes to, voluntary desegregation programs run by school districts .... Examples of desegregation spending that could be affected by the measure include the special funding given to (1) "magnet" schools (in those cases where race or ethnicity are preferential factors in the admission of students to the schools), and (2) designated "racially isolated minority schools" that are located in areas with high proportions of racial or ethnic minorities....


In addition, the measure would affect a variety of public school and community college programs such as counseling, tutoring, outreach, student financial aid, and financial aid to selected school districts in those cases where the programs provide preferences to individuals or schools based on race, sex, ethnicity, or national origin....


University of California and California State University


The measure would affect admissions and other programs at the state's public universities. For example, the California State University ("CSU") uses race and ethnicity as factors in some of its admissions decisions. If this initiative is passed by the voters, it could no longer do so....

 Id. (emphasis in original). As the above reflects, the only programs identified by the LAO as potentially affected by Proposition 209 are race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs.

 The California Ballot Pamphlet also included partisan arguments submitted by proponents and opponents of the initiative. These arguments further established that the issue at stake in Proposition 209 was the continuation of public sector race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs. The Argument In Favor Statement begins by instantly focusing the reader on the issue of affirmative action:


A generation ago, we did it right. We passed civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination. But special interests hijacked the civil rights movement. Instead of equality, governments imposed quotas, preferences, and set-asides.

 Pls. Exh. 3. The next paragraph quotes the facially-neutral language of the initiative but then immediately returns to the issue of affirmative action, with a particular emphasis on race-conscious affirmative action:


"REVERSE DISCRIMINATION" BASED ON RACE OR GENDER IS PLAIN WRONG!.... Students are being rejected from public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are turned away because their RACE does not meet some 'goal" or "timetable." Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are of the preferred RACE...Proposition 209 will stop [these] terrible programs....

 Id. (emphasis in original). *fn11"

 The Argument Against Statement also focused attention on Proposition 209's impact on affirmative action programs beneficial to women and minorities. The argument warns that:


Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative action programs...that help achieve equal opportunity for women and minorities....

 and concludes by stating that Proposition 209:


poses as an equal opportunities initiative, but...[it] puts at risk every outreach program, sets back the gains made by women and puts the brakes on expanding opportunities for people in need.

 Id. (quoting General Colin Powell).

 B. Election Results and Response by Defendants

 On November 5, 1996, the voters of California enacted Proposition 209 into law, with 4,736,180 votes (54%) cast in favor of the initiative and 3,986,196 votes (46%) cast in opposition. *fn12" Because the initiative is by its terms self-executing, public entities around the State faced the immediate question of implementation. Three of the defendants in this action responded by quickly acting to implement and enforce Proposition 209. On November 6, 1996, Governor Wilson issued an Executive Order (W-136-96) requiring state agencies to promulgate implementing regulations and identify all state statutes and programs pertaining to employment, education or contracting that grant or encourage preferences based on race, sex, color, ethnicity or national original. *fn13" That same day, Attorney General Lungren instructed state agencies to comply immediately with Proposition 209 to the extent permitted by California law. *fn14" The University of California also promptly took steps to implement Proposition 209. See Dec. 6, 1996 Order at 2. *fn15" Other defendants expressed uncertainty and confusion regarding the appropriate response to the initiative. See Response of Defendant City of Pasadena to Plaintiffs' Request for Temporary Restraining Order at 2 ("Complex questions now exist about how to reconcile the competing and seemingly conflicting requirements of federal, state and local affirmative action policies. These are issues which this City cannot resolve on its own.").

 C. Effect of Proposition 209 on Affirmative Action Programs

 Any California public entity that implements Proposition 209 is required to end voluntary race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in three areas: contracting, employment, and education. We thus briefly review each of these areas in turn. *fn16"

 1. Contracting

 Race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in California in the area of public contracting have taken various forms, from requiring that prime contractors make good-faith efforts to utilize women- or minority-owned subcontractors to providing an advantage in evaluating bids. These programs are designed to address the continuing effects of past or present bias against the use of women- and minority-owned contractors on public sector projects. According to the evidence before the Court, their effect has been to provide such contractors with substantial opportunities not previously available.

