The opinion of the court was delivered by: William Q. Hayes United States District Judge
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)
On May 1, 2009, Peter Romero Lomax, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, submitted a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. See July 17, 2009 Order at 6-7.
Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court's July 17th Order. Id. at 7. Plaintiff then requested additional time to file his amended pleading. On December 7, 2009, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") [Doc. No. 13].
II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)
As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds "frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim).
Before its amendment by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur "before service of process is made on the opposing parties").
"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) "parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se's pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is "particularly important in civil rights cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
As currently pleaded, the Court finds that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need
Plaintiff alleges that he was first examined in July of 2007 for a "growth of some kind that was on his buttocks." (FAC at 9.) Plaintiff claims that a request for an ultrasound of the growth by an unnamed doctor was denied by the Medical Authorization Review ("MAR") Committee and Nurse Tyler. (Id.) Two months later, Defendant Lehv submitted another request for an ultrasound of the ground. (Id. at 10.) A few days later an ultrasound was performed which confirmed that the growth was a lipoma.*fn1 (Id.)
Defendant Canlas then submitted a request for surgery to remove the lipoma on October 1, 2007. (Id.) On December 28, 2007, Defendant Farinas examined Plaintiff and found that the lipoma had grown from approximately three centimeters in diameter to six centimeters in diameter. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Whitehead that he was "getting scared" because the lipoma was growing but he claims that Defendant Whitehead told him that it would take thirty to sixty days to schedule the surgery. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff then claims that he told Defendants Lehv, Farinas and Whitehead that he was experiencing a lot of pain and had trouble walking due to the lipoma. (Id.) Plaintiff received the surgery on June 11, 2008. (Id. at 14.)
In order to assert a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must allege facts which are sufficient to show that each person sued was "deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Prison officials must purposefully ignore ...