guards, other inmates, and prison resources is evaluated. Id. Finally, the absence of ready alternatives that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimus cost to valid penological interests is considered. Id.
Here, Defendants not only failed to set forth the correct standard, even when directly asked by this Court at oral argument,
but also did not present sufficient evidence to rebut Plaintiff's claim. This Court has determined that under the above controlling authority, there remain triable issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's free exercise claims.
Plaintiff alleges he was deprived by Defendants Garcia, Calvin, Robles, Tomasetti, and Giles of rights to practice his Muslim religion while confined to Ad Seg in February 1994, in that he was denied his special diet and deprived of his religious events meals during Ramadan. (Washington Decl. PP 12-16; Second Am. Compl. at 8-9, 13.) On the other hand, Plaintiff testified that many of his allegations with respect to burden on the practice of his religion occurred in 1994, when Centinela first opened (Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 16:11), after which time Plaintiff stated "a lot" of problems regarding Muslim worship were "cleaned up". (Pl.'s Dep. Tr. 10:20-26).
Plaintiff claims that at the end of the day, general population or mainline prisoners were served with religious Suhoor meals, but Ad Seg prisoners were not. Plaintiff contends that he had a right to receive such meals in Ad Seg during the month of Ramadan in 1994. Thus, Plaintiff contends Defendants burdened the practice of his religion by not providing such special event meals in Ad Seg during the month of Ramadan in 1994.
A. Logical connection to legitimate government interest
Even assuming Plaintiff is able to substantiate his claim of interference with his religion, Defendants contend the neutral policy of serving regular meals does not violate the Constitution. Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's placement in Ad Seg may have reasonably limited some of Plaintiff's religious rights for security reasons. Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial, criminal, and often violent conduct. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). Certain concerns justify restrictions on the rights of lockdown prisoners such as those placed in Ad Seg at Centinela. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1996). Here, Defendants contend in light of Plaintiff's conduct while in Ad Seg, any incidental limitation on his religious practice would not amount to a constitutional violation. However, Defendants have not provided this Court with any evidence that a policy of regular meals in Ad Seg existed in 1994,
or that such policy, if it indeed did not accommodate special event meals during the month of Ramadan in 1994, was logically connected to valid penological interests.
B. Alternative to exercise right
This factor assesses the degree to which a regulation impinges upon a prisoner's asserted right. Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the current Muslim Imam at Centinela confirms the essence of the Islamic practice is fasting and prayer during daylight hours of Ramadan. (Shabazz Decl. at 2.) Fasting is one of the essential aspects of practicing Islam, but eating a special daily meal is not. Id. Defendants contend that because Plaintiff was in Ad Seg during the alleged deprivation, he was not required to work, and had adequate opportunity to fast and pray, thus was sufficiently able to practice his religion. Therefore, it cannot be said Plaintiff was deprived of "all means of [religious] expression." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
Defendants further contend that if Plaintiff was served meals at his cell, which is the current practice for inmates in Ad Seg, Plaintiff had the alternative of saving any food served during the day for consumption during non-daylight hours. (See Shabazz Decl. at 2.) However, in reviewing the record, there are many instances in which Plaintiff was not able to save containers in his cell due to his frequent misconduct, which included his gassing of staff. In view of Plaintiff's behavior, it is possible that in consideration of legitimate penological goals and safety concerns associated with Plaintiff's conduct towards staff, Plaintiff may have been denied the alternative of saving his meals. However, Defendants have not provided sufficient evidence that any such burden or interference on his practice was justified by the state's need to preserve institutional order during the month of Ramadan, in 1994. Further, this Court cannot conclude that the opportunity to engage in prayer is enough to satisfy the second Turner factor. Ward, 1 F.3d 873 at 878. If it were, the factor would have no meaning because an inmate would always be able to pray privately. Id. (citations omitted).
C. Impact of accommodation
Defendants have not presented evidence that to accommodate Plaintiff's request for special event meals during Ramadan would have strained prison resources. To the contrary, Plaintiff has presented evidence that his Prisoner Appeal was granted, thus, it appears that for Muslim Ad Seg inmates to receive the same diet as General Population Muslim inmates during Ramadan 1994 may not have been a difficult accommodation.
