other compelling reasons justify declining jurisdiction. While the
presence of any one of these four factors may be sufficient grounds to
decline supplemental jurisdiction, in this case, three of the four
First, plaintiffs RICO claim provided the only basis for federal
jurisdiction over the state law claims set forth in the complaint. Now
that the RICO claim must be dismissed, it is appropriate to decline
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Second, the state law
claims raise important issues of state law that have yet to be
definitively addressed by a state appellate court, and are more
appropriately resolved by the state courts. Third, the seven state law
claims predominate over the RICO claim. Indeed, as discussed above, it is
clear that this case turns on issues of state law. The Court also notes
that, notwithstanding Judge Legge's ruling, discovery has not yet
commenced. Finally, the fact that this case was removed significantly
alleviates any prejudice to the plaintiff since the state claims can be
remanded, rather than dismissed, and plaintiff will return to the
original forum of her choice.
Plaintiff argues that Judge Legge's ruling on the HLA justifies
retaining supplemental jurisdiction. While the Court has considered this
as a factor, it concludes that it is outweighed by the other "factors
For all of these reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. As such, the Court does
not reach defendants' arguments regarding dismissal of the remaining
state law claims.
B. Defendant's Motion to Vacate Partial Summary Judgment
The Court's decision to dismiss the RICO claim and decline supplemental
jurisdiction necessarily divests the Court of power to address the merits
of plaintiffs claims. See Axess Int'l Ltd. v. Intercargo Insur. Co.,
183 F.3d 935, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1999) ("once the district court chose not
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [plaintiff's] supplemental
state law claims, it lacked the power to adjudicate the merits of these
claims"). Thus, any ruling previously made on the merits must be
vacated. Id. at 944 (vacating portion of district court's order that
addressed merits of state law claims); see also Gold v. Local 7 United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (10th Cir.
1998); Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 389-90 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, defendants' motion to vacate the June 15, 2001 partial
summary judgment order must be granted.
C. Plaintiffs Motion For Permanent Injunction and Restitution
In light of the foregoing, the Court does not reach plaintiffs' Motion
for Permanent Injunction and Restitution.
For the reasons set forth above, and good cause appearing, it is HEREBY
(1) Plaintiffs' RICO claim is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is otherwise denied without prejudice.
(2) The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state
(3) The partial summary judgment ruling entered on June 15, 2001 is
(4) The Court does not reach plaintiffs Motion for Permanent Injunction
(5) This case is REMANDED FORTHWITH to the Superior Court for the
County of San Francisco, California.
IT IS SO ORDERED.