The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller United States District Judge
ORDER: (1) DENYING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION; and (2) DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
On October 23, 2007, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. On November 15, 2007, the case was transferred to this district.
MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The request to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED because Petitioner has not provided the Court with sufficient information to determine Petitioner's financial status and because Petitioner has failed to sign the motion. A request to proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must include a certificate from the warden or other appropriate officer showing the amount of money or securities Petitioner has on account in the institution. Rule 3(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Local Rule 3.2. In addition , a request to proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must be executed by the petitioner under penalty of perjury. See Local Rule 3.2; Rule 3(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Petitioner has failed to provide the Court with the required Prison Certificate and has failed to sign the motion to proceed in forma pauperis under penalty of perjury.
FAILURE TO USE THE PROPER FORM
Additionally, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus must be submitted in accordance with the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See Rule 2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. In order to comply with the Local Rules, the petition must be submitted upon a court-approved form and in accordance with the instructions approved by the Court. Presently, Petitioner has submitted an application for writ of habeas corpus on a non-approved form.
FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must "fairly present his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it . . . or . . . demonstrate that no state remedy remains available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. For example, "[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (emphasis added). Nowhere on the Petition does Petitioner allege that he raised his claims in the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has raised his claims in the California Supreme Court he must so specify.
Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...