The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES BREYER, District Judge
This section 1983 action arises out of the defendant police
officers' 10 minute detention of plaintiff Sam Morgan, a
California Highway Patrol Officer. Plaintiff alleges that there
was no probable cause to detain him; the officers used excessive
force; the detention was racially motivated; and the City of
Pleasant Hill had a policy that led to these constitutional
violations. Now pending before the Court is defendants' motion
for summary judgment on all claims. After carefully considering
the evidence and argument submitted by the parties, and having
had the benefit of oral argument, defendants' motion is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on December 19, 2003, a man called
the Pleasant Hill police dispatcher. The caller reported that he
had been in Einstein Entertainment in Pleasant Hill when two
gentlemen came into the store. He reported further that the store
employees then suddenly announced that the store was closing and that all
the customers should leave, as there was an emergency. The caller
left the store and a few minutes later drove by the store. He
reported that when he drove by he saw the guys who had entered
the store behind the register, and they had a phone up to their
ear. The caller explained that the store was supposed to be open
until 10:00 p.m. He told the dispatcher: "I don't know it just
felt funny, and I wasn't really sure if I should call, I mean,
but it just was really weird." The caller then described the two
men: a 6'3" African-American man, and a shorter, dark-skinned
Asian man. He reported that the men had a big case with them,
"like one of those large suitcases."
The dispatcher called Pleasant Hill police officer defendant
Drew Sanchez and his partner. The dispatcher ordered the officers
to respond to the store and stated that a caller reported that
"two subjects came into the store, spoke to the employees, the
employees then told all the customers they needed to leave that
they had an emergency, and locked the doors behind them."
Defendant police officer Steve Dexheimer also responded to the
call. The dispatcher described the subjects as a tall black male
and a shorter Asian male carrying a large suitcase.
The responding officers asked the dispatcher to call the video
store. She did, and a person identifying himself as "Joseph"
answered the phone. The dispatcher relayed to Joseph what the
caller had reported and said, "he was a little concerned for your
guys' safety. . . . So we wanted to call and make sure." Joseph
responded, "the subjects are still here." He explained further
that the two men had police identification, but no uniforms, that
they came with state papers, and that it looks like official
business. The dispatcher then asked Joseph to send someone
outside to talk with the officers. The dispatcher reported to the
defendant officers that the store employee had said "that the
subjects that are there, still there. And that they are not
uniforms, but have badges, and state papers, and say that they're
police officers."
Joseph came out of the store and talked to the defendant
officers. He reported that the men were taking money out of the
register. Officer Dexheimer then reported to the dispatcher about
the money being taken from the register, and explained that the
officers still did not know what was going on. Officer Dexheimer asked the
dispatcher to place another call to the store. He also asked the
dispatcher to send another officer to cover the rear of the
store. A store employee, "Bill," answered the dispatcher's call
to the store. The dispatcher told Bill to meet the officers
outside and to bring the phone with him. He did so. Neither
Joseph nor Bill could tell the officers anything more about why
the men were taking money out of the register.
According to the defendant officers, they believed a night-time
robbery was in progress so they entered the store with their
weapons drawn. Before they did so, they radioed the dispatcher
that they were "code 4." Code 4 means no further assistance
required. At that time there were two other officers on the
scene. The defendant officers then entered the store with their
weapons targeted at the two "suspects." According to plaintiff,
he and his partner identified themselves as police officers, but
defendants ordered them to the ground and handcuffed them.
Officer Dexheimer saw a badge around plaintiff's neck.
The two men identified themselves as plainclothes California
Highway Patrol ("CHP") investigators who were in the process of
serving a tax warrant at the business. The defendant officers
searched plaintiff and his partner and removed their weapons and
identification, while they were still handcuffed and on the
ground. Officer Dexheimer then asked his partner to search
plaintiff again, "to make sure I didn't miss anything." The two
"suspects" provided law enforcement identification, badges and
other corroborating identification showing that they were CHP
Officers Sam Morgan and Edward Dela Cruz. The defendant officers
then removed the handcuffs, released them, and apologized.
Plaintiff asked the defendant officers why they responded as
they had. Officer Dexheimer responded something to the effect
that "this is Pleasant Hill, this town is lily white . . . you
guys are two minorities . . . what do you expect us to do?"
According to plaintiff, the detention lasted approximately 10
minutes. The evidence also demonstrates that the CHP has a policy
that requires tax warrants to be served by uniformed officers,
although plaintiff claims that he was given permission to serve
this particular warrant in plainclothes. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CHP Officer Morgan filed this section 1983 suit seeking damages
and injunctive relief. He claims he was detained without probable
cause; defendants used excessive force; they detained him because
of his race; and a City of Pleasant Hill policy led to the
violations (Monell claim). Defendants move for summary judgment
on all claims on the ground that no reasonable trier of fact
could find any constitutional violations. In the alternative,
they argue that at a minimum they are entitled to qualified
immunity.
A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A party
moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate
burden of persuasion at trial (usually the defendant) has the
initial burden of producing evidence negating an essential
element of the non-moving party's claims or showing that the
non-moving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.
See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos.,
210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the
non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything and
summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand, the
moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then
the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's evidence, but instead must produce
admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one that could
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is
"material" ...