The opinion of the court was delivered by: Patel, Chief J.
Re: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Petitioner's Motion for Stay
Respondent J. Solis, Acting Warden of the Correctional Training Facility, filed this motion on September 7, 2004 to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Ronnie Gene Bush. Bush's petition alleges that the Board of Prison Terms ("Board") violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution when it found him unsuitable for parole in December 2001. Respondent argues that because the Board found Bush suitable for parole in a July 2004 hearing, this court can grant no further relief and the petition is moot. After having considered the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows.
Petitioner Ronnie Gene Bush began serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole in 1984 following his conviction for conspiracy to kidnap for ransom or extortion. In a series of hearings dating to 1991, the Board has considered Bush's suitability for parole and found him unsuitable seven times. Bush filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus after being found unsuitable for parole for the fifth time, on November 17, 1999. The California Superior Court found that the Board violated its discretion in finding Bush unsuitable for parole because the finding was not supported by "some evidence" as due process under the United States Constitution required. The court ordered the Board to conduct a new hearing comporting with due process. On December 20, 2001, the Board held the court ordered hearing and again found Bush unsuitable for parole. Bush then modified his habeas petition, requesting that the trial court grant his immediate release because the December hearing was not conducted in a timely fashion and the unsuitability finding again was not supported by the evidence. The trial court held that the Board had again abused its discretion in finding Bush unsuitable for parole because the record contained no factual support for the Board's findings and thus the only appropriate remedy was to find Bush suitable for parole and order his immediate release.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that the Board had "some evidence" justifying its decision. After the California Supreme Court denied review on September 24, 2003, Bush timely filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court on May 7, 2004.
While appealing the Board's 2001 decision, Bush has twice appeared before the Board for suitability hearings. At the first such hearing, on March 5, 2003, the Board found Bush unsuitable for parole. At the second hearing, on July 27, 2004, after Bush's petition had been filed with this court, the Board preliminarily found Bush suitable for parole and calculated his release date. The Board panel assessed Bush's term, considering credits and additions, as 150 months. This decision will become final on November 24, 2004. If the Board's finding of suitability goes unchallenged, it is unknown whether the Board will credit Bush for his time served beyond 150 months (which would have expired in 1997) and release him unconditionally or will grant conditional release.
Given the preliminary nature of the Board's July 2004 decision, Bush filed a motion on August 12, 2004 to stay proceedings in this court for 150 days to allow California's parole review process to conclude. Pet. Mot. for Stay at 3. Respondent opposed the motion to stay, and filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that the Board's July 2004 suitability finding mooted the petition.
Mootness is a jurisdictional issue; "federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot, that is, where no actual or live controversy exists." Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir.1999)). To avoid dismissal on mootness grounds, the court must determine that the habeas petitioner continues to have a "personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit." United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 878 (2001) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)) "This means that ... the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (quotations omitted). The party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing that there is no "effective relief" remaining that the court could provide. Southern Oreg. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2004).
In order to dismiss Bush's petition as moot, the court must find that either 1) Bush no longer suffers an injury traceable to respondent, or 2) the court cannot provide relief to redress Bush's injury. Verdin, 243 F.3d at 1177. At present, Bush remains in prison and therefore continues to suffer an actual injury traceable to the Board's 2001 denial of parole. Therefore, respondent relies only on the contention that this court can no longer grant relief to redress petitioner's injury.
Respondent raises three arguments supporting its assertion that the relief provided by the Board's July 2004 hearing mooted Bush's petition. First, that the Board's finding of suitability and calculation of a release date satisfied Bush's requested relief; second, that the injury has already been redressed by the Board's hearing as this court can only remedy a procedural due process violation in a Board hearing by granting a new hearing; and third, that any new parole board hearing moots a habeas petition based on a ...