ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Elizabeth Sanchez's ("Plaintiff") motion for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") and Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. ("DJG") (collectively "Defendants") oppose the motion. The parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on this motion on May 13, 2009. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2005, Sanchez alleges she bought a Dorel model 01-834 PGH stroller ("Stroller") from Wal-Mart at Florin Road in Sacramento, California. Sanchez contends that she relied on Defendants' representations that the Stroller was safe, easy to use, of merchantable quality, and fit for its intended and reasonably foreseeable uses. Sanchez further contends that Defendants failed to adequately warn about a "dangerous, unguarded and unmitigated pinch point" that creates an "unreasonable potential for harm." Sanchez claims that were it not for Defendants' false and misleading statements, in the form of written representations and material omissions, she would not have purchased the $20 Stroller. According to Sanchez, once she learned of the Stroller's potential for harm, she had to replace it, and therefore suffered harm.
On October 2, 2006, Sanchez filed a class action lawsuit against Defendants in state court. On November 16, 2006, Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity. Doc. # 1. On January 18, 2008, Sanchez filed a second amended complaint seeking equitable relief, including restitution and injunctive relief in the form of a recall. Doc. # 84. In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks to certify this action as a class action. Doc. # 124. Defendants oppose the motion.*fn1 Doc. # 156.
A party seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four prerequisites enumerated in Rule 23(a), as well as at least one of the four requirements of Rule 23(b). Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking class certification must establish that: (1) the class is so large that joinder of all members is impracticable (i.e. numerosity); (2) there are one or more questions of law or fact common to the class (i.e., commonality); (3) the named parties' claims are typical of the class (i.e., typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the other members of the class (i.e. adequacy of representation). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). In addition to satisfying these prerequisites, parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 12(b)(1), (2), or (3). Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Class actions for monetary damages are permissible where "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that litigation of a class action be more efficient and fairer than alternative methods of adjudication. Id.
The party seeking certification must provide facts sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements. Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1977). In turn, the district court must conduct a rigorous analysis to determine that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been met. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). If a court is not fully satisfied, certification should be refused. Id.
Plaintiff has not met her burden in establishing that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. First, certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class requires a finding not only that common issues exist, but that they "predominate" over individual issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3). Here, the common issues relied on by Plaintiff in support of her motion do not predominate over the individual issues identified by Defendants in their opposition to this motion. The record established that there are many individual factors that must be examined before determining whether a particular individual's behavior with respect to the Stroller would have been materially changed by the presence of safety warnings. See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 746-747 (7th Cir. Ill. 2008); Blackwell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 453 (S.D. Cal. 2007)(refusing to certify class because of the need for "extensive individualized inquiries"). Class members are likely to react differently to the disclosure of safety information, therefore there are no "common" issues, and certainly no common issues that predominate. See id.
Second, there is no proof of the existence of injury on a classwide basis. When fact of injury cannot be established through classwide proof, class certification is improper. See, e.g., Caro v. Procter & Gamble, 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 668 (1993)(the Court concluded that "whether any asserted misrepresentation induced the purchase of  orange juice would vary from consumer to consumer," and therefore, the issue of liability was not susceptible to classwide proof). Here, Plaintiff contends that she and the absent class members sustained a classwide injury because (1) they were required to replace their allegedly defective Strollers or (2) they purchased a "less valuable" or "devalued" Stroller and failed to receive the "benefit of the bargain," represented by "the extent to which the product was devalued by the breach." Neither of these purported injuries however, can be established through classwide proof.
There is simply no way to determine whether any particular class member "replaced" the Stroller that he or she purchased with a different one, absent an individualized inquiry into that class member's particular circumstance. Further, whether any particular Stroller was "devalued" by the alleged breach is likewise an inherently individualized issue. For example, in Plaintiff's case, she made full use of the perfectly functioning Stroller for 18 months. Plaintiff must prove that she did not receive her $20 worth from the Stroller. It is impossible for her to prove that each and every one of the hundreds of thousands of potential class members did not receive the Stroller's worth either. Thus, because individual issues permeate every aspect of the claims in this suit, the requirement to prove commonality under Rule 23 has not been met.
Plaintiff's motion for class certification is also denied because she is an inadequate class representative. Her claims are not typical of the putative class and she cannot satisfy the "adequacy of representation" requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and (a)(4). The requirements that a class representative's claims be "typical" of those of the putative class, and that the class representative and class counsel "fairly and adequately" represent the interests of that class, ensure that the class representative is part of the proposed class, possesses the same interest, and suffers the same injury as the absent class members. See e.g. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
Here, Plaintiff's claims do not satisfy either the typicality or the adequacy requirements for many of the same reasons that her claims do not satisfy the commonality and predominance requirements. First, Plaintiff's claims are not typical of those of the class she seeks to represent. There are innumerable variations in the experiences and information possessed by consumers, in the factors that influence consumers' purchasing decisions, and in the manner by which consumers react to product warnings and the disclosure of safety information. The putative class will include persons who knew about the alleged hazard, yet purchased the product anyway; people, like Plaintiff, who bought the Stroller because of its price, size, and other characteristics; and many others for whom the "warning" would have made no difference in their purchase decision. As a result, there is no "typical" ...