With the agreement of the parties, and with the consent of defendant Yusef Sterling, the Court enters this order documenting defendant's exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), from January 29, 2009, to March 19, 2009. The parties agree, and the Court finds and holds, as follows: 1. Defendant agreed to an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act. Failure to grant the requested continuance would unreasonably deny defendant's counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, in this case. Defendant's counsel requested this exclusion in order to allow him time to continue to evaluate the case against his client and to discuss the case with his client. 2. Given these circumstances, the Court found that the ends of justice served by v. SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION excluding the period from January 29, 2009, to March 19, 2009, outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. at § 3161(h)(8)(A). 3. Accordingly, and with the consent of the defendant, at the hearing on January 29, 2009, the Court ordered that the period from January 29, 2009, to March 19, 2009, be excluded from Speedy Trial Act calculations under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) & (B)(iv).