The opinion of the court was delivered by: Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge United States District Court
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT U.S. BANCORP'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 3); (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT WMC MORTGAGE CORP.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (Doc. No. 5); and (3) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT ALL THOSE CORP.'S MOTION FOR MORE CLAIMING INTEREST LEGAL OR DEFINITE STATEMENT (Doc. No. 6)
Presently before the Court are Defendants U.S. Bancorp's ("U.S. Bank") and WMC Mortgage Corp.'s ("WMC") motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. Nos. 3 and 5.) WMC has alternatively moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).*fn1 (Doc. No. 6.) Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to any of the motions. The Court finds the motions appropriate for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1).
On February 8, 2006, Plaintiff Anthony Sanchez ("Sanchez") allegedly entered an agreement to purchase for $600,000 the property located at 3721 Herman Street in San Diego, California (the "Property"). Plaintiff financed this purchase through a loan from WMC, which he apparently obtained on May 8, 2006. (Compl. ¶ 13.)*fn2 The loan was secured by a deed of trust on the Property. Beyond these bare factual allegations, what happened next is unclear. Based on scattered allegations in the complaint, it appears Plaintiff defaulted on his loan, contacted Defendants in an attempt to modify the terms of the loan, and Defendants refused to agree to his proposed modification.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging: (1) breach of contract as to WMC; (2) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to all defendants; (3) fraud as to WMC; (4) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 as to all defendants; (5) violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1611 as to all defendants; (6) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA," 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.) and California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA," Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq.") as to all defendants; (7) quiet title as to all defendants; and (8) declaratory relief as to all defendants. U.S. Bank and WMC now seek to dismiss all claims Plaintiff has brought against them.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2009). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if it contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007). The court only reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). Notwithstanding this deference, the court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Moreover, it is improper for a court to assume "the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged." Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Accordingly, a reviewing court may begin "by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
However, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
II. Breach of Contract (Against WMC)
Plaintiff alleges WMC breached "a contract" (presumably the loan agreement), which he entered into on May 8, 2006. Plaintiffs allege misconduct by WMC as follows:
On information and belief Plaintiff alleges that Defendant herein breached said contract in that it included unlawful terms in said contract in that it contained an unlawful rate. [¶] Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereupon alleges that Defendant and[/]or its agents and assignees by its actions an[d] conduct described herein have breached the agreement by, among other things refusing to accept payment when tendered and attempting to induce Plaintiff to vacate the premises. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff's allegations do not even rise to the level of "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff has not indicated which terms of the agreement were "unlawful," the amount of the rate, why the rate was "unlawful," or how WMC breached the contract through the unspecified terms and rate. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not specify which term(s) of the agreement WMC breached by "refusing to accept payment when tendered and attempting to induce Plaintiff to vacate the premises." (Compl., ¶ 16.) Although the Court must assume Plaintiff can prove the facts he alleges in his complaint, it may not assume that WMC has violated the law in ways that have not been alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 526. Accordingly, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is dismissed.
III. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Against All Defendants) A. U.S. Bank
Plaintiff has alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against all defendants. As to U.S. Bank, Plaintiff's claim fails because he has not alleged U.S. Bank is even a party to a contract with him. The prerequisite for any action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, because the covenant is an implied term of the contract. Smith v. City & County of San Francisco, 225 Cal. App. 3d 38, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("Without a contractual relationship, appellants cannot state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant.") Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff only alleges he entered a ...