Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

MITCHELL v. VILLA

United States District Court, S.D. California


November 8, 2005.

ROBERT MITCHELL, Plaintiff,
v.
L. VILLA, Correctional Officer, Defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: LOUISA PORTER, Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING MOTION TO SANCTION DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
[Doc. Nos. 31, 32, 39, 44]
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Robert Mitchell is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona on a complaint for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment and Plaintiff's motion to sanction Defendant's counsel. After thorough review of Plaintiff's motions, Defendant's opposition, and all supporting documents, this Court recommends that both Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment and motion for sanctions be DENIED.

II. Procedural Background

  On June 11, 2003, Plaintiff Robert Mitchell, a state inmate incarcerated at Centinela State Prison at the time of the events, filed a pro per civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff concurrently filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP"). The Honorable Judith N. Keep granted Plaintiff's IFP motion on September 23, 2003.

  Plaintiff raises five claims in his Complaint. First, he alleges that Defendant Villa, a correctional officer at Centinela, retaliated against him after he filed a grievance against Defendant Villa. (Compl. at 7-10.) Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Villa violated his right to petition the government for grievances. (Id. at 10-12.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villa engaged in "Due Process Equal Protection and Liberty Interest Violations[.]" (Id. at 12-13.) Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villa was negligent. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff's final claim is for "Torts in Essence[.]" (Id. at 15-16.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 17.)

  On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff requested a hearing date for the purposes of filing a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 26]. In an order dated June 7, 2005, this Court issued a scheduling order and a hearing date for the motion. [Doc. No. 27].

  On June 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. [Doc. No. 32]. Concurrently, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Sanction Defendant's Attorney of Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. [Doc. No. 31]. On August 12, 2005, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and for Sanctions. [Doc. No. 39]. On August 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. [Doc. No. 44]. By previous order, this Court deemed Plaintiff's Motion submitted without oral argument.

  III. Factual Background

  Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on January 22, 2003, Correctional Officer Villa forced Plaintiff to forego a shower. (Compl. at 3.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Villa and Correctional Officer Delgadillo were responsible for conducting inmate showers on the day in question. (Id.) The complaint alleges that Defendant attempted to force Plaintiff and inmate Grigsby to shower together in a single capacity shower. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he informed Defendant that it would be hazardous for two people to shower together in a single shower. Further, Plaintiff claims that he told Defendant that he is disabled and requires a special handicap seat when he showers. (Id.) After Plaintiff requested to see a program status report authorizing two inmates in a single shower, Defendant denied Plaintiff a shower. (Id.) On January 26, 2003, Plaintiff filed a citizen's complaint against Defendant Villa regarding the January 22, 2003, incident. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that on March 10, 2003, Defendant approached him at the drinking fountain and attempted to provoke Plaintiff into a physical altercation. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he walked away and tried to return to his cell. (Id.) Defendant directed Correctional Officers Tyler and Ryan to activate the emergency alarm. (Id. at 5.) At that point, all inmates got down on the floor in compliance with policy. (Id.) Plaintiff and another inmate were placed into mechanical restraints and escorted to the Program Office where they were put in security cages. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he was the only one that received a disciplinary rules violation in relation to the incident. (Id.) On March 13, 2003, Plaintiff filed a citizen's complaint against Defendant Villa regarding the March 10, 2003, incident. (Id.)

  Plaintiff claims that on March 24, 2003, 11 days after Plaintiff filed his second complaint against Defendant, he was approached by "several unknown `gang affiliated' inmates" who attempted to intimidate him into dropping his complaints against Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to drop his complaints against Defendant. (Id. at 6.)

  On April 7, 2003, Plaintiff received a disciplinary hearing regarding the March 10, 2003, incident. (Id.) Plaintiff informed the hearing officer that Defendant was discussing Plaintiff's complaints with other inmates. (Id.) As a result of the hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of refusing a direct order in violation of CCR § 3005(B). (Id.)

  After the hearing, Plaintiff claims that he witnessed Defendant telling "several unknown `gang affiliated' inmates" about what Plaintiff said at the hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was again confronted by the "gang affiliated" inmates who threatened to physically harm Plaintiff if he did not drop his charges against Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that out of fear for his safety, he withdrew his remaining complaint against Defendant. (Id.)

  Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Defendant on June 11, 2003, alleging that Defendant's alleged retaliation against him for filing grievances resulted in a denial of Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Motion for Summary Judgment at 3.)

  IV. Discussion

  Plaintiff claims that he was singled out and retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights. (Motion for Summary Judgment at 4.) Plaintiff also argues that he was denied the right to file grievances against the Defendant because he feared for his safety as a result of Defendant's discussions with other inmates. (Id. at 10.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims he was "denied equal protection, liberty, interest [sic] and due process." (Id. at 11.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Villa is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 13.)

  A. Standard of Review

  Summary judgment is properly granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court shall consider all admissible affidavits and supplemental documents submitted on a motion for summary judgment. See Connick v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 784 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1986).

  A "material" fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. See Fair Hous. Council of Riverside County, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1037 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 942 (2001)). The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing a claim or defense. Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 620, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

  The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

  The court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on a motion for summary judgment. Quite the opposite, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The nonmovant's evidence need only be such that a "fair-minded jury could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. However, in determining whether the nonmovant has met his burden, the court must consider the evidentiary burden imposed upon him by the applicable substantive law. Id.

  B. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim

  1. Disciplinary Rules Violation

  Plaintiff claims that he received a disciplinary rules violation for exercising his constitutional rights. (Motion for Summary Judgment at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendant Villa retaliated against him because he filed a grievance against Defendant. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he received a disciplinary rules violation from Defendant on March 10, 2003, because Plaintiff filed a staff complaint against Defendant in January 2003. (Id.) Plaintiff's staff complaint was in regards to his allegation that Defendant attempted to force two inmates into a single person shower. Plaintiff received the March 10, 2003, disciplinary rules violation for being disruptive and refusing a direct order. Plaintiff claims that although three inmates were involved in the March 10, 2003, incident, only Plaintiff received a disciplinary rules violation. (Id. at 8.)

  Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). A prisoner's retaliation claim must rest on proof that a guard filed the disciplinary action against him in retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (1997). Further, a plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the defendant's decision to act. Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). However, courts "should `afford appropriate deference and flexibility' to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory." Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant Villa filed a disciplinary action against him in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional right to file a grievance. Plaintiff received a hearing, in front of a senior hearing officer, regarding the March 10, 2003, incident and was found guilty of refusing a direct order. Moreover, at the hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he did not follow a direct order. Specifically, Plaintiff stated that he did not go to his cell when told to do so because Defendant cussed at him. Further, the fact that other inmates involved in the March 10, 2003, incident were not disciplined does not establish that Defendant acted improperly in filing a disciplinary action against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the disciplinary action was a product of retaliation.

  Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant's retaliatory action did not advance a legitimate penological interest. Rather, Plaintiff admits to refusing a direct order. While Plaintiff was talking to another inmate Defendant Villa ordered him to go back to his cell. Plaintiff ignored the order and continued to talk with another inmate. Prison officers have a legitimate interest in maintaining order within the prison and should be afforded flexibility in the evaluation of legitimate penological interests. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807. Because Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to show that there was no legitimate penological interest for Defendant's actions, there is certainly a material fact at dispute. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate.

  2. Discussions with Other Inmates

  Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his First Amendment rights by telling "inmate gang members" that Plaintiff is a "snitch." (Motion for Summary Judgment at 9.) Plaintiff contends that this was a further act of retaliation by Defendant. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the inmate gang members forced him to withdraw his complaints against Defendant and that he did so out of fear for his safety. (Id.)

  The question whether a prison official "called an inmate a `snitch' in the presence of other inmates is `material' to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for denial of the right not to be subjected to physical harm by employees of the state acting under color of law." Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1988). A prison officer may violate an inmate's constitutional rights by labeling him a "snitch" to other inmates out of retaliation for filing grievances. Id. at 1138. The question of whether Defendant labeled Plaintiff as a "snitch" to other inmates is a genuine issue of fact. The documents provided by Plaintiff in his Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, along with the Declaration of Correctional Officer L. Villa, demonstrate the existence of a dispute over whether Defendant Villa targeted Plaintiff for retribution by identifying him as a "snitch." Moreover, documents provided by Plaintiff alone show that there is a genuine issue of fact. Specifically, Exhibit C of Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, a Rules Violation Report, shows that Defendant denies speaking with other inmates regarding Plaintiff's complaints. Additionally, Defendant denies identifying Plaintiff as a snitch in his Declaration. The Rules Violation Report only shows that Plaintiff accused Defendant of speaking with other inmates to get Plaintiff to drop his complaints. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, it cannot be said that there is not a material fact at issue. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate.

  C. Right to File Grievances

  Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his First Amendment right to file prison grievances by labeling Plaintiff a "snitch." (Motion for Summary Judgment at 10.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that by calling him a "snitch," Defendant caused "inmate gang members" to force Plaintiff to drop his complaints. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff contends that he dropped his complaints against Defendant out of fear for his safety.

  The Constitution provides protections against "deliberate retaliation" by prison officials against an inmate's exercise of his right to petition for redress of grievances. Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Because retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate's exercise of his legitimate First Amendment rights, such conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989).

  Although it is clear that Plaintiff has a right to file prison grievances, he has not shown that his First Amendment rights were violated. Plaintiff claims that "here it is undisputed that [he] had to withdraw his grievance . . . against the Defendant because the Defendant labeled [him] a `snitch' in front of inmate gang members and that these inmates forced Plaintiff to withdraw his grievance against Defendant." (Motion for Summary Judgment at 10.) Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, his allegations are not undisputed. Plaintiff is simply making an allegation and does not establish his accusations as true. Rather, based on the evidence presented by both parties, whether Defendant identified Plaintiff as a "snitch" and whether certain "inmate gang members" forced Plaintiff to withdraw his complaints are disputed issues. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.

