The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hayes, Judge
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand to state court. (Docs. #11). The Court finds this matter suitable for submission on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).
On March 23, 2007, Plaintiff Elizabeth Maher (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of California against Defendants Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Novartis), Novartis Corporation*fn1 and McKesson Corporation (McKesson). Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1), ¶ 1. The Complaint alleges state law claims against Novartis and McKesson for injuries sustained by Plaintiff when Plaintiff ingested the prescription drug Tegretol, an anti-seizure medication. Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 3. Specifically, the Complaint alleges state law claims for (1) strict products liability, (2) common law fraud, (3) negligence, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) misrepresentation, (6) express warranty, (7) implied warranty, and (8) violations of the California Business & Professions Code. Compl., ¶¶ 42-70.
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of California. Notice of Removal, ¶ 4; Compl., ¶ 2. Defendant Novartis is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the State of New Jersey. Compl., ¶ 4; Notice of Removal, ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that Novartis, "[a]t all times relevant . . . was in the business of designing, testing, manufacturing, labeling, advertising, marketing, promoting, selling and distributing pharmaceuticals, including Tegretol, and other products for use by the mainstream public, including Plaintiff." Compl., ¶ 10. Defendant McKesson is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the State of California. Compl., ¶ 7; Notice of Removal, ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that McKesson, "[a]t all times relevant . . . was in the business of labeling, advertising, marketing, promoting, selling and distributing pharmaceuticals, including Tegretol, and other products for use by the mainstream public, including Plaintiff." Compl., ¶ 11.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Novartis and Mckesson, or their representatives, "manufactured, marketed, distributed and sold" Tegretol to Plaintiff. Compl., ¶ 13. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Novartis and McKesson knew that Tegretol was a dangerous drug and failed to adequately warn physicians and patients about its dangers. Compl., ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made false statements about Tegretol and improperly promoted the Tegretol taken by Plaintiff for off-label uses. Compl., ¶ 19.
On April 11, 2007, Plaintiff served Defendant Novartis with the Complaint. Notice of Removal, ¶ 2. On May 11, 2007, Novartis filed Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1). The Notice of Removal asserts diversity jurisdiction and contends that the citizenship of Defendant McKesson is irrelevant because McKesson is a sham Defendant fraudulently joined. Notice of Removal, ¶ 7. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 9-10; Compl., ¶ 75, 84, 87-88.
On June 1, 2007, Plaintiff moved to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Docs. # 8, 11).
"A federal court can exercise removal jurisdiction over a case only if it would have had jurisdiction over [the case] as originally brought by the plaintiff." Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Removal based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Removal is not permitted where one of the defendants "is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, Holcomb v. Bingham Toyota, 871 F.2d 109, 110 (9th Cir. 1989), and there is a "strong presumption against removal jurisdiction." Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006), citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining the existence of removal jurisdiction, a court may ignore a "fraudulently joined" defendant. Morris v. Princess Cruise Lines, 236 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2001). "Fraudulent joinder is a term of art"--when a "plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident defendant is fraudulent." McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987).
A district court evaluating fraudulent joinder properly considers the allegations of the complaint and any evidence submitted by the parties showing the joinder is fradulent. Ritchey v. UpJohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339. "All disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law" must be resolved in favor of the non-removing party, and "any doubts concerning the sufficiency of a cause of action due to inartful, ambiguous, or technically defective pleading must be resolved in favor of remand." Aaron, CV 05-4073-JFW (MANx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40745, *5-6 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2005); see also Little v. Purdue Pharma, LP, 227 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("a federal court should hesitate before pronouncing a state claim frivolous, unreasonable, and not even colorable in an area yet untouched by the state courts.").
Plaintiff moves for remand to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff, a citizen of the State of California, contends that there is no diversity jurisdiction because Defendant McKesson is a legitimate defendant with its place of business in the State of California. Plaintiff contends that a distributor such as Defendant McKesson is liable under California law ...