UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 23, 2005
CRYSTAL BODELY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
JOANNE THOMPSON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joseph C. Spero United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO CONSENT DECREE [Docket No. 43]
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to Consent Decree ("the Motion"). Plaintiffs have requested $67,107.05 in attorneys' fees and $8,367.42 in costs. The parties have consented to magistrate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.*fn1
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and related state laws, alleging that they had been discriminated against on the basis of familial status. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that Crystal Bodely sought to rent a unit that Defendants Clarence and Josephine Gagliani had listed as available to rent with JoAnne Thompson and Bradford Thompson, doing business as JAT Realty. Defendants allegedly refused to rent the unit to Bodely on the basis that she planned to live in the unit with her three children. Complaint, ¶ 10.
The action settled in October 2004 -- over nine months after the complaint was filed and after the parties had engaged in significant discovery. Declaration of Liza Cristol-Deman in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to Consent Decree ("Cristol-Deman Decl."), Ex. 1 (Consent Decree). Plaintiffs had served three rounds of written discovery and taken the deposition of three witnesses, while Defendants had served written discovery and deposed Plaintiff Crystal Bodely as well as six staff members of Project Sentinel, the agency that had investigated Plaintiffs' complaints. Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶ 44. On September 8, 2004, Defendants made their first settlement offer, offering to settle the case for $10,000, including attorneys' fees and costs. Id., ¶ 42. Plaintiffs did not accept the offer and Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs' subsequent counteroffer. Id., ¶ 43. A mediation was conducted on October 27, 2004, at which the case was settled, resulting in a consent decree ("the Consent Decree"), which was filed on November 9, 2004.
Under the Consent Decree, Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs a settlement amount of $20,000.00, as well as Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12989.2 and the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(h). The Consent Decree also includes equitable relief. Id. In particular, Defendant JoAnne Thompson, the JAT real estate agent who represented the Gagliani property, is required to: 1) provide all prospective tenants and all housing providers who retain JAT, JoAnne Thompson or her husband as an agent with a pamphlet regarding fair housing requirements; 2) display in a conspicuous place in all units shown for rental a HUD fair housing poster; 3) include in all advertisements and internet postings listing available rental units the statement, "We're a Fair Housing Provider;" 4) attend and pay for a two-hour fair housing training seminar; and 5) provide a written statement every year to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing certifying that Defendants have complied with the terms of the Consent Decree. Id. In addition, Defendant Clarence Gagliani is required to attend and pay for a two-hour fair housing training seminar. Id.
Pursuant to the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs brought this Motion, seeking attorneys' fees and costs. In the Motion, Plaintiffs sought $71,459.55 in attorneys' fees and $8,367.42 in costs. The fees are based on the following lodestar calculation, with a 10 % reduction taken off the entire lodestar amount:
- 7,939.95 (10% reduction)
In their Opposition, Defendants do not dispute that they are required under the Consent Decree to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. They also raise no objections to the costs sought by Plaintiffs. However, they assert that the amount sought by Plaintiffs in attorneys' fees is excessive.
First, they complain that the fees sought by Christopher Brancart are excessive. Defendants question Brancart's hourly rate, pointing out that the rate of defense counsel, who "is equally capable," is only $185.00/hour. In addition, Defendants argue that Brancart should not have continued to bill for time after November 10, 2003, when Cristol-Deman became lead counsel. On this basis, they assert that the time after November 10, 2003, billed by Brancart for communications with the clients and with CristolDeman was duplicative. (Defendants do not, however, identify specific time entries to which they object.) Similarly, Defendants argue that it is unreasonable for Plaintiffs to bill for Brancart's time attending the mediation, given that Cristol-Deman also attended the mediation.
