ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 11, 2009, the undersigned ordered respondent to file a response to the petition. On May 6, 2009, respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims by presenting them first to the highest state court. Petitioner has filed an opposition as well as a supplemental opposition to the motion. Respondent has not filed a reply.*fn1
On August 2, 2006, petitioner received a Rules Violation Report ("RVR"), Log #S1-06-07-0393, charging him with Distribution/Controlled Substance. On October 18, 2006, the Senior Hearing Officer in charge found him guilty of that disciplinary charge and assessed him 180-days loss of credits. In his pending habeas petition, petitioner claims, inter alia, that prison officials denied him due process in connection with his prison disciplinary proceedings. (Pet. at 5-6, Pet'r's Brief in Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3-19, Exs. C & D.)
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Respondent has moved to dismiss the pending petition, arguing that petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims in state court as required. Specifically, respondent argues that the California Supreme Court never reached the merits of petitioner's claims as evidenced by its citation to the decisions in In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) and People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (2005) in its order denying the state habeas petition. According to respondent, the cited cases stand for the proposition that a petitioner is required to plead with particularity the facts upon which he bases his request for relief. Respondent argues that the California Supreme Court's citation to these cases indicates that petitioner failed to provide sufficient facts to support his request for relief in his petition filed with that court. Accordingly, respondent concludes that petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies. (Resp't's Mot. to Dismiss at 2-4 & Ex. 1.)
II. Petitioner's Opposition
In opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss, petitioner argues that he has presented his claims to the California Supreme Court, thereby satisfying the exhaustion requirement. In addition, petitioner argues that he is proceeding pro se and the court must therefore construe his pleadings liberally and afford him any benefit of the doubt. (Pet'r's Opp'n to Resp't's Mot. to Dismiss at 2 & Exs. A-C.) Finally, petitioner appears to argue that, if a state court's order denying habeas corpus relief is ambiguous, the order is inadequate in and of itself to restrict federal habeas corpus review. (Pet'r's Supp. Opp'n to Resp't's Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)
I. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
State courts must be given the first opportunity to consider and address a state prisoner's habeas corpus claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)); King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Habeas petitioners have long been required to adjudicate their claims in state court - that is, 'exhaust' them - before seeking relief in federal court."); Farmer v. Baldwin, 497 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) ("This so-called 'exhaustion requirement' is intended to afford 'the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error' before a federal habeas court may review a prisoner's claims.") (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986)). In general, a federal court will not grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus unless "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A state will not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).
A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting to the highest state court all federal claims before presenting the claims to the federal court. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the federal legal theory upon which his claim is based. See Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1025 ("Fair presentation requires that a state's highest court has 'a fair opportunity to consider... and to correct [the] asserted constitutional defect.'"); Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) (same) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 276)); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Bland v. California Dep't of Corrs., 20 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the court finds that petitioner has fairly presented his federal claims to the California Supreme Court. Specifically, the petition filed by petitioner with the California Supreme Court contains the same claims, legal theories, and alleged operative facts as his federal petition pending before this court. In fact, petitioner incorporates a copy of his claims and arguments presented to the California Supreme Court as part of his federal petition. He also attached to his California Supreme Court petition the same supporting documents that he has attached to his ...