ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
In the present case, plaintiff has identified as the defendants Sacramento County Assistant Public Defender Steve Plesser and Sacramento County Deputy District Attorney A.J. Pongrants. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that his right to legal counsel and his right to an assistant public defender have been violated. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he discussed his defense with his assigned public defender, Mr. Plesser, who then revealed it to Deputy District Attorney Pongrants. Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Plesser is improperly having Mr. Pongrants conduct the defense investigation. Plaintiff notes that he was planning to file a Marsden motion in his criminal proceedings, but the presiding judge has denied his previous motions. In the "Relief" section of the form complaint, asking plaintiff to state briefly what he wants this court to do for him, plaintiff requests that the court appoint proper counsel for him. (Compl. at 3.)
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff has a right to be free from violations of constitutional guarantees by those acting under color of state law. Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). However, plaintiff is advised that public defenders are not "state actors" for purposes of § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Briley v. State of California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (privately-retained attorney does not act under color of state law).
Plaintiff is also advised that where, as here, a state prosecutor engages "in activities 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,'" he is entitled to absolute immunity. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("Prosecutors are absolutely immune for quasi-judicial activities taken within the scope of their authority.").
Finally, plaintiff is advised that this court is barred from directly interfering with his ongoing criminal proceedings in state court, absent extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985) ("When a state criminal prosecution has begun the Younger rule directly bars a declaratory judgment action" as well as a section 1983 action for damages "where such an action would have a substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state criminal proceedings."). Here, plaintiff has not alleged extraordinary circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 48-50. Of course, plaintiff may raise his constitutional claims in his ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. Lebbos v. Judges of the Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Abstention is appropriate based on 'interest of ...