The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. United States District Judge
(1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION;
(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. NO. 28]; and
(3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC. ) NO. 46].
Plaintiff Carlos Hendon ("Plaintiff"), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint ("Complaint") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), in which he alleges that prison medical staff ("Defendants") forcibly drugged him in violation of his civil rights. [Doc. No. 1.] On September 22, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. No. 28.] Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. No. 36.] On November 17, 2006, Defendants filed their Objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 43.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Further, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint.
Plaintiff is an inmate committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections ("CDC"), and the events giving rise to the causes of action herein occurred when Plaintiff was housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJDCF"). (See Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff named multiple Defendants in his Complaint, including Homer Ramsey, a psychiatrist at RJDCF, Margo Parker, a psychologist at RJDCF, several registered nurses employed at the prison, an unnamed medical contractor, a medical technical assistant, and various named RJDCF correctional officers. (Id. ¶¶ 4-8.)
According to the Complaint, Defendants Ramsey and Parker diagnosed Plaintiff as being suicidal, psychotic, and a potential danger to others. As a result, Plaintiff received "mental health crisis bed treatment." (Id. ¶12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ramsey and Parker prescribed psychotropic drugs and ordered the drugs to be forcibly administered to Plaintiff against his will. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff alleges that these activities occurred during the following periods: (1) November 14, 2003, to November 26, 2003; (2) May 7, 2004, to at least July 13, 2004; and (3) other unknown dates. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant medical contractor created or allowed the continuance of a policy that permitted physicians to forcibly administer medication to an inmate with no immediate indications of violence. ( Id. ¶¶ 13, 22.) Plaintiff further alleges that the remaining Defendants, all part of the prison staff, aided in forcibly medicating Plaintiff by extracting him from his cell and/or administering the medications to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff asserts that he suffered side effects from the administered medications, including stiffness, a shuffling gait, weight gain, high blood pressure and cholesterol, dry mouth, hallucinations, and symptoms akin to having Parkinson's disease. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not afforded protections required by CDC policy, which mandates that a prisoner be given notice and a hearing prior to the administration of long-term, involuntary psychotropic drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 16.)
Plaintiff alleges that the failure of Defendants Parker and Ramsey to follow CDC policy before ordering the forcible administration of drugs constitutes a violation of Plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant medical contractor's policy or custom permitting physicians to determine when a nonviolent inmate should be forcibly drugged constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a violation of Plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶ 22.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' actions in forcibly drugging Plaintiff or in failing to prevent such drugging constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a violation of Plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence under state law. (Id. ¶ 23.)
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").
Defs.' Mem. P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") at 1.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed for failure to file a timely government claim as required under California law. (See id.)
The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge's R&R are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge."
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). Dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where " 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the motion, the court must ...