Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Chan v. County of Sacramento

October 30, 2009

MADY CHAN, PLAINTIFF,
v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gregory G. Hollows United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se. On July 29, 2009, plaintiff filed a notice consenting to jurisdiction by the undersigned. No defendant parties have yet appeared.

Named as defendants are federal and county actors. Accordingly, the court finds this action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal actors, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by state and county actors. "Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens." Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir.1991).

On August 21, 2006, the court granted plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. On September 4, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion to file an amended complaint and motion for appointment of counsel. On September 8, 2009, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

Pursuant to the August 21, 2009, order, plaintiff's motion to amend is granted. The court will now screen the amended complaint.

Named as defendants are Sacramento County, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, "Doe" Classification Officer, Sacramento County Medical Director, "Doe" doctor, "Doe" dentist, Chaplain Ortiz, United States Marshal Amador, Deputy Marshal Yandell, Sergeant Morsey, and "Doe" Intel. Sergeant.

In claim one, plaintiff alleges that defendants Amador and Yandell violated his right to due process by labeling him as an escape risk. Plaintiff is challenging his classification as an escape risk. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a particular classification status. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, this claim is dismissed as legally frivolous.

In claim two, plaintiff alleges that on August 16, 2009, defendant Morsey and defendant "Doe" Intel. Sergeant placed him in administrative segregation for eight hours after other inmates attempted to escape from the Sacramento County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that his placement in administrative segregation, without good cause, violated his right to due process.

The court cannot order service of a "Doe" defendant. Accordingly, the court considers whether plaintiff has stated colorable claims against defendant Morsey.

It is unclear whether plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. Assuming he is, under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), prison regulations generally will create a federally enforceable liberty interest only where their application to an inmate "inevitably" affects the duration of the inmate's sentence or imposes an "atypical and significant hardship upon the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 487. The Sandin analysis applies to conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees which are not imposed as punishment. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir.1996).

Because plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation pursuant to an investigation, rather than as punishment, the Sandin analysis applies to this claim. Placement in administrative segregation for eight hours so that jail officials may investigate an attempt escape by other inmates does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of jail life. Accordingly, this claim has no legal merit.

Plaintiff next alleges that while he was in administrative segregation, his cell was searched. When he returned to his cell, all of his property had been removed. Defendant Morsey told plaintiff that his legal papers would be returned to him on August 24, 2009. When the papers were not returned on that date, on August 25, 2009, plaintiff again requested that they be returned. On August 26, 2009, plaintiff received 2/3 of his legal paperwork. Plaintiff goes on to allege that he was provided with access to his remaining legal materials. However, they were not placed in a sealed container. For that reason, he cannot determine whether any documents in his 20 boxes of legal materials are missing.

Plaintiff alleges that the temporary deprivation of his legal property violated his right to due process. Plaintiff also appears to allege that defendants may have confiscated some of his legal property.

Plaintiff's allegations do not state a colorable due process claim. Rather, they suggest a claim for violation of ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.