The opinion of the court was delivered by: Maxine M. Chesney, United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR TRANSFER OF VENUE; VACATING HEARING
(Docket No. 33)
Before the Court is the motion of defendants DaimlerChrysler AG ("DCAG") and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC ("MBUSA") to transfer the above-titled action to the District of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Plaintiff Jens Ole Sorensen ("Sorensen") has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied.*fn1
Having considered the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the motion appropriate for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for March 28, 2003, and rules as follows.
Sorensen alleges that he invented a process for stabilized injection molding and thereafter obtained U.S. Patent No. 4,935,184 ("the `184 patent"). Sorensen alleges that defendants engage in the manufacture and sale of automobiles, including automobiles imported for sale into the United States. According to Sorensen, defendants' imported automobiles include "lens assemblies manufactured using the `184 patent process." (See Compl. ¶ 49.) The lens assemblies, which defendants refer to as "SLK taillights" or "light assemblies," are manufactured in Germany by non-party Schefenacker Vision Systems Germany GmbH & Co. ("Schefenacker"). (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 2 at 2-3.) The automobiles incorporating the lens assemblies are manufactured in Germany by defendant DCAG, (see Jung Decl. ¶ 2), and are sold and marketed in the United States by defendant MBUSA. (See Barnard Decl., filed February 19, 2003, ¶ 1.)
Defendants argue that the District of New Jersey is a more convenient forum than the Northern District of California ("Northern District").*fn2
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). In order to transfer an action under § 1404(a), a district court must find "that the district court is one where the action might have been brought and that the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice favor transfer." See Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir.) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985).
Here, the action "might have been brought" in the District of New Jersey, as defendant DCAG is an alien corporation see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (d) (providing "alien may be sued in any district"), and defendant MBUSA resides in New Jersey. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (b) (providing action for patent infringement may be brought in district where defendant resides).
With respect to the issue of convenience, a district court must "weigh multiple factors in its determination whether transfer is appropriate in a particular case." See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 928 (2000). One important factor is the convenience of witnesses. See id. at 499 (holding where "more of the relevant witnesses" resided in plaintiffs chosen forum, district court properly weighed that finding against transfer). Indeed, as one district court observed, this factor is "often the most important factor." See Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1468, 1470 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
In their initial disclosures made to Sorensen on January 29, 2003, defendants identify four witnesses employed by MBUSA in New Jersey, whom defendants assert are likely to offer testimony concerning importation, distribution, sales and/or marketing decisions made by MBUSA. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. I at 2-3.) Additionally, defendants initially disclosed three witnesses employed by DCAG in Germany, two of whom, defendants assert, are likely to offer testimony concerning DCAG's design and development of the light assemblies, and a third who, according to defendants, is likely to offer testimony concerning DCAG's communications with non-party Schefenacker, the manufacturer of the light assemblies. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 2 at 2-3.) Defendants also initially disclosed witnesses in Germany who are employed by Schefenacker. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 2 at 3.)*fn3 Sorensen, in his initial disclosures made to defendants on January 27, 2003, agrees that "officers and/or employees of Defendants and/or their fabricators" are witnesses on such issues as the design and manufacture of the accused products, sales figures, pricing decisions, and defendants' decisions made after being notified of Sorensen's claim of infringement. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 3 at 2.) Consequently, all parties are in accord that witnesses employed by defendants and Schefenacker,*fn4 all of whom work in either New Jersey or Germany, are potential witnesses in the instant action.
Sorensen, the inventor and a resident of the Cayman Islands, initially disclosed both himself and Paul Brown ("Brown"), an employee of non-party Turn-Key-Tech, LLC ("Turn-Key"),*fn5 a company located in the Southern District of California, as potential witnesses. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 3 at 1.) According to Sorensen, he and Brown are witnesses as to the patented technology and identification of accused products. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. 3 at 2.) Defendants agree that both Sorensen and Brown are likely to be called as witnesses at trial. (See Defs.' Mot. Ex. I at 3:18-20; Defs.' Reply at 10:18-20.)
In his opposition, Sorensen additionally identifies as witnesses Jens Erik Sorensen, Trustee of SRD Trust, (see Jens Erik Sorensen Decl. ¶ 1), and John Tang-Pedersen ("Tang-Pedersen"), Turn-Key's Plant Engineer. (See Tang-Pedersen Decl. ¶ 12.) Jens Erik Sorensen states he is likely to testify as to his efforts to license the `184 patent, (see Jens Erik Sorensen Decl. ¶ 6); Tang-Pedersen states he is likely to testify as to the chain of custody of automobile lamp lenses currently in Turn-Key's warehouse located in the Southern District of California. (See Tang-Pedersen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Brown Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendants argue the materiality of such testimony is questionable in light of the fact that Sorensen did not disclose either of those witnesses in his initial disclosures, thus indicating that as of January 27, 2003, Sorensen was not of the opinion that Jens Erik Sorensen and Tang-Pedersen were "likely to have discoverable information." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) (providing party making initial disclosures "must" disclose name of "each individual likely to have discoverable information"). Sorensen has not had an opportunity to explain why he omitted Jens Erik Sorensen and Tang-Pedersen from plaintiffs initial disclosures. In any event, there is no showing that either individual resides in the Northern District. Jens Erik Pedersen works in the Southern District of California*fn6 and Tang-Pedersen, as noted, works for a company in that district as well.
In sum, no potential witness resides in or near the Northern District of California. All such witnesses reside and/or work in New Jersey, Germany, the Cayman Islands, or the Southern District of California, with a sizable majority residing a significant distance from the Northern District.*fn7 Thus, if the action remains in this forum, all witnesses will be required to travel significant distances to attend trial. Even Brown, who resides in the Southern District of California, will be required to travel hundreds of miles to the Northern District.*fn8 By contrast, if the action is transferred to the District of New Jersey, the four potential witnesses working in New Jersey will not be required to travel any significant distance, and those witnesses traveling from Germany will face a considerably shorter trip. On balance, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
In Jones, the Ninth Circuit identified eight additional factors that a district court should consider: "(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiffs choice of forum, (4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiffs cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof." See id. at 498-99. The Court addresses these factors in turn.
At the outset, the Court notes that because the action does not involve an agreement, the first factor identified in Jones is not applicable and, as the action arises solely under federal law, the second ...