The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rosalyn M. Chapman United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Steven McInnis filed a complaint on November 24, 2009, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability benefits. On April 20, 2009, the Commissioner answered the complaint, and the parties filed a joint stipulation on July 2, 2009.
On January 30, 2006, plaintiff, who was born December 12, 1962, applied for disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income program ("SSI") of Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), claiming an inability to work since September 14, 1999, due to back, left shoulder and right thumb pain, an "exploding" ulcer, a hole in his intestine, and three "fractured toes that will not heal." Certified Administrative Record ("A.R.") 77-80, 90, 101. The plaintiff's application was initially denied on May, 2006, and was denied again on February 8, 2007, following reconsideration. A.R. 41-52. The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge Jay E. Levine ("the ALJ") on January 9, 2008. A.R. 18-38, 53. On February 28, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff is not disabled. A.R. 5-17. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review on September 15, 2008. A.R. 1-4.
The Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), has the authority to review the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff disability benefits to determine if his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards in reaching his decision. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). "In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, [this Court] must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). "Where the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the decision, [this Court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner." Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1068 (2008); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591.
The claimant is "disabled" for the purpose of receiving benefits under the Act if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to an impairment which has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). "The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability." Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process for the ALJ to follow in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting him from performing basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to perform his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If not, in Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Moreover, where there is evidence of a mental impairment that may prevent a claimant from working, the Commissioner has supplemented the five-step sequential evaluation process with additional regulations addressing mental impairments.*fn1 Maier v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 154 F.3d 913, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date. (Step One). The ALJ then found plaintiff has the following severe impairments: "degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, a learning disorder in language and reading, status post[-]fractured foot and left thumb" (Step Two); however, he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a Listing. (Step Three). The ALJ next determined plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work as a combat signaler in the military or a warehouse worker. (Step Four). Finally, the ALJ determined plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy; therefore, he is not disabled. (Step Five).
A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is what he can still do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other limitations. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Valentine v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009) (RFC is "a summary of what the claimant is capable of doing (for example, how much weight he can lift)."). Here, the ALJ found plaintiff has the RFC:
to perform sedentary work[*fn2 ] . . . except he cannot work at unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery. He cannot work on uneven ground or with vibrating tools/ equipment. He can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He cannot do forceful gripping or grasping and can occasionally lift above shoulder level. Mentally, the [plaintiff] can perform entry level work.
A.R. 11 (footnote added). However, plaintiff contends the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of examining psychologist David C. Anderson, Ph.D., nonexamining physician Ann ...