The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Before the Court are Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz Vista Two, LLC's ("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Motion to Strike. [Doc. No. 44] Plaintiff Diane Cross ("Plaintiff") has filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 54.] The issues presented are decided without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1.d.1 (2006). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz Vista Two, LLC.
This is a disability discrimination case alleging that architectural barriers at various retail establishments located within the North County Square Shopping Center ("Shopping Center") violate federal and state law by preventing Plaintiff, an alleged disabled individual, from enjoying full and equal access to public accommodations. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff brings claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), the California Disabled Persons Act ("DPA"), and the Health and Safety Code. (See generally id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she is a paraplegic and therefore "physically disabled" within the meaning of federal and state law. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendants Krausz Vista, LLC and Krausz Vista Two, LLC owned portions of the Shopping Center from June 25, 2004, to January 26, 2007. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Defendants assigned their ownership interests in the Shopping Center to ValVista South, LLC and Valvista North, LLC approximately two months before Plaintiff filed this action on March 16, 2007. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants presently have no ownership interest in the Shopping Center. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that during a visit to the Shopping Center, she encountered barriers that prevented her from enjoying full and equal access to the facilities located thereon and deterred her from returning. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. (See generally Compl.)
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's ADA claims because Plaintiff lacks standing. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Defendants contend that because Plaintiff cannot establish that her injuries are redressable, Plaintiff has failed to establish standing. (Id. at 6.) Specifically, Defendants assert that they cannot provide the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks under the ADA because they no longer have ownership or control over the property at issue. (Id.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants no longer own the property at issue. (Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) However, Plaintiff argues that any dismissal of her claims should be without prejudice. (Id.)
A. Legal Standard: Standing
Article III of the Constitution requires that litigants have standing to invoke the federal court's power. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) ("In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.") (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Lack of Article III standing constitutes a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion challenging standing is properly presented under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See id. ("Because standing . . . pertain[s] to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, [it is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6).").
The party invoking jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements. First, the plaintiff must have "suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Second, there must be a causal nexus between the alleged injury and the defendant's challenged conduct. See id. Third, it must be likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury. See id. at 561.
B. Legal Standard: Injunctive Relief Under the ADA
The enforcement provisions of Title III of the ADA provide only for injunctive relief, and damages are not available to individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). Injunctive relief typically takes the form of "an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by [Title III]." See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). Such relief "is available to 'any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability' or who has 'reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be ...