Second, Defendants argue that Cristol-Deman's fees are unreasonable because they exceed the $20,000.00 settlement amount. Defendants suggest that the hourly rate of $250.00 sought by Cristol- Deman also is too high, asserting that Cristol-Deman, by her own admission, has never billed at this rate. Defendants go on to point to several examples of what they argue is unreasonable billing by Cristol-Deman:
1) time spent "reviewing . . . the complaint that had already been prepared by the same law firm;"*fn3 2) duplicative attendance at the mediation (see above); 3) excessive time billed between June 22, 2004, and July 7, 2004, drafting a nine-page demand letter;*fn4 4) seven hours of time to prepare Plaintiff Bodely for her deposition, when the deposition itself took only three and one-half hours;*fn5 5) 10 hours of time billed for inter-office conferences with Brancart and other staff;*fn6 6) time spent performing secretarial tasks.*fn7
Third, Defendants argue that the fees sought for time billed by paralegals are unreasonable. According to Defendants, the tasks performed by the paralegals -- "preparation of summaries, databases and witness tables" -- were unnecessary given the stage of litigation. Defendants assert that this work would only have been necessary if litigation were "imminent" and thus reflects "a mindset wherein the billing of fees is aggressively encouraged with the intent that it would be passed on to the defense at the conclusion of the lawsuit."
Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs'10% reduction in their fee request does not make their fees reasonable. Rather, they argue, this reduction is either "an admission that the attorney's [sic] fees are excessive" or "a disingenuous attempt to convince the court that Plaintiffs' counsel is being reasonable."
In their Reply, Plaintiffs agree to reduce their adjusted lodestar amount of $71,459.55 by the following amounts: 1) $2,502.50 for time billed by Brancart for travel to and attendance at the mediation; 2) $1,000 for time spent preparing the demand letter; and 3) $850.00 for secretarial tasks. Plaintiffs argue that in all other respects, their fees are reasonable. Taking into account these reductions, Plaintiffs seek a revised lodestar amount of $67,107.05. Addressing the specific objections posed by Defendants, Plaintiffs argue, first, that Defendants have mischaracterized the Consent Decree by referring only to the $20,000.00 in monetary damages and ignoring the significant equitable relief obtained. When this equitable relief is taken into account, Plaintiffs argue, the fees they seek are not disproportionate to the results obtained. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that fees must be proportionate to a plaintiff's monetary recovery in civil rights cases.
Second, Plaintiffs assert that their overall fees were not excessive in light of Defendants' aggressive litigation tactics and the fact-intensive defenses asserted by Defendants.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the time spent on the demand letter (now reduced to eight hours from 12 hours) involved "extensive evidentiary and legal analyses." In particular, Plaintiffs note that the case involved application of an occupancy restriction, which required a "complex legal analysis." With respect to the time spent preparing Plaintiff Bodely for her deposition, Plaintiffs argue that the time spent was, in fact, six hours rather than seven, and that this time was reasonable because Bodely was the key witness in the case. Plaintiffs note that they could not be expected to anticipate that Defendants would fail to raise many of the issues that are typically raised in such depositions. Rather, they assert, they would have been remiss if they had not devoted adequate time to preparing Bodely.
In response to Defendants' complaint that too much time was devoted to inter-office communications, Plaintiffs point out that Defendants have not specifically identified the time entries to which they object. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert, the 10% reduction should adequately take into account any excessive billing for inter-office communications.
Similarly, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have not identified any specific time entries as secretarial tasks. Further, Plaintiffs argue, to the extent that this objection is based on time spent e-filing documents, making telephone calls that involved scheduling and time spent conducting internet searches, these tasks are not secretarial. Finally, Plaintiffs have reduced the amount sought by 3.4 hours to account for any additional tasks which might be considered secretarial.
Plaintiffs also reject Defendants' assertion that the time spent by paralegals was unnecessary and merely an effort to generate fees. Plaintiffs assert that the summaries, witness lists and exhibit lists created by the paralegals were used throughout the case, including as a basis for Rule 26 disclosures, which must be completed long before trial is imminent.
Regarding the hourly rates sought for Brancart and Cristol-Deman, Plaintiffs argue that the lower rate charged by Defendants' lead counsel does not support Defendants' position. First, Plaintiffs argue, it is well-established that reasonable rates may differ as between Plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel. Second, Defendants have provided no evidence on the question of the qualifications of Defendants' lead counsel in the area of fair housing litigation, making it impossible to determine whether he is "equally capable," as Defendants assert.
A. Legal Standard
Plaintiffs seeks attorneys' fees and costs under federal and state law. Under both federal and California law, the starting point for calculation of fee awards is calculation of the lodestar amount, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate. Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal law); Crommie v. State of California, 840 F.Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (state law). In determining a reasonable number of hours, the Court must review detailed time records to determine whether the hours claimed by the applicant are adequately documented and whether any of the hours claimed by the applicant were unnecessary, duplicative or excessive. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). Where the fee applicant has met its burden of submitting evidence supporting the fee request, the burden shifts to the party opposing the application to rebut that evidence with evidence showing that the fees sought are unreasonable. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1993).
