The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gregory G. Hollows United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See, consent filed on May 28, 2009, docket # 5.
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.*fn1
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments shall be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 2009 WL 1361536 at * 12 (May 18, 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843 (1969).
On the face of his complaint, plaintiff purports to sue the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), Matthew Cate, and the California Attorney General, Jerry Brown, on behalf of himself and "all similarly situated (ADA)." Complaint, p. 1.*fn2 Without ever adequately identifying how his own constitutional rights have been violated, plaintiff seeks to implicate these state officials for generic and undefined procedural due process violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that arise due to prison overcrowding. Complaint, pp. 3-5. The only claim arguably related to his personal circumstances arises when he makes a vague, unsupported claim that he has a June 2, 2009, release date that is not being honored because it would somehow violate the "job security" of unnamed prison guards. Id., at 4. Plaintiff also seeks forms of relief that appear to be frivolous and outlandish: he asks that "all ADA similarly situated prisoners" be released "into the 21st century" (a literal inevitability which has, of course, already occurred with no assistance from any judicial body), and that each putative plaintiff receive one billion dollars as compensatory damages and another billion in the form of punitive damages. Complaint, p. 3.
In the first place, plaintiff, on the face of it, does not have standing to sue on behalf of any party but himself. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (party must assert [his] own rights not those of third parties), citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 (1974). In the second place, plaintiff has made no motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, seeking to have the court certify the instant matter as a class action. Moreover, plaintiff is a non-lawyer proceeding without counsel. It is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily represent the interests of a class. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966). This rule becomes almost absolute when, as here, the putative class representative is incarcerated and proceeding pro se. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). In direct terms, plaintiff cannot "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," as required by Rule 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Middendorf, 420 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1976). Plaintiff's privilege to appear in propria persona is a "privilege ... personal to him. He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself." McShane v. U. S., 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir.1966), citing Russell v.United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962); Collins v. O'Brien, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 208 F.2d 44, 45 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 944, 74 S.Ct. 640 (1954). Therefore, it is likely that plaintiff can bring this action only on his own behalf. This action, therefore, will not presently be construed as a class action and, instead, will proceed as an individual civil suit brought by plaintiff.
Third, if plaintiff seeks to challenge the duration of his confinement, plaintiff must proceed by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus:
Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) (per curiam).
Fourth, plaintiff himself references the tentative conclusions of the three-judge panel addressing the state's overpopulated prisons. Complaint, p. 5. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 33090 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009). That panel has now issued its conclusions with regard to both the "woefully and constitutionally inadequate" medical and mental health care available to California prisoners and "the unprecedented overcrowding of California's prisons." Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820 *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). It appears that the allegations of plaintiff's putative complaint, such as they are, would be subsumed within or mooted by the Coleman class action, at least in regards to any claim for injunctive relief.*fn3 See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir.1979); see also McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir.1991) ("[i]ndividual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought ...