FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This case came before the court on April 9, 2009, for hearing of defendants' amended motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 10 ).*fn1 Plaintiff Glenn-Michael Kuder, proceeding pro se, appeared on his own behalf. Amy L. Morse, Esq. appeared telephonically for defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., an acquirer of certain assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank, and California Reconveyance Company. Upon consideration of all written materials filed in connection with the motion, the parties' arguments at the hearing, and the entire file, the undersigned recommends that defendants' motion be granted and this action be dismissed.
Plaintiff originally filed his complaint on November 13, 2008, in the Siskiyou County Superior Court. On December 19, 2009, defendants removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) on the grounds that this court has original jurisdiction over plaintiff's federal constitutional claims and as well as those brought under the Federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) and supplemental jurisdiction over any other claims. See Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1). Defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss on January 7, 2009. Plaintiff filed his written opposition to the motion on February 9, 2009.
Upon reviewing his difficult-to-decipher complaint the undersigned has gleaned that plaintiff alleges as follows. He purchased the subject property, located at 642 Main Street in Etna, California from one Philip Riley for the grand total of twenty-five dollars. (Compl. at 2.)*fn2
Mr. Riley was the borrower on a mortgage loan secured by a note and deed of trust on the subject property. (Compl. at 1.) Riley's lender was Long Beach Mortgage Company, who subsequently sold the loan to defendant Washington Mutual Bank. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff claims that defendant Washington Mutual fraudulently purchased the loan "without any valuable consideration" and without "incurring any financial cost" by creating a "demand deposit account." (Compl. at 2.) This is because, according to plaintiff, Federal Reserve Notes have "no backing by gold and silver, as required under Article One, Section Ten of our Federal Constitution" and, as a result, "[a]ll bank loans in the continental United States are fraudulent in their very nature[.]" (Compl. at 9.) Accordingly, plaintiff argues that neither he nor Mr. Riley caused defendant Washington Mutual Bank any damage by defaulting on the loan secured by the property. (Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff concludes that defendants have no right to be repaid, have no valid interest in the subject property and therefore cannot legally foreclose upon it. (Compl. at 24-29.)*fn3 Plaintiff seeks abatement of defendants' claim of any interest in the subject property and any right to repayment of the loan secured thereby, along with compensatory damages in the amount of $150 and punitive damages in the amount of $150 with all damages paid in "lawful money, silver specie (silver one ounce coins), minted in the united states of America (sic)." (Compl. at 40-42.)
Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that he has failed to state any cognizable claim. Specifically, defendants argues that at the heart of plaintiff's complaint is his frivolous contention that the loan made in this instance was not backed by gold or silver as required by the United States Constitution. (Mot. at 4.) Defendants assert that this so-called "vapor money" theory has no basis in the law and has been rejected by every court to which it has been presented. In addition, defendants argue that plaintiff has stated no cognizable claim based upon slander of title, fraudulent conveyance or any other provision of state or federal law. (Reply at 2-3.)
In his written opposition to the motion to dismiss plaintiff advances primarily the same arguments set forth in his complaint. None of those arguments is persuasive.
LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). "Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Thus, a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court's ability to grant any relief on the plaintiff's claims, even if the plaintiff's allegations are true.
In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, titled "Pleading Special Matters," provides as follows with regard to claims of "Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind":
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition ...