The opinion of the court was delivered by: Walker, District Judge.
Before the court are defendants' motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment made on the ground that plaintiff, not having
suffered a direct and palpable injury as a result of defendants'
alleged conduct, lacks standing to bring this action. For the
reasons stated below, the court holds that plaintiff lacks
standing to assert its claims. Accordingly, summary judgment is
GRANTED in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants' discriminatory
treatment of families has:
frustrated [plaintiff's] mission requiring it to
expend scarce resources to investigate and document
said practices, and will require further expenditures
of staff time to monitor and perform compliance
investigations.
Compl ¶ 21. Similarly, defendants' alleged failure to provide a
wheelchair ramp has:
frustrated [plaintiff's] mission to insure that the
Fair Housing Act and other fair housing laws are
complied with within its area of responsibility, and
by causing it to expend its resources to investigate
and take steps to remedy said violations.
Compl ¶ 27. These allegations fail to establish an injury-in-fact
as required by Supreme Court authority construing Article III, §
2 of the Constitution. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
Article III, § 2 confers jurisdiction to federal courts over
"cases" and "controversies." One element of the case or
controversy requirement is that a plaintiff, through its
complaint, must establish that he has standing to sue. Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L.Ed.2d 849
(1997). And, to establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must
allege that he has, as a result of defendants' actions, suffered
a distinct and palpable injury. See Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214
(1982).
Just as an individual lacks standing to assert generalized
grievances about the conduct of the government, so an
organization's abstract concern about a subject that could be
affected by an adjudication fails to substitute for the concrete
injury required by Article III. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450
(1976). If, however, an organization points to a concrete and
demonstrable injury to its activities, not simply a setback to
the organization's abstract social interests, the organization
may successfully allege an injury in fact. See Havens, 455 U.S.
at 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114. In other words, an organization
establishes an Article III injury if it alleges that unlawful
action has increased the resources the group must devote to
programs independent of its suit challenging the unlawful action.
The scope of the injury requirement was addressed under similar
circumstances by the Supreme Court in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214
(1982). In Havens, a realty company and one of its employees
were alleged to have engaged in racial "steering" in violation of
the Fair Housing Act. Among the plaintiffs was a housing
organization called Housing Opportunities Made Equal ("HOME"),
whose mission as alleged in the complaint was "to make equal
opportunity in housing a reality." HOME alleged that it had
suffered injury as a result of the unlawful steering in that its
counseling and referral services had been frustrated by the
discriminatory conduct and by the consequent diversion of its
financial resources to identify and counteract the unlawful
conduct. The Supreme Court held that HOME was entitled to sue in
its own right.