The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gregory G. Hollows United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff's motion for entry of default judgment against defendant Paul Coleman & Associates, P.C. ("defendant"), filed May 29, 2009, was submitted on the record. Local Rule 230(h). Also before the court is plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, filed May 29, 2009. Upon review of the motion and the supporting documents, and good cause appearing, the court issues the following findings and recommendations.
On August 8, 2008, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint in this action against defendant, alleging defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") (15 U.S.C. § 1692) and plaintiff's right to privacy under state law by their harassing phone calls and threats to garnish his wages, causing him multiple medical and emotional problems as a result of the stress. The summons and complaint were personally served on defendant on December 5, 2008. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1985) (default judgment void without personal jurisdiction). Defendant has failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in this action. On January 8, 2009, the clerk entered default against defendant Paul Coleman & Associates, P.C.
Request for entry of default and the instant motion for default judgment and supporting papers were served by mail on defendant at its last known address. Defendant filed no opposition to the motion for entry of default judgment. Plaintiff seeks default judgment in the amount of $26,000.00. Plaintiff also has moved for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $5,700.00.
Entry of default effects an admission of all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint by the defaulted party. Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1977). The court finds the well pleaded allegations of the complaint state a claim for which relief can be granted. Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1976). The memorandum of points and authorities and affidavits filed in support of the motion for entry of default judgment also support the finding that plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested. There are no policy considerations which preclude the entry of default judgment of the type requested. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986).
Courts generally disfavor default judgments, however, especially those involving large sums. See In Re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875, 879 (9th Cir.1993);10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d § 2681. "The general rule of law is that upon default factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to amount of damages, will be taken as true." Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 8(d), 55(b)) (emphasis added); see also Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.2002) (same).
Granting or denying default judgment is discretionary. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir.1986). Several factors may be relevant. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986).*fn1
"A judgment by default may not be entered without a hearing on damages unless ... the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits." Dundee Cement, 722 F.2d at 1323 (citing Geddes); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.1981) (no hearing necessary when documents show judgment amount based on a definite figure); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (the district court has the discretion to conduct or refuse a hearing on default judgment). A hearing on the issue of damages is not required as long as the court finds there is a basis for the damages specified. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997). Affidavits or other documentary evidence is sufficient to evaluate the fairness of the amount requested. Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff seeks $1,000 pursuant to § 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the FDCPA.
The FDCPA provides for damages of up to $1,000, and provides for factors to be considered by the court, including "the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); (b)(1). Statutory damages are limited to $1,000 per action. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (limiting statutory damages to "one set of circumstances"); Nelson v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 522 F. Supp.2d 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (limiting statutory damages to "$1,000 per lawsuit, not $1,000 per violation"). The statute itself provides that "in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000 ..." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
Plaintiff's request for $1,000 in statutory damages under the FDCPA is supported by the allegations of plaintiff's ...