The opinion of the court was delivered by: SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge
In accordance with this Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment dated February 27, 2004, judgment is hereby entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On February 27, 2004, this Court heard argument on the motion by
defendant, City and County of San Francisco, for summary judgment. Having
carefully considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted,
the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
This case concerns a suit by 70 plaintiffs, employed as H-3
firefighter/paramedics by the City and County of San Francisco, to
recover overtime pay under 29 U.S.C. § 207. Groothoff Decl. at 2; Ex.
A to Sprague Decl. at 1. Plaintiffs are exempt from overtime pay if they
qualify as "employees in fire protection activities," as defined in
29 U.S.C. § 203(y). Defendant argues H-3 firefighter/paramedics qualify
as employees engaged in fire protection activities.
The H-3 job description provides:
Under general supervision, responds to fire alarms
and engages in firefighting activities for the
saving of life and property; performs fire
prevention duties; maintains station quarters and
equipment; staffs an ambulance to provide initial
emergency medical care in a prehospital setting;
evaluates and administers first aid, life support
and life maintenance measures in accordance with
Emergency Medical Service Agency policies and
procedures, including CPR, definitive and
therapeutic care at or during
transport of persons; may perform duties of
either fire suppression, ambulance driver,
paramedic attendant, dispatcher, or other related
duties as required.
Groothoff Decl., Ex. A. Essential duties of H-3 employees include
(1) engaging in firefighting activities for the saving of life and
property; (2) performing fire prevention duties; (3) operating a variety
of firefighter vehicular equipment at the scene of fires; (4)
participating in rescue activities; (5) performing salvage duties; (6)
inspecting residences and other structures to insure compliance with fire
codes, ordinances, laws, and regulations; and (7) transporting persons in
need of medical care to and from medical sites. Id.; Responses to
Interrogatory No. 18.
There is conflicting evidence concerning the frequency with which H-3
employees assigned to ambulances actually engage in fire suppression
activities. Defendant offers evidence to suggest H-3 employees are
responsible for responding to a majority of "fire in building," "smoke in
building," and "working fire" calls. Decl. of Battalion Chief Paul Chin
at 1. Defendant also offers evidence demonstrating that H-3 employees
assigned to an ambulance are required to perform suppression work when
requested to do so. Groothoff Decl. at 3; Weaver Decl. at 2; Weaver Depo.
62:10-64:1, Ex. C to Sprague Decl. In contrast, plaintiffs offer evidence
demonstrating that ambulances are not sent to every fire call and are
only dispatched when there is a need for medical services. Weaver Decl.
An H-3 work shift is 24 hours, off for 48 hours, with the fifth 24 hour
shift followed by five days off. Weaver Decl. at 1. If H-3 employees are
not subject to § 207's overtime exemption, such a schedule would
entitle them to overtime pay. Now before the Court is defendant's motion
for summary judgment; the parties only dispute whether plaintiffs have
the "responsibility" to engage in fire suppression under § 203(y).
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323; 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). The
moving party, however, has no burden to negate or
disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden
of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that
there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.
See id. at 325.
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to "designate `specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). To carry
this burden, the non-moving party must "do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586; 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). "The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving
party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252;
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). In a motion for summary judgment, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. See
id. at 255. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." id.
1. Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the doctrine of ...