The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dean D. Pregerson United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND EXPUNGING LIS PENDENS
[Motion filed on November 20, 2009]
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") filed by the Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and Recontrust Company, N.A. ("Defendants"). After reviewing the materials submitted by the parties and considering the arguments therein, the Court grants the motion and adopts the following Order.
This lawsuit, filed by the plaintiff Ruth Matudio ("Plaintiff"), alleges state and federal causes of action arising from a residential mortgage transaction.
On July 20, 2009, the Court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Defendants. (Order, Dkt. No. 15.) The Court dismissed (1) Plaintiff's damages claim under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., as time-barred; (2) Plaintiff's claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)-(f), for failure to state a claim; and (3) Plaintiff's quiet title claim for failure to state a claim under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020. The Court declined to dismiss Plaintiff's rescission claim under TILA based on the arguments presented by Defendants and therefore declined to dismiss Plaintiff's California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") claim premised on that violation, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. In addition, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
On November 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed the FAC. In the FAC, Plaintiff pleads five causes of action: (1) rescission under TILA and Regulation Z; (2) damages under TILA; (3) violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a); (4)violations of the FDCPA; and (5) a UCL claim for unfair and unlawful business practices.
II. PROCEDURAL STANDARD: RULE 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to dismissal when the Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "all allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 433, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that a court considering a 12(b)(6) motion should first "identify pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."
Id. Next, the court should identify the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations, . . . assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."
Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief" (internal quotation marks omitted)).