D. Ready alternatives
Plaintiff contends that in 1994, he was denied any type of special meal for Ramadan. Plaintiff's granted appeal tends to support his claim. Even assuming there was a legitimate interest in not allowing Plaintiff to keep a meal in his cell, other ready alternatives may have existed. The existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence the [policy] is not reasonable. Ward, 1 F.3d 873 at 876 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. 78 at 89). At this stage in the litigation, the Court determines Defendant has failed to sufficiently rebut Plaintiff's evidence, and thus the Court cannot determine whether reasonable alternatives existed. See 1 F.3d at 879.
E. Turner analysis conclusion
Here, Plaintiff has the burden "to show that the challenged [policy] is unreasonable under Turner." Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)). As stated in this Court's previous Decision, inmates "have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion." McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, as stated above, Plaintiff has presented some evidence that could be considered "probative evidence tending to support" Plaintiff's allegation that in 1994, his request for a Kosher special event meal was not accommodated during early 1994. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, at this stage, the Court determines that Plaintiff's submissions are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether Defendants denied Plaintiff a special diet during the month of Ramadan in 1994, and, if so, whether such denial met the reasonable relation test as set forth in Turner.
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity so long as his or her actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). The qualified immunity standard requires a two-step analysis: (1) Was the law governing the official's conduct clearly established?; and (2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful? Act Up!/ Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993).
In May v. Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a] right is clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity if, at the time the right was allegedly violated, its contours were 'sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates that right.'" 109 F.3d 557, 561 (1997), cert. denied, 139 L. Ed. 2d 241, 118 S. Ct. 312 (U.S. 1997) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987)). "In 1994, at the time of the alleged constitutional violations, it was well established that prisoners retained the protections of the free exercise clause." Id.; see O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). Further, it was well established that inmates "have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion . . . ." McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, as stated in this Court's prior order, under the existing standards at the time in question, Plaintiff's right to a special meal during Ramadan may have been clearly established, thus supporting a finding that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.
Where the law is clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. However, it may be appropriate for the trier of fact to consider information possessed by the prison officials at the time of the alleged violations.
May, 109 F.3d 557 at 562 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. 635 at 641). Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of Defendants herein were aware of a specific requirement that Plaintiff be given a religious meal in order to practice his religion. Further, Defendants contend in light of the security concerns over Plaintiff's conduct, it cannot be said a reasonable officer would have made a greater attempt to enable Plaintiff to practice his religion. While Plaintiff did present serious security concerns, Defendants have not shown how security concerns entitle Defendants to qualified immunity. The question of fact remains whether a reasonable prison official would have believed that not serving Plaintiff special meals during Ramadan violated Plaintiff's rights under the established standards at the time in question.
VII. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A person deprives another "of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains]." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986).
Thus, to avoid the respondeat superior bar, the plaintiff must allege personal acts by the defendants which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another's affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the deprivation of the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights. Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743.
Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Warden Garcia, Associate Warden Giles, Program Administrator Tomasetti, Dr. Calvin, and Sergeant Robles specifically interfered with his right to practice his religion during the month of Ramadan in 1994, and has failed to set forth facts proximately connecting the individual Defendants to the losses he claims to have suffered. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Garcia, Robles, and Tomasetti are generally responsible for ensuring the spiritual welfare of inmates. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. P 3, at 8.) To this extent Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that these Defendants had a duty, the alleged failure of which caused Plaintiff the deprivation of his right to practice his religion. After a review of the record, this Court finds that Plaintiff has set forth evidence, including Inmate Appeal forms, creating a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants Garcia, Robles, Tomasetti, as well as Defendants Giles and Calvin (against whom Plaintiff has made non-supervisory allegations), deprived Plaintiff of his right to practice his religion with respect to failing to provide Plaintiff with religious event meals during the month of Ramadan in 1994. Defendants, again, have not provided this Court with any evidence which directly refutes these claims.
For the foregoing reasons, this Memorandum Decision is issued DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [117-1]. Plaintiff's surviving claims relating to religious exercise include whether Defendants Garcia, Robles, Calvin, Giles, and Tomasetti denied Plaintiff a special diet during the month of Ramadan in 1994, and, if so, whether such denial met the test set forth in Turner.
HON. JAMES F. STIVEN
United States Magistrate Judge