The opinion of the court was delivered by: William Q. Hayes United States District Judge
ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND MOTION FOR LAW LIBRARY ACCESS [Doc. Nos. 3, 14]; (2) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350 FROM PRISONER'S TRUST ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; (3) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS FOR LACK OF PROPER VENUE AND FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM; AND (4) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON REMAINING DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison located in Delano, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No 2], along with a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3].
On July 24, 2009, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's civil action as frivolous because the Court found that Plaintiff had already filed an action against the same defendants involving the same claims in Bryant v. Thomas, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-2573 WQH (AJB). See July 24, 2009 Order at 2-3. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration because he claimed that he was unable to pursue the 2006 action due to his transfer to a different prison, legal property being withheld from him, and he has been on "high doses of heavy psychiatric medications" for nearly two years. See Pl.'s Mot., Doc. No. 11, at 3. Based on these representations, the Court vacated its July 24, 2009 Order and directed the Clerk of Court to reopen this action. See Sept. 28, 2009 Order at 3. However, the Court informed Plaintiff that his Complaint would be subject to a sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Id.
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party's failure to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a "certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. However, Plaintiff's trust account statement shows he has insufficient funds with which to pay any initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available.").
Therefore, the Court GRANTSPlaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND MOTION FOR LAW LIBRARY ACCESS
Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action. "[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings." Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority "to make coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).
However, "[t]itle 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) permits the district court, in its discretion, to 'request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.'" Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)); see also Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). Such discretion may be exercised upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). "To show exceptional circumstances the litigant must demonstrate the likelihood of success and complexity of the legal issues involved." Burns, 883 F.2d at 823 (citation omitted); Hedges, 32 F.3d at 1363; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). Neither the likelihood of success nor the complexity of the case are dispositive; both must be considered. Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017; Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, it appears that at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has a sufficient grasp of his case, the legal issues involved, and is able to adequately articulate the factual basis of his claims. Under these circumstances, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] without prejudice at this time. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.
In addition, Plaintiff has filed a "Motion for Court Order Law Library Access." [Doc. No. 14]. In this request, Plaintiff is requesting that this Court order prison officials at Kern Valley State Prison to provide Plaintiff nine hours of law library access per week. At this time, Plaintiff has not shown an inability to file documents in this matter and there is no cause for this Court to order additional law library time in excess of ...