The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM HASKELL ALSUP, District Judge
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In this habeas case, petitioner asserts violations of his
Miranda rights and his right to effective assistance of trial
counsel. For the reasons below, this order DENIES the petition.
Following a jury trial in Alameda Superior Court, petitioner
Jeffrey Galbraith was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to prison for fifteen years to life. The state court of
appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review.
On November 17, 1997, petitioner, age 15, and Alvin Richardson,
age 16, robbed a furniture store owned by victim Isaias Aparicio.
During the robbery, victim was shot and died. On the afternoon
following the incident, petitioner obtained treatment at Oakland
Children's Hospital for the gunshot wound he sustained during the
robbery-homicide. Sergeant Ersie Joyner of the Oakland Police
Force testified at trial that Officer T. Pope was dispatched to
contact petitioner there pursuant to standard police protocol to
investigate the circumstances surrounding such an injury (Exh.
C-3 at 64-65, 73). Officer Pope took a statement from petitioner at about 1:00 p.m. without first advising him of his
Miranda rights (Exh. C-3 at 65). Petitioner lied and stated
that three individuals robbed and shot him after he departed a
bus in North Oakland earlier that day (Exh. C-3 at 55-56, 68-69).
While at the hospital, Officer Pope learned from Sergeant
Joyner, who was investigating the victim's robbery-homicide, that
petitioner was a suspect in a shooting.*fn1 As per Sergeant
Joyner's instructions, Officer Pope maintained custody of
petitioner and transported him to the police station for
questioning at 4:38 p.m. (Exh. C-3 at 51-53, 65-66).
At the police station, Sergeant Joyner and Sergeant Michael
Yoell conducted a two-part interview with petitioner about the
victim's murder. At the start of the first session, Sergeant
Joyner read petitioner his Miranda rights (Exh. C-3 at 53-55,
66). Petitioner stated that he understood his rights and
consented to speak with Sergeants Joyner and Yoell. He also
signed an agreement to this effect (Exh. B at 455-56; Exh. C-3 at
55, 68). Sergeant Joyner was aware that petitioner was 15 years
old and in ninth grade; he also knew that petitioner was injured
and had taken morphine earlier that day (Exh. B at 497-80; Exh.
C-3 at 67, 70). Accordingly, Sergeant Joyner asked petitioner
whether he was under the influence of medication at the time.
Petitioner replied that he was not (Exh. C-3 at 67). Petitioner
said that he was "thinking real clear" (Exh. B at 479). Though
petitioner also claimed to be in pain, he did not request a
doctor, nurse or medication (Exh. C-3 at 68, 70).
Petitioner initially provided Sergeant Joyner the same
explanation for his injury as he had given Officer Pope (Exh. C-3
at 55-56). Yet, he was unable to answer Sergeant Joyner's
follow-up questions regarding where he claimed he was shot or
which bus line he was allegedly riding. Petitioner subsequently
confessed that the statement was false after Sergeant Joyner
expressed skepticism about the account. Petitioner also admitted
that he was shot in the course of the robbery-homicide (Exh. C-3
at 56-58, 72). The first part of the interview ended at about
6:50 p.m. and was unrecorded (Exh. C-3 at 68). The second part of the interview, which was fully recorded,
began at 7:00 p.m. and continued until 7:35 p.m. (Exh. B. at
454-82; Exh. C-3 at 60-61). At the end of the session, petitioner
confirmed that neither Sergeant Joyner nor Sergeant Yoell
threatened, made promises, physically abused or deprived him of
water or opportunities to use the bathroom during the interview
(Exh. B at 480; Exh. C-3 at 71). The officers then conducted a
joint interrogation of petitioner and co-defendant Richardson
until 10:37 p.m. At the end of the interrogation, petitioner
complained that he was in great pain and needed medication (Exh.
B. at 405).
At trial, petitioner's counsel moved to suppress these
statements, alleging that they were taken in violation of
petitioner's Miranda rights. The trial court denied the motion
after finding that the statements were not coerced because
petitioner understood and waived his Miranda rights (Exh. C-3
at 83-84). In addition, petitioner's counsel did not require the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case before acquiescing to
the presumption that petitioner had to be tried as an adult
rather than a juvenile at any point in the proceedings.
Petitioner brings two claims for habeas relief. He contends
that: (1) his Miranda rights were violated when Officer Pope
elicited an inculpatory statement from him at the hospital
without first advising him of his Miranda rights, and when
Sergeant Joyner elicited involuntary statements from him at the
police station after he waived his Miranda rights; and (2) his
trial counsel rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance in
failing to require the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case before the presumption that he could not be tried as a
juvenile could apply. Neither of these claims is persuasive.
This petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under the AEDPA, an
application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment shall not be granted
with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state
court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court
28 U.S.C. 2254(d). A state court's application of law must be
objectively unreasonable to warrant habeas relief. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63
, 75 (2003). A state court finding on a
dispositive factual question presented in a habeas petition may