The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dated: Martin J. Jenkins United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Stephen Joseph Kobe ("petitioner") is a California prisoner incarcerated in Soledad, California, who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 2004 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings ("Board")*fn1 to deny him parole. Respondent has filed an answer, and petitioner has filed a traverse.
In 1980, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder in San Diego County Superior Court, and sentenced to a term of 27 years to life in state prison. In 2004, petitioner appeared pro se at a parole hearing before the Board; at which time, petitioner had served approximately 24 years in prison. The Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole, and petitioner unsuccessfully challenged this decision in habeas petitions to all three levels of the California courts. Petitioner raised the same claims in his state habeas petitions as those raised herein, namely: (1) that the Board's finding petitioner unsuitable for parole violated his right to due process because it was not based on sufficient evidence; (2) the Board has an "anti-parole" policy; and (3) the Board's denial of parole violates the "spirit and terms" of his plea agreement, in violation of his right to due process.*fn2
This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Under AEDPA, this Court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court only if the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent "if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, 'or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision'" of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 975 (2006).
1. The Board's Decision Was Based on "Some Evidence"
Petitioner argues that the Board's denial of parole violated his due process rights because the decision finding him unsuitable was not supported by the evidence. A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if "some evidence" supports the decision. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting some evidence standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see also Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The standard of "some evidence" is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [administrative] board. See id. Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board's decision must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.
In assessing whether or not there is "some evidence" supporting the Board's denial of parole, this Court must consider the regulations which guide the Board in making its parole suitability determinations. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) states that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." The regulations direct the Board to consider "all relevant, reliable information available." Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, they list sets of circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d).*fn3 However, these circumstances are meant to serve as "general guidelines," giving the Board latitude in the weighing of the importance of the combination of factors present in each particular case. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2404(c).
The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the murder degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three choices of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. For second degree murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years, to a high of 19, 20 or 21 years, depending on certain facts of the crime.*fn4 Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term, this occurs only once the prisoner has been found suitable for parole. Id. § 2403(a). The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71.
While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., life-maximum) sentences should "normally" receive "uniform" parole dates for similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies "unless [theBoard] determines" that a release date cannot presently be set because theparticular offender's crime and/or criminal history raises "public safety" concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under standards of term uniformity ...