  D. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

  Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by calling Plaintiff a "nigger," by denying him a shower because of his medical disability, by singling Plaintiff out as an African American, and by labeling him a "snitch." In his declaration, Defendant denies doing any acts in violation of Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff offers Defendant's responses to his requests for admissions, Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant's answer, Plaintiff's declaration, and the declarations of three other inmates to establish that Defendant violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

  When an equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff must plead facts to show that the defendant "acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional." FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000). "`Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

  Although Plaintiff points to Defendant's responses to his request for admissions and Defendant's answer to establish that Defendant violated his constitutional rights, there is nothing in either document indicating that Defendant admits to discriminatory conduct. Moreover, Defendant's declaration suggests the opposite. Defendant claims that he has not done any acts in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff also offers his compliant, his declaration, and the declaration of three other inmates to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Although these documents allege that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff, based on Defendant's declaration, the facts are in dispute. This Court may not make credibility determinations on a motion for summary judgment. Further, the inferences to be drawn must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, this Court denies Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

  E. Qualified Immunity

  Plaintiff contends that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because Defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable officer would have known that "filing a disciplinary rules violation against Plaintiff for the exercise of his Constitutional rights, that labeling Plaintiff a `snitch' in front of inmate gang members, and interfering with and denying him the right to petition the grievance was unlawful." Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant is not entitled to seek qualified immunity. Further, Defendant argues that he should be allowed to assert qualified immunity by bringing his own motion for summary judgment.

  Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). "Qualified immunity is `an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.

  "A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. "On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. Thus, "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) ("[A]s explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.").

  This Court must first consider whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, establish that his constitutional rights were violated. Here, the right to file prison grievances, and to be free from discrimination and retaliation, are clearly established constitutional rights. However, the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not establish that Defendant violated those rights. The facts presented by Plaintiff at a minimum show that there is a dispute over whether Defendant filed a disciplinary rules violation against Plaintiff out of retaliation. Specifically, the Rules Violation Report offered by Plaintiff does not show that Defendant's actions did not have a legitimate penological interest. Rather, it shows that Plaintiff was in fact found to have not followed a direct order. Accordingly, there are still triable issues of fact as Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that his constitutional rights were violated, and summary judgment is not appropriate.

  Defendant urges that he should be allowed to assert qualified immunity by bringing his own motion for summary judgment on that and all other applicable grounds. This Court notes that Defendant has failed to file a timely motion for summary judgment, and has thus waived his right to do so. Further, this Court previously denied Defendant's request, based on his counsel's representation of a heavy caseload, for an extension of time to file a cross-motion for summary judgment. In an order dated September 26, 2005, this Court stated that it could not find good cause for extending the time to file the motion premised on the fact that Defendant's counsel was working on every other pending case but this one. Again, this Court cannot find good cause to allow Defendant to bring a late motion for summary judgment.

  F. Sanctions

  Plaintiff contends sanctions should be imposed against Defendant's counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for causing unnecessary delay and increasing the cost of litigation. Specifically, Plaintiff urges that defense counsel misled the Court and Plaintiff by requesting an extension of pretrial deadlines so that defense counsel could depose Plaintiff and submit expert reports. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's counsel unnecessarily delayed litigation because, although Defendant's counsel requested the extension, he never took Plaintiff's deposition or submitted expert reports. Defendant's counsel contends that sanctions are not warranted because he did not violate any court orders in seeking extensions of time.

  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 prohibits lawyers from filing papers with the court that are: (1) "presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation," or (2) not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1)-(2); United Nat. Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001).

  "Rule 11 . . . imposes an objective standard of reasonable inquiry which does not mandate a finding of bad faith." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991); G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) ("As with frivolous pleadings, whether a paper is filed for improper purpose is tested by objective standards.") (quotations omitted). The subjective intent of counsel is of no importance. Instead, the court applies a reasonable person standard. G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc., 326 F.3d at 1109 ("The `reasonable man' against which conduct is tested [for purposes of Rule 11] is a competent attorney admitted to practice before the district court."). It is important to note that the court "should impose sanctions on lawyers for their mode of advocacy only in the most egregious situations, lest lawyers be deterred from vigorous representation of their clients." R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d at 1115. In the present case, Defendant's counsel submitted an application for extension of time of the remaining pretrial deadlines. In this application and at the Mandatory Settlement Conference held on January 21, 2005, Defendant's counsel represented that additional time was needed to complete expert discovery and to conduct Plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff made no objections to the request. Accordingly, the Court found good cause to grant Defendant's request. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant's counsel contacted him well after the point of discovery cut-off to request additional time to conduct further discovery. Plaintiff declined defense counsel's request. Although Defendant's counsel may not have deposed Plaintiff or submitted an expert report, the Court does not find this conduct so egregious as to warrant sanctions. Plaintiff did not object to defense counsel's request for an extension of the remaining pretrial deadlines and declined to stipulate to additional time for discovery when contacted via telephone by defense counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for sanctions is DENIED.

  III. Conclusion

  After thorough review of the record in this matter and based on the foregoing analysis, IT IS RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.
  2. Plaintiff's Motion to Sanction Defendant's Counsel be DENIED.

  This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1993).

  IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than December 9, 2005, any party may file and serve written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed and served no later than December 30, 2005. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

20051108

© 1992-2005 VersusLaw Inc.



Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.