 The experience of Antonio Ruiz provides one such example. Mr. Ruiz owns Ruiz Construction Company & Associates which engages in general engineering and construction work. Amended Ruiz Decl. filed in support of amicus P 2. It is Mr. Ruiz' experience that "contractors accept the bids of those contractors with whom they have established ties." Id. P 8. In 1985, Ruiz qualified to participate in the city of San Francisco's voluntary affirmative action program, which was adopted to remedy past discriminatory practices by the city in its letting of contracts. Prior to this time, Ruiz was unable to "get many large contractors to even accept [his] bids for subcontract work," and he in fact had obtained "only one contracting job with the City." PP 7-8. By participating in the City's affirmative action program, he was able to break through the old patterns of doing business and obtain subcontracts. PP 10-11. The exposure he gained led to additional business with prime contractors, and allowed him to build his business substantially and "form joint ventures to bid as a prime contractor on City contracts." PP 12-14. See also Fung Decl. P 4 (affirmative action in public contracting has reduced discrimination against Asian American contractors and made it possible for them to bid competitively for public contracts); Wu Decl. at 144-145 (affirmative action in public contracting has substantially benefitted Asian Americans); Burns Decl. P 4 (women-owned painting and wallpapering company benefitted substantially from San Francisco affirmative action contracting program); Chavez Decl. PP 3-4 (describing how affirmative action in public contracting programs allowed him to break through the "old boy network" and obtain public contracts); Larson Decl. P 16 (disparities between the availability of women- and minority-owned contractors and their use by public agencies "are noticeably reduced where government agencies implement affirmative action policies"), P 20 (after Los Angeles adopted affirmative action programs, percentage of women businesses obtaining city contracts increased from 0.3% to 8% and percentage of minority businesses obtaining city contracts increased from 2% to 11.8%).

 The record further demonstrates that implementation of Proposition 209 would substantially reduce opportunities in public contracting for women and minorities. Larson Decl. P 17 (discussing studies showing that race or gender neutral programs designed to address under utilization of minority and women contractors were generally ineffective), P 21; Chavez Decl. P 5 (estimating that absent affirmative action program "his firm would lose up to 50 to 75% of" its public contracting work); Leonard Decl. P 15 (discussing a study finding "not only a stagnation but a reversal of advances" for African-Americans under "weak" affirmative action programs).

 2. Employment

 Race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in California in the area of public employment generally allow an employer to consider the ethnicity or gender of an otherwise qualified applicant as one of many factors. Some programs may also utilize hiring goals. Such programs are typically designed to address the continuing effects of past or present bias against the hiring and/or promotion of women and minority employees. According to the evidence before the Court, their effect has been to provide such employees with substantial opportunities not previously available.

 The use of voluntary affirmative action in California's civil service provides one such example. In 1971, then-Governor Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order establishing voluntary affirmative action in the California civil service. Bielby Decl. P 4. Subsequently, state agencies and departments began using hiring goals and timetables in an effort to correct the existing under utilization of women and minorities. *fn17" As a consequence, the "index of gender and race segregation in state agencies" declined by 11 and 16 percent respectively between 1979 and 1986. P 5. See also Newmann Decl. P 7 (period from 1979-85 showed substantial statistical increases in the rate of female representation in the California "civil service and an even greater increase in nonwhite representation"); Badget Decl. P 6 ("After state and federal governments began to require that state and local employers execute affirmative action plans in the early 1970s, the representation of Latino and black women increased dramatically as did access to managerial and professional jobs for all women of color."); Grillo Decl. PP 1-4 (affirmative action guidelines have been "very important" in enabling women and minorities to gain civil service positions in California).

 The record also indicates that implementation of Proposition 209 would substantially reduce opportunities for women and minorities in public employment.

 3. Education

 Race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in California in the area of public education range from voluntary desegregation and "magnet school" programs at the elementary school level to financial aid and admissions programs at the college and graduate school level. The evidence before the Court demonstrates that, overall, these programs have benefited minorities and women.

 The University of California provides one example. Where the number of eligible applicants exceeds the spaces available, the University of California campuses select between 40 and 60% of students based upon their grades, test scores and course work. The remaining selections are made using a combination of criteria including California residence, physical and learning disabilities, educational disadvantage, family income, ethnicity, leadership ability, public service, special athletic, artistic or musical ability, composition of a student's family (whether student comes from a single- or two-parent family) and a student's family's college history (whether student is first-generation college bound).

 Under this system of admissions, the racial composition of the total University of California freshman class for the Fall of 1994 was as follows: number percentage American Indian 214 .96 African American 968 4.35 Latino 3,313 14.87 Filipino 949 4.26 Asian 7,191 32.28 White/ther 9,643 43.28 total: 22,278 100.00


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