The opinion of the court was delivered by: William Q. Hayes United States District Judge
The matter before the court is Plaintiff Rodney Belle, Jr.'s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. # 2).
On November 13, 2009, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a complaint. (Doc. # 1). On November 13, 2009, Plaintiff also filed the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP"). (Doc. # 2).
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009).
In his affidavit accompanying the Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff states that he is unemployed, that he receives no income, that he has a checking account with a balance of $10.00, that he has no savings, and that he has no significant assets. (Doc. # 2 at 2-3). Plaintiff states that he is supported by his father. Id. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's affidavit of assets and finds it sufficient to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. The Court therefore grants the Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the case "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The standard used to evaluate whether a complaint should be dismissed is a liberal one, particularly when the action has been filed pro se. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). However, even a "liberal interpretation . . . may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
A complaint "is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact. [The] term 'frivolous,' when applied to the complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996). When determining whether a complaint is frivolous, the Court need not accept the factual allegations as true, but must "pierce the veil of the complaint," to determine if the allegations are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
Plaintiff named Deutsche Bank Trust Company, Ameriquest Mortgage, a private attorney in Massachusetts, the Temecula Police Department, an officer with the Riverside Police Department, and a lieutenant judge as defendants. (Doc. # 1 at 1). The complaint states that it is brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, is an action seeking to enforce public accessibility, is brought under RICO, is a police brutality suit, and is against predatory lenders. Id. The complaint further requests "Special Grand Jury Investigation and Indictments [Impeachment] for Violation and Obstruction of Proceeding of Legislative." Id. ...