The opinion of the court was delivered by: Anthony W. Ishii Chief United States District Judge
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant D.M. Camp & Sons is a commercial table grape grower based in Kern County. Plaintiffs Fernando Rodriguez and Guadalupe Herrera are former employees of Defendant. The operative complaint is the third amended complaint, ("TAC"). Doc. 170. The TAC alleges Defendant failed to properly pay wages by forcing employees to work off the clock, forcing employees to purchase tools out of pocket, failing to pay minimum required wages, failing to provide meal and rest periods, failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failing to maintain time records. Plaintiffs' claims are divided into ten causes of action: (1) violations of the federal Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. ("AWPA") through misinformation concerning the terms and conditions of employment, noncompliance with the terms of the working arrangement, failure to pay wages when due, and failing to provide accurate itemized written statements; (2) failure to pay wages; (3) failure to pay reporting time wages; (4) failure to provide required meal and rest periods as required by the Industrial Welfare Commission Work Order 14 ("IWC Order 14-2001") and Cal. Labor Code §226.7; (5) failure to pay wages in a timely manner at the termination of employment; (6) failure to provide itemized employee wage statements; (7) recovery for these violations under the Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Labor Code §2699 et seq. ("PAGA"); (8) breach of contract; (9) violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. ("UCL") through the above described activities; and (10) failure to pay overtime wages.
Defendant has made a motion to dismiss on a number of grounds. Defendant argues there is no remedy for IWC Order 14-2001 meal and rest period violations under Cal. Labor Code §226.7; Plaintiffs fail to state an AWPA cause of action; and the court should decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007), citations omitted. The court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must also assume that "general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled on other grounds at 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969. Thus, the determinative question is whether there is any set of "facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint" that would entitle plaintiff to some relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). At the other bound, courts will not assume that plaintiffs "can prove facts which [they have] not alleged, or that the defendants have violated...laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is generally limited to reviewing only the complaint. "There are, however, two exceptions....First, a court may consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint on a motion to dismiss...If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, they may be considered if the documents' authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them. Second, under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001), citations omitted. The Ninth Circuit later gave a separate definition of "the 'incorporation by reference' doctrine, which permits us to take into account documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff's pleading." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005), citations omitted. "[A] court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss. Facts raised for the first time in opposition papers should be considered by the court in determining whether to grant leave to amend or to dismiss the complaint with or without prejudice." Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), citations omitted.
If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is granted, claims may be dismissed with or without prejudice, and with or without leave to amend. "[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges "the class members worked for periods of more than five hours without a meal period of 30 minutes and were not provided full statutory ten minute rest periods while in the employ of Defendants....Plaintiffs and the Class members they seek to represent did not voluntarily or willfully waive rest and/or meal periods." Doc. 170, TAC, at 16:5-8 and 17:6-7. Plaintiffs allege that this constitutes a violation of Cal. Labor. Code §226.7 while Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section 226.7.
1. Substantive Meal and Rest Period Requirements
The Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") is "the state agency empowered to formulate regulations (known as wage orders) governing employment in the State of California [while the] Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)...is the state agency empowered to enforce California's labor laws, including IWC wage orders." Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 561-62 (Cal. 1996). There are seventeen Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders ("IWC Orders") which cover different fields of employment; the IWC Order 14-2001 applies to "all persons employed in an agricultural occupation." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §11140 (2009). These IWC Orders supplement the California Labor Code and "may provide more restrictive provisions than are provided by the general statutes adopted by the Legislature." Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court of Kern County, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 733 (Cal. 1980), citations omitted.
Relevant to the present discussion, all of the IWC Orders were amended in 1980 and 2001. Under longstanding California law, the IWC "shall prepare a statement as to the basis upon which an adopted or amended order is predicated." Cal. Lab. Code §1177(b). "Labor Code sections 61 and 1193.5 specifically empower the DLSE to interpret and enforce IWC Orders with the primary objective of protecting workers. IWC orders must be liberally construed to accomplish this primary objective." Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 32 Cal. App. 4th 968, 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), citing Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 724 (Cal. 1980). The DLSE issues advice letters which state DLSE's interpretation of various issues arising from the IWC Orders. An older opinion states, "DLSE's interpretation of an IWC order is entitled to great weight and, unless it is clearly unreasonable, it will be upheld." Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Service, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 3d 16, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), quotations omitted. The California Supreme Court has consulted DLSE advice letters in interpreting IWC Orders. Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 584 (Cal. 2000), ("Unlike interpretive policies contained in the DLSE's 1989 Operations and Procedures Manual, advice letters are not subject to the rulemaking provisions of the APA. Although Royal correctly observes that the factual situations these advice letters address may be distinguished from this case, we nonetheless find persuasive the following general statement of 'hours worked' THE DLSE MADE IN EACH OF THESE LETTERS") emphasis in original; but see Medrano v. D'Arrigo Bros. Co., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Morillon in finding "DLSE's opinion is not binding authority").
IWC Order 14-2001 states:
11. Meal Periods. Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees after a work period of not more than five (5) hours to take a meal period of not less than thirty (30) minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day's work, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of employer and employee. Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during a thirty (30) minute meal period, the meal period shall be considered an 'on duty' meal period and counted as time worked. An 'on duty' meal period shall be permitted only when the nature of the work prevents an employee from being relieved of all duty and when by written agreement between the parties an on- the-job paid meal period is agreed to.
12. Rest Periods. Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof. However, a rest period need not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3 1/2) ...