The opinion of the court was delivered by: SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
Kanuri Surgury Qawi, currently in custody at the Napa State Hospital,
filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an answer to the
petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is dismissed as
Qawi was sentenced to a four year prison term in 1991 after he
was found guilty of an assault. Once he was done with his prison term,
Qawi was subjected to proceedings under California Penal Code § 2970,
resulting in his commitment to a state mental hospital as a mentally
disordered offender ("MDO"). He was committed in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
In the habeas petition filed here, Qawi challenges his 2002 commitment.
He alleges that he was forcibly medicated to testify at the commitment
proceedings, in violation of his right to due process. He also alleges
that he was unable to access this court because of the forced
medication and because the former respondent had not supplied him
with pens, papers, or envelopes. The question of the state's ability to
forcibly medicate Qawi was recently decided in In re Qawi,
32 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2004). The petition before this court, filed months
before the California Supreme Court issued its decision in In re.
Qawi, does not concern the propriety of Qawi being medicated in
general. Rather, Qawi's federal petition concerns the propriety of
medication only as it relates to the 2002 commitment proceedings.
The decision at issue here is the February 8, 2002 commitment order
that provided for Qawi's recommitment "to Napa State Hospital forthwith
for the period of time terminating on February 17, 2003." Resp. Exh. 8.
He was recommitted in 2003. The commitment order filed January 13, 2003
provided that he was to be recommitted "to Napa State Hospital for the
period of one year beginning February 17, 2003 and terminating February
17, 2004." Resp. Exh. 1.
Qawi's commitment status after February 17, 2004 is not known because
the parties completed their briefing before the 2003 commitment order had
expired. His current commitment status does not affect the court's
analysis of his petition.
Article III, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution requires the existence
of a case or controversy through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings. This means that, throughout the litigation, the
petitioner/plaintiff "must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the [respondent/defendant] and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Lewis v. Continental
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).
An incarcerated (or paroled) convict's challenge to the validity of his
conviction satisfies the case or controversy requirement
because the incarceration (or the restrictions imposed by the terms of
the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and
redressable by the invalidation of the conviction. Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Once the convict's sentence has
expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now
ended incarceration or parole-some "collateral consequence" of
the conviction-must exist if the suit is to be maintained and not
considered moot. Id. Courts may presume that a criminal
conviction has continuing collateral consequences. See id
at 8-12 (noting that Supreme Court has been willing to accept
hypothetical collateral consequences for criminal convictions);
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n.4 (1985) (accepting as
collateral consequence possibility that conviction may be used in future
criminal proceeding to enhance sentence). But this presumption does not
extend to other contexts. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 13;
Lane v. Williams 455 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1982). A petitioner who
seeks to challenge the revocation of his parole, for example, must
demonstrate that continuing collateral consequences exist if the
underlying sentence has expired, see Spencer. 523 U.S. at
14-18, or if the term imposed for violating parole has been served,
see Cox v. McCarthy, 829 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1987) (claim