In calculating the lodestar, the Court should consider any of the factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 951 (1976), that are relevant. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1264 n. 11 (noting that the Ninth Circuit no longer requires that the district court address every factor listed in Kerr). In Kerr, which was decided before the lodestar approach was adopted by the Supreme Court as the starting point for determining reasonable fees in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), the Ninth Circuit adopted the 12-factor test articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). This analysis looked to the following factors for determining reasonable fees: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 'undesirability' of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.
To the extent that the Kerr factors are not addressed in the calculation of the lodestar, they may be considered in determining whether the fee award should be adjusted upward or downward, once the lodestar has been calculated. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1212. However, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262.
B. Calculation of Lodestar
1. Attorneys' Fees
a. Hourly Rates
Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is based on an hourly rate of $250/hour for Cristol-Demon and $325.00 for Brancart. The Court finds these rates to be reasonable.*fn8 The declarations of Christopher Brancart and Liza Cristol-Deman filed in support of the Motion attest to their strong credentials and extensive experience in the area of fair housing litigation. See Cristol-Deman Decl. at ¶¶ 4-10 & Ex. 3 (Brancart Decl.). In addition, declarations by other practitioners in the field support these rates. See Cristol-Deman Decl., Ex. 10 (Declaration of D. Scott Chang), Ex. 11 (Declaration of John M. True), Ex. 12 (Declaration of Brad Seligman in Support of Application for Attorneys Fees). Finally, the rates awarded by other courts for work done two to three years prior to the work done in this case support the conclusion that the rates sought here are reasonable. See, e.g., Cristol-Deman Decl. at ¶ 14 (indicating that Cristol-Deman was awarded fees at a rate of $175/hour for work performed in 2000 and 2002 in a fair housing case litigated in the federal district court for Central District of California), Ex. 3 (Brancart Decl.) at ¶ 11 (indicating Brancart was awarded fees at a rate of $300/per hour in the same case).
Defendants' assertion that Brancart's and Cristol-Deman's rates are unreasonable is supported by virtually no evidence. Defendants rely entirely on the hourly rate of their own lead counsel. See Opposition at 5; Declaration of George E. Clause in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Clause"). However, the Clause Declaration states nothing more than Clause's hourly rate of $185.00 and Defendants have not provided any evidence attesting to Clause's qualifications. In the absence of evidence establishing that Clause possesses qualifications and experience commensurate with that of Brancart and Cristol-Deman in the area of fair housing litigation, Clause's hourly rate has no bearing on the reasonableness of the rates sought by Plaintiffs' counsel.
Accordingly, the Court awards attorneys' fees based on the rates of $250.00 per hour for CristolDeman and $325.00 per hour for Brancart.
b. Overall Reasonableness of Time Billed
The Court has reviewed in detail the billing records submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel, as well as the objections submitted by Defendant. Based on all of these records, the Court finds that the overall number of hours spent by each of the time keepers on tasks in this matter are reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies, in particular, on three factors: 1) the results obtained by Plaintiffs; 2) the litigation strategies employed by Defendants; and 3) Plaintiffs' exercise of billing judgment.
i. Results Obtained
In determining whether fees sought by a prevailing party are reasonable, courts must consider whether these fees are proportionate to the results obtained. See Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing to Farrer v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992) for the proposition that "it is an abuse of discretion for the district court to award attorneys' fees without considering the relationship between the 'extent of success' and the amount of the fee award"). Where a plaintiff in a civil rights action obtains only de minimis relief, the court need not calculate the lodestar amount but may, instead, award low fees or no fees at all. Id. at 362-363 (citing to Farrer, 506 U.S. at 116-118). To determine whether the relief obtained is de minimis, courts look beyond the monetary relief awarded to consider in addition the significance of the legal issues at stake and the public purpose served by the plaintiff's litigation. Id. at 363.
Here, the relief obtained by Plaintiff is not de minimis. In addition to the $20,000.00 payment to Plaintiffs, the Consent Decree includes significant equitable relief that will protect the public from being subject to housing discrimination by Defendants and may have the broader effect of educating both tenants and providers of housing who have dealings with Defendants about their rights and obligations in this respect. In addition, the right to be free of housing discrimination based on familial status is an important one, the vindication of which has value for Plaintiffs beyond the monetary relief they received. See id. at 364. In light of the importance of the rights at issue and the benefit obtained for the community, the Court does not find the attorneys' fees sought by Plaintiffs to be unreasonable.
ii. Defendants' Litigation Tactics
Further, the attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs are reasonable given that Defendants litigated the case vigorously, asserting numerous fact-intensive defenses that required Plaintiffs to engage in significant discovery. See Motion at 15-16; Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶¶ 36-40. Among these was testimony by Defendant JoAnne Thompson (the agent who represented the Gaglianis) that she had never told Plaintiff Crystal Bodely the unit could not be rented to children and speculating that Bodely was fabricating her claims as part of a conspiracy with several of her co-workers and a neighbor. See Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶ 13.*fn9 As a result of this testimony, Plaintiffs were required to interview several witnesses to determine the truth of these assertions. Id. One of the key witnesses cited by Thompson, Ben Mahabir, refused to answer the calls of Plaintiffs' counsel and had to be subpoenad for deposition. Id.
Another example of a defense asserted by Defendants that caused Plaintiffs to incur additional fees was Defendants' assertion in interrogatory responses and through deposition testimony that the previous tenants, the Choi family, had lived in the same unit with a minor child. Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶ 39.*fn10
Defendants provided the name of the family but did not provide contact information. Id. In order to verify this claim, Plaintiffs were required to conduct computer searches to find the family and retain a Korean interpreter when efforts to communicate through the Choi's daughter were unsuccessful. Id. According to Plaintiffs, when counsel finally succeeded in communicating with the Choi family, the Chois told them that their daughter was already over 18 when they lived in the unit and that they had never had a child under 18 living in the unit. Id.
While Defendants are entitled to litigate aggressively, they cannot now claim that fees that were incurred as a result of their own litigation tactics are unreasonable. See Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 638 (1982) (holding that a party cannot "litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response"). Nor does the fact that Defendants offered to settle the case for $10,000.00 in September 2004 -- barely more than a month before the parties entered into a settlement agreement -- persuade the Court that Plaintiffs' fees were unreasonable. Plaintiffs attest (and Defendants do not dispute) that this was the first settlement offer Defendants made in the case and by the time the offer was made, Plaintiffs had already incurred over $50,000.00 in fees and costs. Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶ 42. Given that Plaintiffs obtained twice the monetary relief offered by Defendants and, more importantly, that the September offer did not include any equitable relief, that offer does not establish that Plaintiffs' fees were unreasonable.
iii. Billing Judgment
In determining the reasonableness of fees, an important consideration is whether the party seeking fees has exercised "billing judgment." See Association of California Water Agencies v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 887 (th Cir. 2004). "Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority." Id. Plaintiffs have exercised billing judgment in several respects. First, they have removed the fees incurred in this case by another partner of the firm, Elizabeth Brancart, in the amount of $585.00. Second, they have voluntarily reduced the entire lodestar by 10%, resulting in a downward adjustment of over $8,000.00 in fees. Finally, Plaintiffs have declined to request fees on the Motion, to which they are entitled, even though Cristol-Deman attests that she devoted 16 hours to its preparation. Plaintiffs also do not request fees for the 1.6 hours Cristol-Deman spent corresponding with Defendants about the Motion and monitoring Defendants' compliance with the Consent Decree. See Cristol-Deman Decl., ¶ 15.
Having determined that the overall amount sought by Plaintiffs in attorneys' fees is reasonable, the Court addresses below the specific objections raised by Defendants to Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
c. Duplicative Billing
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have billed for duplicative time, pointing to the fact that even after Cristol-Deman was appointed lead counsel, Christopher Brancart remained involved in the case. In particular, Brancart continued to bill for time spent communicating with the clients and with Crystol-Deman, among other things, after November 11, 2003. The Court rejects Defendants' position.
The use of multiple attorneys on a case is widespread and, frequently, an efficient way to manage a case. See Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983) (cited with approval in Davis v. County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir. 1992)). It is well established that fees are not excessive merely because more than one attorney worked on a case. Id. Rather, "a reduction is warranted only if the attorneys are unreasonably doing the same work." Id. Conversely, "[a]n award for time spent by two or more attorneys is proper as long as it reflects the distinct contribution of each lawyer to the case and the customary practice of multiple-lawyer litigation." Id. Here, instead of performing all of the work in the case himself, Christopher Brancart assigned the case to an associate who, working in consultation with Brancart, performed the bulk of the work in the case. Given that Crystol-Deman's hourly rate is substantially lower than Brancart's, it is likely that Plaintiffs' fees are lower than they otherwise would have been as a result of this decision.
Nor does the Court find that the continued involvement of Brancart in the case resulted in duplicative time. Rather, given Brancart's expertise, his continued involvement reflected his "distinct contribution . . . to the case." Id. The Court notes that aside from Brancart's participation in the mediation -- the fees for which Plaintiffs no longer request -- Defendants have not identified any specific time entry that they believe is duplicative. Nor does the Court find any specific time entry by Brancart that appears to be duplicative.
d. Demand Letter
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' fees for a nine-page demand letter prepared by Cristol-Deman are unreasonable, asserting that the letter contained "boilerplate" sections and further, could have been prepared in less time given the professed expertise of Plaintiffs' counsel. In response, Plaintiffs have reduced the amount sought for the demand letter to eight hours. Plaintiffs further argue that these fees are reasonable, given that the letter contained "extensive evidentiary and legal analysis." See Supplemental Declaration of Liza Cristol-Deman in Support of Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to Consent Decree (Cristol-Deman Supp. Decl.), ¶ 3. The Court agrees.
The demand letter at issue is not included in the record. However, Defendants do not dispute that it contained a detailed discussion of the factual and legal issues raised in the case. Typically, such letters are similar to a legal brief and therefore, their preparation may be time-consuming. Further, it is the Court's experience that such demand letters may be useful for focusing the parties' understanding of the issues and facilitate settlement. In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that the eight hours of CristolDeman's time sought by Plaintiffs for the demand letter is reasonable.
e. Preparation for Bodely Deposition
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs billed too much time for preparing Crystal Bodely -- the key witness in the case -- for her deposition. The Court disagrees. First, as Plaintiffs point out in their Reply, Plaintiffs billed six hours for this task rather seven hours as asserted by Defendants. See Reply at 4. Second, Bodely was the key witness in Plaintiffs' case and her deposition was crucial to the success of the case. Third, the fact that Defendants' deposition of Bodely ended up being relatively short -- only three and one-half hours -- is not a basis for reducing Plaintiffs' fees. At the time Plaintiffs' counsel prepared Bodely, counsel was not in a position to know whether the deposition would be brief or lengthy. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to fully prepare Bodely for either possibility.
f. "Secretarial" Tasks
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs improperly seek fees for secretarial tasks. In response, Plaintiffs deleted 3.4 hours of time and argue that many of the tasks listed by Defendants as secretarial, such as e-filing, are not, in fact, secretarial. The Court concludes that taking into account the deletion of time stipulated to by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' fees do not include any fees for purely secretarial tasks.
The Court notes as a preliminary matter that Defendants fall far short of meeting their burden with respect to this objection. Defendants have simply presented a laundry-list of tasks without identifying a single specific time entry on which their objection is based. See Opposition at 8. As a result, the Court is left guessing which tasks and time entries are at issue. Putting this problem to one side, the Court has no difficulty concluding that a number of the generic tasks listed by Defendants are not secretarial, and many may require the expertise of an attorney, depending on the circumstances. These include e-filing, tasks related to scheduling, and reviewing web-sites. Having reviewed in detail the time sheets submitted by Plaintiffs and considering that Plaintiffs have deleted an additional 3.4 hours of time for tasks that might be considered secretarial, the Court concludes that no further reduction in fees is necessary.
g. Paralegal Time
Defendants assert that time spent by paralegals preparing summaries, databases and witness tables was unreasonable because such work is only necessary on the eve of trial. The Court disagrees. Such materials may be useful throughout the discovery period and in fact, may allow attorneys to use their time more efficiently, thereby reducing fees incurred in a case. The Court rejects Defendants' objection.
Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs' costs, which the Court finds to be sufficiently documented, necessarily incurred and reasonable. Therefore, the Court awards $8,367.42 in costs.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded $67,107.05 in attorneys' fees and $8,367.42 in costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.