Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-05-01443-REJ/PP.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judge
Argued and Submitted October 23, 2008 -- Portland, Oregon
Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges, and George Wu,*fn1 District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Oregon (Oregon) appeals the district court's dismissal of its claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Oregon brought suit against the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) for an alleged violation of its rights under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. LSC has required the recipients of its funding to maintain legal, physical, and financial separation from organizations that engage in certain prohibited activities. Oregon alleges that this restriction has effectively thwarted its ability to regulate the practice of law in the State of Oregon and to provide legal services to its citizens. The district court dismissed the suit on the basis that Oregon's allegations of injury were not recoverable, and Oregon appealed. Because we conclude that Oregon lacks standing, we vacate the district court's dismissal of this action on the merits and remand with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Background: The Program Integrity Regulation
LSC is a private nonprofit corporation established by the United States for the purpose of providing financial support to individuals who would otherwise be unable to afford legal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a). To accomplish this purpose, LSC provides federal funds to local legal assistance programs throughout the United States. Id. § 2996e(a). See generally Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 (LSC Act), Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996l).
By regulation, LSC places certain restrictions on the use of its funds. Id. § 2996e(b)(1). These restrictions include, for example, a prohibition on the use of LSC funding for such activities as lobbying, participating in class action lawsuits, and advocating for the redistricting of political districts. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1612.3, 1617.3, 1632.3. Additionally, LSC requires its recipients to maintain "objective integrity and independence from any organization that engages in restricted activities." Id. § 1610.8(a).*fn2 Requirements for this "objective integrity" are codified in what is now denominated the "pro-gram integrity" rule or regulation. The requirements include:
(1) legal separation of the recipient from the unrestricted organizations; (2) no transfer of LSC funds between the recipient and the unrestricted organization; and (3) the recipient's physical and financial separation from the unrestricted organization.*fn3 Id.
Whether an LSC fund recipient is sufficiently physically and financially separated from non-compliant legal services providers is determined on a case-by-case basis, based upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. § 1610.8(a)(3). The program integrity regulation specifies that "mere bookkeeping separation of LSC funds from other funds is not sufficient." Id. Other factors, such as having separate personnel, separate accounting and timekeeping records, separate facilities, and distinguishing forms of identification are relevant but not all- encompassing. Id. Fund recipients must annually certify to the LSC that they comply with the program integrity regulation. Id. § 1610.8(b).
In this appeal, Oregon contends that the program integrity regulation violates its Tenth Amendment rights.
II. Factual and Procedural History: Conflict with Oregon's Guidelines
In April 2005, the Oregon State Bar amended its guidelines for Oregon's legal services program, directing service providers to integrate their operations and staff in places where separate organizations provide services to the same geographic area. While some of Oregon's service providers are LSC fund recipients, others are not and engage in restricted activities. Legal Aid Services of Oregon (LASO), a legal services provider, is a recipient of LSC funds, which account for approximately 45% of its $6.5 million annual budget. Oregon Law Center (OLC), another large legal services provider, is not an LSC fund recipient and engages in LSC-restricted activities.
In response to the State Bar's amended guidelines, LASO submitted a configuration proposal to LSC that would combine the LASO and OLC corporations into one non-profit corporation. Under the proposal, the newly constituted corporation would have two divisions, one of which would be subject to the LSC restrictions and the other of which would not. The two divisions would also maintain separate financial books and records, and would notify the public of their distinct functions in letterheads, business cards, and signage. However, the two divisions of the proposed new entity would share personnel and equipment, and would operate in the same physical premises. LSC's Office of Legal Affairs reviewed the proposal and concluded that it would not comply with LSC's requirements for program integrity.
In September 2005, LASO and OLC filed a complaint against LSC in district court, alleging that the LSC restrictions violated their First Amendment rights. On the same day and in the same court, Oregon filed this action against LSC alleging that the program integrity regulation effectively thwarted Oregon's policies governing its legal services program, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Oregon sought to enjoin LSC from enforcing the program integrity regulation in Oregon. The two suits were consolidated and assigned to a magistrate judge.
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant LSC's motion to dismiss as to all of LASO's claims except its as-applied challenge to the program integrity rule. The magistrate judge also recommended granting LSC's motion to dismiss Oregon's complaint, because the state itself was not regulated by the LSC and because Oregon's claims of coercion did not meet the high standard required under Ninth Circuit precedents. ...