The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Larry Alan Burns United States District Judge
ORDER: (1) DISMISSING DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO P. JAYASUNDARA, EFFECT SERVICE OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)
On September 22, 2008, Plaintiff, Jay G. Kimpel, an inmate currently incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but instead submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
On November 26, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b). See Nov. 26, 2008 Order at 6-7. Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint and cautioned him that any claims not re-alleged and Defendants not named in the First Amended Complaint would be deemed waived. Id. (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)).
On February 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Doc. No. 5]. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not rename the California Department of Corrections as a Defendant. Accordingly, the California Department of Corrections is DISMISSED from this action. See King, 814 F.2d at 567.
II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)
As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds "frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim).
Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur "before service of process is made on the opposing parties").
"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims in his First Amended Complaint survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and that Plaintiff is therefore entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases."); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (providing that "service be effected by a United States marshal, deputy Untied States marshal, or other officer specially appointed by the court ... when the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915."). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that "the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring." Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
III. Conclusion and Order
Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant California Department of Corrections is DISMISSED from this action. See ...