The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sandra M. Snyder United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, AND DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.*fn1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge.
On April 10, 2007, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to voluntary manslaughter (Cal. Penal Code*fn2 § 192) with personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022(b)(1)); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs causing injury (Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a)) with two enhancements; and failing to report an accident (Cal. Veh. Code § 20001(b)(1)). (Lodged Doc. No. 9, at p.8; Lodged Doc. No. 14.) Petitioner also admitted a prior prison term. Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of sixteen years and four months in state prison. (Lodged Doc. No. 10.)
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal.
However, on December 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court, which was denied on January 30, 2008. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 1-2.)
On April 23, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The petition was dismissed because it involved an appeal from a non-appealable order pursuant to People v. Ryan, 118 Cal.App.2d 144, 149 (1953). (Lodged Doc. Nos. 3, 5.)
On August 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on October 1, 2008. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 6-7.)
Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 17, 2008, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which was subsequently transferred to this Court. (Court Docs. 1, 3.)
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on February 3, 2009, and Petitioner filed a traverse on March 13, 2009. (Court Docs. 18 & 21.)
Because Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charges set forth in the Amended Information, there is no factual basis for the crimes in the record. In any event, the factual circumstances are not relevant to the disposition of the instant petition.
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.
Where a petitioner files his federal habeas petition after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), he can prevail only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id., quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (per curiam). "A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, at 1175 (citations omitted). "Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Id.(citations omitted).
"Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, § 2254(d)(2)." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Both subsections (d)(2) and (e)(1) of § 2254 apply to findings of historical or pure fact, not mixed questions of fact and law. SeeLambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 976-77 (2004).
Courts further review the last reasoned state court opinion. SeeYlst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991). However, where the state court decided an issue on the merits but provided no reasoned decision, courts conduct "an independent review of the record... to determine whether the state court [was objectively unreasonable] in its application of controlling federal law." Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). "[A]lthough we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decisions." Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner contends that a conflict arose between her appointed counsel and she was denied effective assistance. Petitioner's claim is completely conclusory in nature. However, to the extent Petitioner seeks to raise claims relating to pre-plea matters, it is foreclosed.
The United States Supreme Court, in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602 (1973), held that when "a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, to confront one's accusers, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and generally to challenge the evidence that he committed the offense. See Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709. Typically, one who enters a valid guilty plea, cannot on habeas corpus challenge pre-plea constitutional violations. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67, 93 S.Ct. 1602 (1973); see also Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir.1994) ("As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations"). Such a Petitioner may only contend that his guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent (see e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969)) or challenge the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See e.g., McMann v. ...