Ct.App.3 C055838 Lassen County Super. Ct. Nos. J4674 & J4675 Judge: Stephen Douglas Bradbury
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Corrigan, J.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 authorizes the juvenile court to find that adoption of a dependent child is probable but difficult, and to order a search for an appropriate adoptive family. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subds. (b)(3) & (c)(3).)*fn1 The Courts of Appeal have divided over whether such orders are appealable. We hold that they are.
In this case, the Court of Appeal dismissed as premature an appeal from orders entered under section 366.26(c)(3). The mother of the affected children asks us to review only the question of appealability. We need not consider the facts to answer this question.
"A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment." (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); see Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018; In re Gabriel G. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435 (Gabriel G.) [citing cases]; In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Ramone R.) [citing cases].) As a result of these broad statutory terms, "[j]uvenile dependency law does not abide by the normal prohibition against interlocutory appeals." (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 590; see Ramone R., at p. 1350.) The dispositional order is the "judgment" referred to in section 395, and all subsequent orders are appealable. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 668.) " "A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or post-disposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.‟ (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.)" (Sara M., at p. 1018; see Ramone R., at p. 1350.)
The Legislature has restricted the right of appeal in certain dependency contexts. (See §§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1) [orders setting § 366.26 hearings], and 328 [placement orders following termination of parental rights].) As the mother here notes, however, there is no such limiting provision for section 366.26(c)(3) orders. We review the statutory context of these orders, before examining the parties‟ claims and the split that has developed among the Courts of Appeal on the issue before us.
The section 366.26 hearing is a critical late stage in a dependency proceeding. The child has been under juvenile court jurisdiction for an extended period following the dispositional order, and the court has held one or more review hearings to consider a return to parental custody. (See § 366.21.) At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from family reunification and toward the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Section 366.26 sets out "the exclusive procedures for conducting these hearings." (§ 366.26, subd. (a).) If adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be detrimental to the child.*fn2 (§ 366.26(c)(1); In re Celine R. (1993) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Under section 366.26(b), the court must "make findings and orders in the following order of preference: [¶] (1) Terminate the rights of the parent or parents and order that the child be placed for adoption . . . . [¶] (2) Appoint a relative or relatives with whom the child is currently residing as legal guardian or guardians for the child, and order that letters of guardianship issue. [¶] (3) On making a finding under paragraph (3) of subdivision (c), identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family for the child within a period not to exceed 180 days. [¶] (4) Appoint a non-relative legal guardian for the child and order that letters of guardianship issue. [¶] (5) Order that the child be placed in long-term foster care, subject to the periodic review of the juvenile court under Section 366.3."
Section 366.26(c)(3) comes into play "[i]f the court finds that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child . . . and that the child has a probability for adoption but is difficult to place for adoption and there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent." (Ibid.) In that case, "the court may identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and without terminating parental rights, order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family for the child . . . within a period not to exceed 180 days." (Ibid.) "At the expiration of this period, another hearing shall be held and the court shall proceed pursuant to paragraph (1) [adoption] or (4) [guardianship] of subdivision (b)." (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal dismissed mother‟s appeal from orders entered under section 366.26(c)(3). It was not persuaded by her reliance on the general rule of appealability provided in section 395, reasoning that she was challenging only the finding that her children were probably adoptable. This was error. It is true that "one does not appeal from a finding; one appeals from a judgment or from an order that the Legislature has designated as appealable." (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) However, review of findings is normally obtained by appeal from the ensuing judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906; In re Matthew C. (1995) 6 Cal.4th 386, 396.) That is what occurred here. Mother appealed from the "order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family." (§ 366.26(c)(3).)
The Court of Appeal also rejected mother‟s reliance on Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 1428, and Ramone R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, both of which hold that section 366.26(c)(3) orders are appealable. The court instead followed In re Y.R. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 99 (Y.R.), which disagreed, in dicta, with Gabriel G. and Ramone R. The Y.R. court reaffirmed its earlier decisions in In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011 (Jacob S.), and In re Cody C. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1297 (Cody C.), holding that appeals by parents from section 366.26(c)(3) orders were premature. Jacob S. and Cody C. viewed these orders as mere continuances of section 366.26 hearings, which did not aggrieve the parents in any way. (Jacob S., at p. 1019; Cody C., at pp. 1300-1301; see Y.R., at p. 111.) Respondent, Lassen County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), urges us to adopt this reasoning. However, the Ramone R. and Gabriel G. courts provide the more convincing analysis.
In 2005, Ramone R. observed that the rationale of Jacob S. and Cody C. had been undermined by recent amendments to section 366.26(c)(3), which limited the placement options available to the trial court. The Legislature had deleted long-term foster care as an option, identifying only adoption and guardianship as possible permanent plans under section 366.26(c)(3). (Ramone R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1349-1350.) Therefore, the Ramone R. court concluded that the 180-day period for seeking an adoptive placement could no longer be deemed a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, and that the usual rule permitting appeals from postdispositional orders in dependency proceedings applies to section 366.26(c)(3) orders. (Ramone R., at pp. 1350-1351; accord, Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.)
As the Gabriel G. court explained, referring to the subdivisions as they were lettered and numbered at the pertinent times, "[p]rior to 2003 [section 366.26] subdivision (c)(3) provided that following the expiration of the extra time allowed for seeking an adoptive placement, "another hearing shall be held and the court shall proceed pursuant to paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of subdivision (b). . . .‟ (Stats. 2001, ch. 747, § 3.) This meant that at the further hearing the juvenile court could select adoption, legal guardianship, or long-term foster care, which, arguably, made the further hearing like a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing. Now, however, the Legislature has eliminated the option of long-term foster care when no adoptive placement is found. The court must "proceed pursuant to paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (b) . . . .‟ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3).) That is, at the expiration of the 180-day period, the court is limited to the choices of adoption and legal guardianship. It follows that reversal of an erroneous subdivision (c)(3) ruling would not be an idle gesture because it would have the effect of returning the parties to the initial permanency planning stage and permit the selection of long-term foster care as the permanent placement plan, a situation that could not be achieved by allowing the matter to proceed along the course directed by the current version of subdivision (c)(3)." (Gabriel G., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436.)
The Y.R. court found this reasoning "puzzling." (Y.R., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 111.) It took the view that long-term foster is authorized by section 366.3 regardless of the provisions of section 366.26(c)(3). "[I]t is plain in section 366.3 that long-term foster care remains the de facto placement for children who are not freed for adoption or placed with a guardian. (See § 366.3, subds. (d) & (g).) For these children, [the social services agency] and the juvenile court must continue efforts to obtain more permanent placement in the form of ...