The opinion of the court was delivered by: Andrew J. Wistrich United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the decision of defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits. The parties have filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS") setting forth their contentions with respect to each disputed issue.
The parties are familiar with the procedural facts, which are summarized in the Joint Stipulation. [See JS 2]. In a written hearing decision that constitutes the Commissioner's final decision in this matter, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that through December 31, 2007, plaintiff's date last insured, plaintiff had no severe physical impairments, and a severe mental impairment in the form of an affective mood disorder. [Administrative Record ("AR") 8-17; JS 2]. The ALJ further found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") through his date last insured to perform work at all exertional levels involving no more than simple, repetitive tasks with no public interaction. [AR 12]. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff's RFC precluded performance of his past relevant work, but that plaintiff could perform alternative jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy, such as the jobs of production assembly worker and small products assembler. [JS 2; AR16-17].
The Commissioner's denial of benefits should be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Stout v. Comm'r Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). "It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks omitted). The court is required to review the record as a whole and to consider evidence detracting from the decision as well as evidence supporting the decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999)).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed properly to evaluate the opinion of Dr. Divy Kikani, a consultative physician, and therefore that the ALJ's RFC finding is defective. [See JS 5-12].
Dr. Kikani, a board-eligible psychiatrist, evaluated plaintiff in July 2006. Plaintiff was 57 years old at the time of the examination. Dr. Kikani elicited a history, reviewed medical records, and conducted a mental status examination. [AR 160-163].
Plaintiff told Dr. Kikani that he was in chronic pain due to prostate cancer, which plaintiff believed had spread to his back.*fn1 Dr. Kikani noted that plaintiff reported having symptoms of depression and anxiety for the past 5 to 7 years. Plaintiff said that he was not taking medication or undergoing treatment. His primary care physician at the Veterans' Administration ("VA") Hospital had prescribed Paxil and Elavil in the past, but plaintiff said he was not taking those medications. Dr. Kikani commented that plaintiff indicated that he stopped taking those medications because they "knocked him out." [AR 160].
On mental status examination, plaintiff's grooming, appearance, and behavior were unremarkable. Plaintiff's speech was normal. His thought processes were clear, coherent, and goal-directed. His thought content reflected a preoccupation with despair, chronic pain, inability to work in his former capacity, and inability to attend to his activities of daily living due to prostate cancer. Plaintiff reported "having flashbacks of the Vietnam War," but "on specific questioning," plaintiff denied symptoms of thought disorder, perceptual disturbances, prominent delusions, prominent manic symptoms, and any active suicidal or homicidal ideation. [AR 162]. Plaintiff was oriented in all spheres. His recent and remote memory was intact. His general fund of knowledge, abstracting ability, and judgment were fair. Plaintiff's insight into his current psychiatric problems was impaired. [AR 162].
Dr. Kikani's impression was mood disorder, currently depressed type, secondary to medical condition, and rule out mood disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. Kikani assigned plaintiff a Global Assessment of Function ("GAF") score of 55.*fn2 [AR 162]. In a narrative assessment, Dr. Kikani said that plaintiff's symptoms "are primarily and secondarily due to" his medical condition and chronic pain complaints. [AR 162-163]. Dr. Kikani concluded that plaintiff had "mild to moderate impairment" in social functioning; activities of daily living; and concentration, persistence, and pace. Dr. Kikani added that plaintiff "may have mild to moderate" difficulty remembering, understanding, and carrying out complex instructions; persisting at normal work situations under customary work pressure; coping with changes in routine work settings; and responding appropriately to usual work situations, attendance, and safety. [AR 163]. Plaintiff "does show mild to moderate difficulty" responding appropriately to co-workers, supervisors, and the public. [AR 163]. He "may be expected to show mild to moderate episodes of emotional deterioration" in normal work situations under customary work pressure. [AR 163]. Plaintiff had no impairment in remembering, understanding, and carrying out simple instructions. [AR 163]. Overall, Dr. Kikani found that plaintiff was "mildly to moderately psychiatrically disabled from the underlying psychiatric condition," which in Dr. Kikani's opinion was "in reaction to, or secondary to, [the] underlying medical condition." [AR 163]. Plaintiff's prognosis was "fair under structured outpatient psychiatric treatment, both with medications and psychotherapy." [AR 163].
In general, "[t]he opinions of treating doctors should be given more weight than the opinions of doctors who do not treat the claimant." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527(d)(2), 416.902, 416.927(d)(2). An examining physician's opinion, in turn, generally is afforded more weight than a non-examining physician's opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831 (9th Cir. 1995). If contradicted by the opinion of another doctor, a treating or examining physician's opinion can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons that are based on substantial evidence in the record. Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148-1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester, 81 F.3d at ...