The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
On November 19, 2008, Defendant Jeremiah Barry filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Alternatively, Defendant moved for a More Definite Statementunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs David T. Jackson and Carl Benson were allegedly co-tenants in Apt. No. 23 at the Felton Courtyard, located at 4240 Felton St., San Diego, CA, 92104. (FAC ¶ 1.) According to Defendant, Jackson became a tenant around May, 2007. (Barry Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendant claims Benson moved into Jackson's unit (but did not officially sign a lease) around October or November, 2007. (Id.) Defendant alleges that he is merely the property manager of Felton Courtyard, while Jon Hall is the owner and landlord. (Barry Decl. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiffs are African-American. (FAC ¶ 6.)
Plaintiffs initially filed a Complaint with the Court on July 2, 2008. On July 9, 2008, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 29, 2008, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice and granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint within forty-five days.
On October 15, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their FAC. Plaintiffs' FAC appears to make generalized accusations of discrimination by Barry and complaints regarding the standard of living conditions at Felton Courtyard. Plaintiffs also claim specifically that Barry prohibited them from engaging white guests at their residence. (FAC ¶ 10.) The FAC does not clearly state whether Plaintiffs allege that their eviction was based on their race. Rather, Plaintiffs state that "Barry began retaliatory eviction for alleged non payment [sic] of rent," which they claim to have paid. (FAC ¶ 12.)
Plaintiffs' FAC brings four causes of action. Plaintiffs appear to assert their first claim, "denial of full enjoyment and use," under several provisions of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The FAC's second cause of action, also under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, appears to claim Defendant intentionally, or with reckless disregard, caused Plaintiffs emotional distress. Plaintiffs' third cause of action allegedly comes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for "ignoring dangerous conditions . . . and providing inferior living conditions." Finally, Plaintiffs' bring their fourth claim pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act for Defendant's "failure to modify existing policies and procedures" that denied Plaintiffs "equal accommodations," seemingly on the basis of their race.
On November 19, 2008, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for a More Definite Statement. On December 9, 2008 Plaintiff Benson filed a response. On January 2, 2009, Defendant filed his reply.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss first argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Because Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' only federal cause of action fails to state a claim, he asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the remainder of Plaintiffs' FAC, all state law claims. Finally, if the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs' FAC, Defendant requests that the Court order Plaintiffs to file a more definite statement.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") should be granted only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff must set forth only a "short and plain statement" of the claim showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts of the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' Section 1983 cause of action must fail because it alleges no state action. To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show only (1) that the conduct engaged in by the defendant was under the color of state law; and (2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962). The "under-color-of-state-law element of [Section] 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citations omitted). Conduct by private individuals may, however, constitute action "under the ...