The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Larry Alan Burns United States District Judge
ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has paid the $5.00 filing fee and has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petition is subject to dismissal without prejudice because Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent and has failed to allege exhaustion of state court remedies with respect to all claims presented. The Court will therefore dismiss the Petition without prejudice to Petitioner to file a First Amended Petition which names a proper respondent and alleges exhaustion of state court remedies.
Review of the Petition reveals that Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent. On federal habeas, a state prisoner must name the state officer having custody of him as the respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). "Typically, that person is the warden of the facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated." Id. Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to name a proper respondent. See id.
The warden is the typical respondent. However, "the rules following section 2254 do not specify the warden." Id. "[T]he 'state officer having custody' may be 'either the warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.'" Id. (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory committee's note). If "a petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, '[t]he named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner (for example, the warden of the prison).'" Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory committee's note).
Here, Petitioner has incorrectly named "The People of the State of California" and "Jerry Brown, the Attorney General of the State of California" as Respondents. A long standing rule in the Ninth Circuit holds "that a petitioner may not seek [a writ of] habeas corpus against the State under . . . [whose] authority . . . the petitioner is in custody. The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the respondent." Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1968). This requirement exists because a writ of habeas corpus acts upon the custodian of the state prisoner, the person who will produce "the body" if directed to do so by the Court. "Both the warden of a California prison and the Director of Corrections for California have the power to produce the prisoner." Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 895.
Additionally, the Attorney General of the State of California, is not a proper respondent in this action. Rule 2 of the Rules following § 2254 provides that the state officer having custody of the petitioner shall be named as respondent. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. However, "[i]f the petitioner is not yet in custody -- but may be subject to future custody -- under the state-court judgment being contested, the petition must name as respondents both the officer who has current custody and the attorney general of the state where the judgment was entered." Rule 2 (b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, there is no basis for Petitioner to have named the Attorney General as a respondent in this action.
In order for this Court to entertain the Petition filed in this action, Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state correctional facility in which Petitioner is presently confined or the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice due to Petitioner's failure to name a proper respondent. To have this case reopened, Petitioner must file a First Amended Petition no later than December 31, 2007 in conformance with this Order.
Further, the Court notes that Petitioner may not be able to simply amend his Petition to state a federal habeas claim and then refile the amended petition in this case. He must exhaust state judicial remedies before bringing his claims via federal habeas. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: "If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added). For example, "[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court." Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
Here, although Petitioner indicates that he has presented claim 1 to the state supreme court on direct appeal, he indicates that he has not presented claims 2 and 3 to the state supreme court. (See Pet. at 6-9.) Although Petitioner states that he is unable to present such claims on direct review (see Pet. at 5), he has not attempted to explain why he is, or was, unable to present those claims to the state supreme court though post-conviction collateral review proceedings, such as a habeas corpus petition. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion with respect to these claims. The burden of pleading that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.1981).
Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...